Seven out of every 10 jobs created were in the informal sector

El Economista

By Evelyn Machuca

Translated by Martin Mowforth

25 November 2022

Key words: CEPAL; jobs; informal sector.

 

Unemployment levels in 2022 represent a set-back of 22 years with women especially badly affected, according to CEPAL (the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). The majority of new jobs were created in the informal sector.

Seven out of every ten jobs that were created in the post-pandemic era were set up in the informal sector, according to the report ‘Social Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022: the transformation of education as a base for sustainable development’, presented in November by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL by its Spanish initials).

Although for 2021 income inequality (measured by the Gini Coefficient) was slightly lower for Latin America than it was in 2020 – measured at 0.458, around the same level as for 2019 – “the word ‘slightly’ has to be emphasised” said the Executive Secretary of the UN organisation, José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs.

On the other hand, the unemployment level projected for 2022 represents a retrograde step of 22 years, especially affecting women for whom unemployment rose from 9.5 per cent in 2019 to 11.6 per cent in 2022.

“The impacts of the pandemic in terms of poverty and extreme poverty have not been reversed and countries are facing a silent crisis in education which affects the future of the new generations,” warned the UN official. He called on countries to make decisive investments in education and to convert this crisis into an opportunity to transform education.

Data collected for the report also showed that the percentage of youths aged 18-24 who neither studied nor worked increased from 22.3 per cent in 2019 to 28.7 per cent in 2020, this involving especially young women, 36 per cent of whom found themselves in this situation compared with 22 per cent of men of the same age.

CEPAL predicts that by the end of this year, 201 million people (32.1 per cent of Latin America’s total population) will live in poverty and 82 million (13.1 per cent of the population) will live in extreme poverty.

The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)

The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is a global network of investigative journalists specialising in crime and corruption. It publishes its reports in English and Russian and its website is at: https://www.occrp.org  On 31st October the OCCRP released a report on The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The full report can be found at: https://www.occrp.org/en/the-dictators-bank/the-dictators-bank-how-central-americas-main-development-bank-enabled-corruption-and-authoritarianism , but a summary of the key points and the report’s introduction are given here for The Violence of Development website. OCCRP credits are given as follows.

 

Credit: James O’Brien/OCCRP

by Eli Moskowitz (OCCRP), Jonny Wrate (OCCRP), Madeline Fixler (Columbia Journalism Investigations), Bill Barreto (No Ficción), Ernesto Rivera (Lado B), Daniel Valencia (Redacción Regional), Andrew Little (Columbia Journalism Investigations), and Mariana Castro (Columbia Journalism Investigations). Data by Romina Colman (OCCRP). Research by Angus Peacock (OCCRP)

31 October 2023

 

The Central American Bank for Economic Integration was created (in 2006) to give the region more control over its own development, but a new investigation by OCCRP and partners raises questions about the bank’s lending practices.

Key Findings

  • CABEI has funded major infrastructure projects that have later been engulfed in scandal, where its loans were used to pay bribes, or seen as an easy source of cash by alleged conspirators.
  • Internal audits obtained by reporters show the bank has ignored red flags when investing in projects, including lending money for hydroelectric dams even after violent crackdowns on protesters.
  • In recent years the bank has begun giving out policy-based loans, a few-strings-attached type of financing that critics say is easily misused.
  • In El Salvador, reporters found $200 million of one CABEI loan designed to support small businesses through the pandemic was diverted to fund the country’s ill-fated plan to make Bitcoin a national currency.
  • CABEI has faced criticism for lending billions of dollars to Central America’s authoritarian governments, providing an important source of funding for the region’s authoritarian leaders as they committed widespread human rights abuses.
  • Late in 2021, nine of CABEI’s directors wrote a letter warning of the bank’s worsening financial situation and raising transparency concerns. Financial statements show these indicators have declined since then.

In mid-November, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) will appoint a new executive president for the next five years. Whoever takes the helm of the region’s main investment bank does so at a key moment in its history.

While only a small player compared to global institutions like the World Bank, CABEI plays a vital role in channeling billions of dollars into its five founding states: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. The bank says it accounts for close to half the development finance in Central America, one of the poorest parts of the Western hemisphere.

CABEI played a critical role during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the bank gave over a billion dollars in loans and grants to keep its founders afloat. With all of these states’ sovereign bonds rated as “junk,” CABEI has become a lifeline to international financial markets — and a key source of funding for the region’s authoritarian leaders.

“It doesn’t matter what the politics are as long as poor people are getting services,” the bank’s outgoing president, Dante Mossi, said at an event in Washington, D.C., this year, as he faced criticism for providing funding to Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega.

“The bank is not a political model,” Mossi told the assembled crowd.

Others disagree.

CABEI has been criticized for giving billions of dollars to Central America’s authoritarian regimes — led by Ortega, President Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, and the former president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández. Now an investigation by OCCRP and partners can show the bank has funded projects that led to environmental destruction, and others where loans were diverted for corrupt practices or used to fund the pet projects of dictators.

Reporters spent more than a year investigating CABEI, combining open-source data with official investigations, leaked documents, and interviews with current and former bank employees. To get a clearer picture of the bank’s track record, reporters also compiled a database of more than 500 approved operations from the past quarter century. Together, they show how CABEI’s failures have enabled waste and corruption in one of the most unequal regions on Earth.

Investor-State Dispute Settlements

Environment and development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) slowly began to grasp the purpose and significance of the International Court for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) from around the turn of the century. In 2010, the effects of the findings and judgements of the World Bank court upon local communities and environments became particularly clear with the case of Pacific Rim (now Oceana Gold) against the state of El Salvador and specifically the department of Cabañas and the area around the town of San Isidro. In that particular case, several years later, the state of El Salvador won one of the few victories against a transnational mining corporation that ICSID has awarded, although the threat of land takeover and pollution from mining remains present in the country.

As time moved on, the significant threats to environments and communities of these unelected World Bank tribunals that in essence represent transnational corporations in their pursuit of profit became even clearer. They frequently make judgements that allow the corporations to pursue financial gain regardless of the communities and environments that they wish to exploit. It has been a classic case of poor people providing profits for rich transnational corporations, as a report by Martin Mowforth in the January 2012 Central America Report suggested with the headline: ‘The Perpetrator Who Sues The Victim: Pacific Rim Mining Company v El Salvador’. See all the articles under the section on El Salvador in Chapter 5 of this website: https://theviolenceofdevelopment.com/chapter-5-mining/  As the organisation Trade Justice has made clear:

 

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a mechanism written into many older trade and investment agreements that allows individual corporations to challenge laws, regulations, permitting decisions and even court decisions that they view as a violation of their supposed trade agreement rights.

Very recently in interview with Ed Boles in Belize, ENCA member Liz Richmond recorded his words about their battle with Vulcan Materials:

… there is the 1.5 billion dollar lawsuit Vulcan won against Mexico because that Government refused to renew their mining permit due to the incredible environmental damage they have done just south of Playa del Carmen, and that is just one of three lawsuits they have filed against Mexico. The Belize Government is well aware of this and can look down the road, realizing that eventually Vulcan would operate very similarly in Belize, challenging our environmental laws and suing Belize if we took action against them, and even leveraging US Congress to take action against Belize, as they have done with Mexico. We cannot even afford to fight the case in international court, let alone pay billions should we come out on the bottom

And even more recently, Hélionor de Anzizu of the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) produced a guide to ISDS cases. We are grateful to Hélionor and to CIEL for their permission to reproduce their guide to Investor-State Dispute Settlements below. (https://www.ciel.org )

 

By Hélionor de Anzizu (Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL))

1st April 2024

As the impacts of the climate crisis worsen and the world moves away from fossil fuels, oil and gas companies are turning to little-known trade and investment agreements to extort governments into maintaining their reliance on fossil fuels. These court proceedings, called Investor-State Dispute Settlement cases, or ISDS cases, are a mechanism through which fossil fuel companies can sue countries that take measures to phase out fossil fuels, claiming that such measures damage their ability to make profits.

The cases are undertaken in closed-door proceedings, and companies seek extreme settlement costs—often in the billions of dollars— even for projects that have yet to break ground. The prospect of an ISDS case has a chilling effect on government officials who may want to act in the public interest to phase out fossil fuels but are scared of expensive judgements.

That’s why CIEL seeks to end ISDS in trade and investment agreements. To accelerate the end of ISDS, CIEL just released a toolkit that helps government officials consider ways to exit investor agreements with fossil fuel companies without litigation or settlement payments. Here’s a quick overview on our new ISDS toolkit:

Q: What is ISDS?

  • Fossil fuel companies invest in countries that promise to protect their foreign investments.
  • When a State enacts measures that a company perceives will affect its profits, the company may use a mechanism to settle and negotiate the dispute, called ISDS.
  • ISDS claims often involve huge costs and can award companies millions or billions of taxpayer dollars from the country.
  • Most ISDS cases related to environmental, climate change, or human rights measures often fail to properly consider or uphold the responsibilities and obligations of the State involved

Q: How does ISDS work?

  • The cases happen behind closed doors and most of the time do not allow the public to listen or participate.
  • CIEL has long fought for the right of affected third parties to submit expert opinions, called amicus curiae submissions, or send additional documents to the court, but they are rarely accepted.

Q: Why are so many States willingly entering into investor agreements?

  • For many States with lower GDPs, investor agreements are considered a way to attract capital investment in their economy, especially for countries with political instability.
  • There has not been enough work to shift States away from making foreign investment deals, nor enough viable alternatives for countries to avoid making these deals.

Q: What is the ISDS toolkit?

  • A recent IPCC report stated ISDS is a legal barrier to States pursuing real climate action.
  • Some State leaders who want to take progressive climate action but are concerned about getting hit with an ISDS suit, have appealed to CIEL for guidance.
  • CIEL’s toolkit is designed to help State officials and UN representatives navigate the different options that can eliminate ISDS risks or mitigate ISDS risks or respond to an ISDS if it arises.
  • This toolkit is not intended to be comprehensive or exhaustive, but instead offers a sample of possible approaches States may pursue in the face of ISDS threats, though the unique circumstances and the timeline of ISDS-related risks will vary.
  • What is clear and uniformly applicable, however, is that investment law must not impede urgently needed climate action.

Q: How does CIEL interact with the ISDS system?

  • We educate State representatives, partner organisations, and frontline community members to use the toolkit to inform their advocacy for phasing out fossil fuels in their countries.
  • Our ISDS toolkit is being rolled out to lawyers and environmental advocates to clarify the scale of the problem, provide solutions or alternatives to ISDS, and expose how ISDS is a barrier to real climate action.
  • We have also worked with frontline communities and local partner organisations who have successfully stopped extractive projects, but then run into an ISDS case that undermines their progress. CIEL helps to change their challenges into legal terms that can be used in court.

Q: How does ISDS impact me?

  • Many environmental activists encounter ISDS only after years of organising and finally achieving a monumental win. Or, they encounter it when pushing their country to stop a pipeline, offshore drilling, petrochemical plant, or extractive project, and the country fears ISDS to such a degree that it is unwilling to stop the project.
  • This kit provides information you can share with your government officials to stop fossil fuel expansion and investments while avoiding or neutralizing ISDS risks.

ISDS should not slow down States’ rapid phase out of fossil fuels.

Our new toolkit sheds light on foreign fossil fuel investments and provides a clear path for States to take action and disentangle from these investment agreements. CIEL’s new toolkit gives hope for a greener future for countries whose economies are currently deeply entrenched with fossil fuels— it is possible for countries to get out of ISDS, phase out fossil fuels, and move towards renewable energy sources.

With hope for the future,

Hélionor De Anzizu
Staff Attorney
Environmental Health Program
Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL)

Further Reading:
CIEL’s ISDS toolkit
Overview of ISDS

 

Highway Robbery: How Bad Trade Policies Make Life Unaffordable

A lawsuit over toll booths in Honduras shows how corporate trade policies make life unlivable in poor countries — and send people fleeing north.

By: Jen Moore & Karen Spring

October 3, 2024

https://otherwords.org/highway-robbery-how-bad-trade-policies-make-life-unaffordable/
Jen Moore is an associate fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies. Karen Spring is the Tegucigalpa-based coordinator for the Honduras Solidarity Network. They are co-authors of the new report ‘The Corporate Assault on Honduras’. This op-ed was distributed by otherwords.org . Other Words is a free editorial service published by the Institute for Policy Studies. We are grateful to Jen, Karen and OtherWords for their permission to include their summary article in this website.

************

Many of us know the pain of paying steep tolls, especially when a turnpike is taken over by a private company.

Now imagine you live in one of our hemisphere’s most impoverished countries. Do that and you’ll get a glimpse into how unfair trade deals help make life unlivable in many countries — and force countless people to seek a living in countries like the United States.

When a private company suddenly put up toll booths in the middle of a taxpayer-funded highway, local residents in El Progreso, Honduras were furious.

They knew the new fees would also hike the price of food, bus fares, and their daily commutes — and that making it in their country, where roughly half of the population lives below the poverty line, was going to become unbearable.

So local businesses and residents joined forces to stop the company from charging fees. For 421 days, starting in 2016, the Angry Citizens Movement stood night and day — even on weekends and holidays — at the ‘Camp for Dignity’ along the highway. With handwritten signs and chants, they urged their neighbours not to pay. Even after facing tear gas, police repression, and threats, the movement persisted and expanded.

Eventually, they won — but not without consequences.

At the end of 2017, with the 24-hour camp still in place, the U.S.-backed President Juan Orlando Hernández managed to get reelected, even though presidential reelection is illegal in Honduras and there was widespread evidence of fraud. Mass protests lasted for weeks and the toll booths were burned. The company’s contract was finally cancelled in 2018 amid accusations of corruption.

Now, the private toll booth operator — backed by big U.S. banks, including JP Morgan Chase Bank and two Goldman Sachs funds — is suing Honduras through a process called international arbitration. They’re claiming $180 million, more than four times what the company reportedly invested.

It doesn’t matter that the project lacked public support, that the government institution that negotiated the contract was shut down under a cloud of corruption, or that now former President Hernández, who struck the highway deal, was convicted in the U.S. for drug trafficking earlier this year. What matters is the profit.

Lawsuits like these are only possible because of exclusive privileges for foreign investors found in many international trade agreements, investment laws, and contracts like this one. Under this ‘Investor State Dispute Settlement’ system, foreign investors can sue governments for losses and future claimed profits over decisions they believe affect them.

Currently, Honduras faces at least $14 billion in claims from foreign and domestic corporations. That’s equivalent to roughly 40 percent of the country’s GDP in 2023 and nearly four times its public investment budget for 2024.

In our new study into this avalanche of claims, we found that the majority of investors are revolting against Honduran efforts to reverse or renegotiate corrupt deals struck under Hernández, which were often damaging to the public interest and local communities.

And if these investors succeed, the economic burden on the country will only deepen the displacement crisis driving Hondurans to migrate north.

The blatant injustice of these corporate claims is increasingly recognized at the international level. The former UN Special Rapporteur for human rights and environment, David Boyd, has called them “a catastrophe for development.” Notably, the U.S. recently removed these corporate privileges in its trade relations with Canada.

Now it’s time for the U.S. to end these privileges in its other trade agreements including with Central America — and not sign any more that include them. That would be a good first step toward respecting the efforts of Hondurans and all people to live and prosper in their own countries.

 

Institute for Policy Studies and Transnational Institute, 3 October 2024, ‘The Corporate Assault on Honduras’, by Luciana Ghiotto, Jen Moore, Aldo Orellana López, Karen Spring, Manuel Pérez-Rocha

Why is El Salvador turning away from Bitcoin?

By Doug Specht

Published by Geographical Magazine

El Salvador made headlines in 2021 when it became the first country in the world to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender. This bold move, spearheaded by President Nayib Bukele, was seen as a groundbreaking experiment in cryptocurrency adoption at a national level. However, recent developments suggest that the Central American nation is now taking a more cautious approach to its cryptocurrency policies.

When El Salvador first embraced Bitcoin, President Bukele presented it as a solution to several economic challenges. El Salvador was seeking to reduce dependency on the US dollar, while also facilitating easier remittances from Salvadorans abroad. Bukele also saw Bitcoin as a way to boost the country’s GDP through cryptocurrency investments.

From a more personal perspective, Bukele, who is known for his tech-savvy image and social media presence, saw this move as a way to position El Salvador at the forefront of financial innovation.

However, in February 2025, El Salvador began dialling back its ambitious Bitcoin policies, implementing significant changes to its cryptocurrency law. Shopkeepers are no longer obliged to accept Bitcoin alongside the US dollar; instead, businesses can now choose whether to embrace digital coins or stick to traditional currency. This voluntary approach marks a stark departure from the government’s initial enthusiasm for widespread Bitcoin adoption.

Plans for wholesale adoption have also been pushed back by Bitcoin’s status being downgraded – it has lost its designation as a ‘currency’, although retaining its position as legal tender. Moreover, the digital asset can no longer be used to settle tax bills or government debts, further limiting its practical applications.

The reason for this change would appear to be the influence of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With El Salvador seeking a hefty £1.4 billion loan, the IMF’s weight has proven pivotal. The lending giant had long expressed concerns about the fiscal risks associated with El Salvador’s crypto-friendly stance and has taken the opportunity to curtail its use. This intervention is unlikely to have a direct impact on the majority of the population as adoption of bitcoin remains low. A recent survey revealed that 92 per cent of Salvadorans didn’t use Bitcoin for transactions in 2024, highlighting the gap between governmental ambition and public uptake.

Despite these changes and challenges, President Nayib Bukele’s government continues to stockpile the cryptocurrency, recently adding 52 Bitcoin to the national coffers. With a total of 6,055 Bitcoin in reserve, El Salvador hasn’t given up on its digital asset strategy entirely. As the country navigates this cryptocurrency crossroads, the world watches with keen interest.

El Salvador’s experiment offers valuable insights into the complexities of integrating digital currencies into national economies. While the dream of a Bitcoin-powered economy may have been deferred, it’s clear that its crypto journey is far from over.

Cryptocurrency around the world

Many nations have been watching Bukele’s experiment closely, assessing whether the potential benefits of cryptocurrency adoption outweigh the inherent risks. El Salvador’s journey has illuminated the complex challenges and varied approaches that countries are taking toward digital currencies.

The Central African Republic (CAR) followed El Salvador’s lead in 2022, venturing into uncharted territory by also making Bitcoin legal tender. However, the CAR’s experience highlights the significant obstacles faced by nations with limited infrastructure. With low rates of internet penetration and a population largely unversed in digital finance, the CAR’s attempt to integrate Bitcoin has been fraught with difficulties, raising questions about the practicality of such policies.

Beyond these two trailblazers, several other nations have expressed an interest in cryptocurrencies, albeit without fully embracing them as legal tender. Countries like Cuba and Venezuela, grappling with economic sanctions and seeking to circumvent traditional financial systems, have explored the potential of cryptocurrencies to bypass restrictions and facilitate international transactions. However, their approaches have been more cautious, focusing on the use of cryptocurrencies for specific purposes rather than wholesale adoption.

Conversely, a significant number of countries have adopted a far more restrictive stance on cryptocurrencies. Economic powerhouses such as China and India have implemented stringent regulations, heavily curtailing the use of digital currencies within their borders. These nations cite concerns about financial stability, money laundering, and the potential for cryptocurrencies to undermine state control over monetary policy. Having said that, there have been suggestions that both countries may be looking to open their crypto markets.

In the US, cryptocurrencies seem to have become a rite of passage for every influencer and social media star, with most of the world’s 1,882 currencies launched in 2024 being done by Americans. Even the inauguration of Donald Trump was awash with conversation about the launch of $Trump, a meme-based coin that encouraged investors with the prospect that its value would rise significantly following Trump’s swearing-in. In a typically contractionary way, Trump has also expressed scepticism towards cryptocurrencies, often voicing concerns about their potential to undermine the dominance of the US dollar and their role in illicit activities.

The diverse range of approaches highlights the lack of a unified global consensus on cryptocurrencies. Each nation is weighing the potential benefits against its own unique economic circumstances, regulatory frameworks, and geopolitical considerations. As El Salvador continues to navigate its cryptocurrency crossroads, the world watches with keen interest, seeking to glean valuable insights from its successes and failures.

The future of digital currencies in the global economy remains uncertain, but El Salvador’s experiment has served as a timely reminder of the broader crypto landscape: a volatile and often murky space where hype and misinformation can easily cloud the truth. The proliferation of unofficial coins and tokens, often capitalising on popular figures or current events, highlights the need for caution and critical thinking when navigating the world of digital assets.

El Salvador’s experience serves as a crucial case study. It demonstrates that while cryptocurrencies may offer innovative solutions to economic challenges, their integration requires careful consideration of practical, regulatory, and social factors.

Highlights of the trade pillar of the Association Agreement between Central America and the European Union

Mariah Jen 20 June 2011

The Association Agreement between the EU and Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama) marks an important step forward in the relationship between the two regions. The Parties have finalised the legal review of the Association Agreement which includes a comprehensive trade part. Once ratified, this agreement will open up markets on both sides, help establish a stable business and investment environment, increase benefits for citizens and will foster sustainable development. The Agreement is also meant to reinforce regional economic integration in Central America and the EU hopes for it to have a positive spill-over effect on the overall political integration process and contribute to the stability of the region. In 2010, bilateral trade in goods between Central America and the European Union was worth €12 billion.

Negotiations of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Central America were finalised in May 2010. The Agreement can enter into force once the legislative procedure involving the Council and the European Parliament has been concluded.

The Association Agreement consists of three pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and trade. The key elements of its trade pillar are presented below:

1. Substantially improved market access for EU exports to Central America

Tariff elimination – manufactured goods, fisheries and agriculture
The Agreement will largely eliminate tariffs for manufactured goods and fisheries with complete liberalisation at the end of the tariff phase-out period, generally within a ten-year period and with only a small amount (4 percent) of products after 15 years. Upon entry into force of the Agreement, Central America will liberalise 69% of its existing trade with the EU. Once the trade pillar of the Agreement is in force, EU exporters will save €87 million annually in customs duties.

In agriculture, tariffs on key agricultural products will be largely eliminated whilst “sensitive areas” for local markets are being respected. Panama, for example, is a main importer of European whiskeys to the region. 70% of its whiskey imports come from the EU and those will be liberalised on day one of the entry into force of the Agreement. All other Central American countries will liberalise this market after six years. Wine, another key product for the EU, will be fully liberalised at entry into force of the Agreement. EU exporters of wine and spirits can expect savings of €6 million annually in customs duties.

Tariffs on dairy products will be entirely eliminated with the exception of milk-powder and cheese, for which the EU has obtained duty-free quotas. These quotas cover the currently traded quantities and will be increased on an annual basis.

Addressing obstacles to trade in goods
Tariff elimination is only of real benefit if technical or procedural obstacles to trade are also being tackled. The proposed Agreement will ensure more transparency and better cooperation in the areas of “standards” and market surveillance. The agreed provisions go beyond the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The requirements for marking and permanent labelling have been simplified. The Parties agree to cooperate when drafting technical regulations, setting standards and establishing conformity assessments. Most importantly, the parties will promote the development of harmonised regulations and standards within each region with a view to facilitate the free movement of goods.

It has been agreed to move towards international standards in customs legislation and simplify their procedures. This will improve trading conditions, while at the same time maintain an effective customs control. Central America has not yet harmonised standards, but has agreed to promote the development of regional customs regulations. This will facilitate operations for traders and business both within and outside the region.

As regards sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) barriers, the Agreement also goes beyond WTO SPS requirements in key areas such as the regionalisation of animal diseases and pests, and the transparency of SPS import requirements and procedures. It includes other useful trade facilitation tools such as the listing of establishments, exports can come from. Further improvements, e.g. in the field of animal welfare have been agreed. These will help strengthen capacity building in the Central American countries and hence facilitate their market access.

Improved market access to government procurement, services and investment
The services and establishment commitments obtained from Central America are significant and meet the EU’s key interests in telecommunication, environmental, financial and maritime services. Further commitments cover cross-border services, investment and non-service sectors as well as key personnel, graduate trainees and business service sellers. The Agreement also liberalises current payments and capital movements between the Parties. These sectors will benefit from an easier access and possibilities to expand onto all markets of the Central American countries.

The opening of Central America’s public procurement market varies in terms of levels of liberalisation, with Costa Rica and Panama opening their markets more significantly than the other countries covered by the Agreement.

2. Common rules to level the playing field

Intellectual property rights & Geographical Indications
Protection of intellectual property rights is an important part of the Agreement. It includes a chapter on the effective protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property rights and other rights covered by the WTO Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS). As a result, EU rights holders will profit from improved procedures to defend their rights more effectively in case of infringements.

The Central American countries have adopted new or amended their legislation to incorporate regional specialities, so-called ‘Geographical Indications’ (GI) in a manner similar to the EU. Additionally, over 200 geographical indications, such as Champagne, Parma ham and Scotch whisky, are also specifically protected on the Central American markets to the benefit of producers of GI products in the EU.

The Agreement also makes specific reference to the importance of promoting access to medicines as well as protecting the biological diversity.

More competition and enhanced transparency on subsidies
Once the Agreement enters into force, it ensures a level playing field for European operators by calling upon national governments to ban all types of anticompetitive practices including restrictive agreements, cartels and abuse of dominance. This will help guarantee a fair and reliable competition environment for European companies.

In an effort to increase transparency particularly on subsidies, the EU and Central American countries will regularly report on the subsidies given to companies that trade in goods and also exchange information about matters related to subsidies in services. The Agreement goes beyond existing WTO rules in setting up a platform to discuss subsidies in the services sector.

A transparent way to settle trade disputes
The Trade pillar of the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America includes an efficient and streamlined dispute settlement system in accordance with the principles that the EU considers to be most important such as transparency (open hearings and amicus curiae briefs) and sequencing (no right to impose retaliation until such time as non-compliance is verified). A mediation mechanism for non-tariff barriers is also foreseen.

3. Regional Integration

The Agreement responds to Central America’s commitment to strengthen regional economic integration in the region and thus facilitate the movement of EU goods within Central America. Regional rather than “national” regulations and using a single administrative document for customs declarations will considerably ease the administrative burden on European exporters. Customs procedures as well as customs itself are going to be harmonized. Eliminating double duties over time, an importer will have to pay a single duty for the region rather than at each country’s borders. The transition period for this elimination is 2 years.

Regional integration will also help reduce the current regulatory divergences between Central American countries in the services sectors, including maritime transport. Dairy products and processed pig products, for example, will see a harmonisation of sanitary and phytosanitary requirements within the region in the coming years so as to facilitate the free movement of goods in the region.

4. An agreement for sustainable development

Further economic development through trade
Thanks to this Agreement Central American countries will benefit from liberalised access to the European markets in numerous sectors. This entails important economic and social benefits in Central America with gains in national income for Central America as a whole expected to amount at € 2.6 billion. The change in national income is estimated to vary from 0.5% in Nicaragua to 3.5% for Costa Rica in the long run due to the Agreement. In addition, the Agreement is expected to have an overall poverty-reducing effect across the Central American region.

According to an independent Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment commissioned by the EU, the Agreement is expected to contribute to large sectoral gains in the fruits, vegetables, and nuts (FVN) sector, especially for Panama and Costa Rica. Guatemala and Nicaragua are expected to become more competitive in the textiles and clothing sector for example, while El Salvador and Honduras will see an increase in their export of transport equipment.

By granting Central American countries immediate and fully liberalised access to European markets in industrial goods and fisheries, the Agreement will help exporters from these countries to move up the value-added chain. When fully enacted, the reduced costs of trade will have a beneficial impact on growth and jobs in all Central American countries.

Sustainable development
An overarching objective of the Association Agreement is to contribute to sustainable development in both Central America and the European Union, taking due account of the differences and specificities of each region. This objective is embedded in all the sections of the Agreement and finds a specific expression in the trade part through a chapter addressing the interrelation between trade and social and environmental policies. The chapter reflects the Parties’ commitments as regards internationally recognised core labour standards and multilateral agreements addressing environmental issues of international concern. It recognises the right and the responsibility of the Parties to adopt social and environmental regulations in the pursuit of legitimate objectives, and puts much emphasis on the effective enforcement of domestic labour and environmental laws. The Parties also undertake to encourage and promote trade and marketing schemes based on sustainability criteria, and to work towards a sustainable management of sensitive natural resources.

An important element in the overall structure of the Association Agreement is the role of civil society in the follow-up. A Joint Consultative Committee is foreseen and, specifically in the trade area, consultation of civil society stakeholders at domestic level goes hand in hand with a “Bi-regional Civil Society Dialogue Forum” to facilitate exchanges across the Atlantic regarding sustainable development aspects of the trade relations. Should divergences between the Parties arise in the implementation of this chapter’s provisions, recourse to an impartial panel of experts is possible under conditions of transparency.

Cooperation in trade areas
Both Parties have agreed to improve cooperation in areas such as competition, customs, intellectual property or technical barriers to trade. Enhanced cooperation in the production of organic products or the promotion of sustainable development have also been agreed.

Trade flows
In 2010, EU was Central America’s second trade partner after the US (and intra-regional trade), representing almost 9.4% of the trade flows.

In 2010, the main exporters from Central America to the EU were Costa Rica (53.9%), Honduras (21.6%) followed by Guatemala (12%). Exports consisted mainly of coffee, bananas, pineapples and microchips. EU’s exports to Central America went first to Costa Rica (36.3%) then Guatemala (28.1%) and El Salvador (15.2%) and were mainly medicines, petroleum oil and vehicles.


For more information
Text of the Association Agreement: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689
More details on the benefits of the Association Agreement: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=687


From http://www.iewy.com/28673-highlights-of-the-trade-pillar-of-the-association-agreement-between-central-america-and-the-european-union.html

The failure to industrialise

The following section also appears in the book under the same sub-heading, but the section which appears her is a much fuller version.

Eduardo Galeano’s classic work ‘Open Veins of Latin America’ explains how the imperialist states of Europe and the United States kept Latin American countries relatively free from the development of domestic industry by two particular means. First, a system of loans and interest-inflated repayments absorbed finance that would otherwise be available for domestic investment – the recent debt crisis is nothing new. Second, the development of a railway network, normally seen as a necessary condition for industrial development, was designed to link areas of primary production with ports (for export) rather than linking internal areas with one another: “thus railroads, so often hailed as forerunners of progress, were an impediment to the formation and development of an internal market.”[1]

To break out of what were seen as the chains of imperialist domination through which Central America had served simply as a supplier of primary produce to the industries of Europe and the USA, the strategy of domestic industrialisation was followed by some nations from the 1930s onwards. “These measures included increasing tariffs on imported goods. In Central America this was largely to help raise revenue, rather than promote import substitution.”[2] As British academic Victor Bulmer-Thomas admits, however, this industrial expansion did not amount to much. He cites five particular obstacles to industrial growth:

  • energy supplies were woefully inadequate;
  • virtually no credit was available;
  • foreign exchange for essential capital equipment was hard to obtain;
  • the market remained too small; and
  • efforts at regional integration at this time came to nothing.[3]

The post-WWII development of the dependentistas or the Dependency School of thought associated the development of independent national industry with the notion of import substitution industrialisation (ISI). ISI was “an attempt to restructure the nature of economic relations with core economies [Europe and North America] … This would reduce dependence on imported goods, so helping the balance of payments, and would also provide employment.”[4]

Although dependency theory draws on the work of Marx, it is particularly associated with economic historian and sociologist André Gunder Frank[5], although his work simply became the most famous expression of what many had been thinking and saying around Latin America for some time. Dependency theory argues that western capitalist countries have grown as a result of the expropriation of surpluses from the Third World, especially because of the reliance of Third World countries on export-oriented industries (coffee, bananas, bauxite and so on) which are notoriously precarious in terms of world market prices. The theory uses the notion of core–periphery relationships to highlight the inequality, where the core is the locus of economic power within a global economy.

André Gunder Frank[6] takes matters one step further in his notion of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ which stresses that it is the underdevelopment of the structures in Third World countries created by First World capitalist development that creates dependency – see Cristóbal Kay[7] and Walter Rodney[8]. As anthropologist Arturo Escobar bluntly asserts, “Europe was feeding off its colonies in the nineteenth century, the First World today feeds off the Third World.”[9] In other words, dependency theorists see development of the core through exploitation of and extraction from the periphery, leaving the periphery in a constant state of underdevelopment.

Above all else, theories of dependency are in general agreement that the interdependence resulting from global economic expansion and the suppression of autonomous growth results in unequal and uneven development. The dependentistas explain Latin America’s failure to industrialise as a result of this unequal power relationship between the core (USA and Europe) and the periphery (Latin America, and of course Africa and parts of Asia).

Success in Central American ISI was rather limited for a number of reasons, chief amongst which were the small size of the Central American domestic markets, poor infrastructural development and the fact that many industrialisation efforts within the region produced similar products. Additionally, “although some consumer goods were relatively straightforward to produce, attempts to replace the import of other goods (particularly industrial machinery) highlighted the limits of ISI at that time.”[10]

In the 1970s, attempts to industrialise for the sake of independent development changed motivational tack as flows of international finance into the region became the major stimulus to limited industrial development. The debt crisis which followed “these vast flows of credit”[11] is well documented elsewhere[12] and seemed to represent a new form of dependency – ‘new’, but as noted above by Galeano, one that was already well-rehearsed in the nineteenth century.

In the late 1970s and particularly through the policies pursued by the Reagan-Thatcher axis of the early 1980s, Third World attempts at ISI were replaced by an export-oriented model of development, “building on ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as the way forward for indebted nations.”[13] The simplistic notion of comparative advantage was used to justify the need for Third World nations to produce goods or crops for which they have a natural advantage. This effectively justified the continuation of the colonial model of development, and the debt crisis served as a mechanism to ensure the continuation of a relationship of First World dominance over Third World nations.

The economic model mandated by the USA and Britain in the 1980s was later imposed on developing countries by the international financial institutions (IFIs) – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and in Latin America the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The model advocated cuts in public spending and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, especially utilities such as energy companies.[14]

Free trade and economic growth are regarded as essential pre-requisites of development by the supranational and national agencies: the World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organisation (WTO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union (EU) and G8 governments. The discourse of these agencies is commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus and its ideology of free trade is captured in the term neoliberalism. Free trade is synonymous with economic globalisation which is synonymous with the spread of capitalist relations of production, and whichever of these terms is employed, it amounts to an ideology.

Neoliberalism sees development as a single linear progression of economic growth and well‑being, a model that has been portrayed by a number of theorists as a series of steps or stages (such as Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth[15]) to the ‘promised land’ – a developed state. There is an almost universal acceptance, at least among those who hold power, that there can be no ‘development’ without economic growth and no economic growth without free trade, an equation that commands near universal respect but which development scholar Gilbert Rist and others insist needs to be questioned.[16]

The notion of free trade itself, however, manages to hide the uneven and unequal economic interdependencies manifest for example in trade protectionist measures adopted by First World governments. In this regard the hegemony of the United States of America is noteworthy, though equally the power vested in the WTO, the G8 and key trading agreements (especially the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement with the EU) should not be underestimated.

Free trade fundamentally requires open and deregulated markets which supposedly provide a level playing field to those who operate business such that there exist no restrictions to trade. As the WTO explains, “In order to do business as effectively as possible, companies need level playing fields so that they can have equal access to natural resources, expertise, technologies and investment, both within countries and across borders.”[17] In theory this would allow national economies to specialise in producing goods or providing services that they are supposedly best at producing or providing. They would export these goods or services and import the things that they are not so good at producing. This is the notion of comparative advantage, one of the theoretical planks on which the ideology of free trade is built.

Comparative advantage is based on the theories developed by David Ricardo in the nineteenth century[18], but as Rist points out, “it assumes a number of hypothetical facts which rarely occur in reality”[19], and he proceeds to list thirteen of these assumptions. Activist and writer Teresa Hayter refers to the advice given to Third World governments as being based on the “apparently unimpeachable doctrines of comparative advantage, to the effect that they should concentrate on what they are supposed to be good at: the production of raw materials and primary commodities.”[20]

The theoretical level playing field belies the inequalities of development, economy and power which exist between and within the First World and the Third World. In the case of Latin American and Central American countries, Wooding and Moseley-Williams tell us that “before the current phase of globalisation, [this] was the region of the world where the greatest inequalities were found”, and that “today it is even more unequal.”[21]

Writer Fred Rosen is also critical of the theoretical framework of the Washington Consensus, arguing that it exists “at the height of abstraction, de-linked from reality”,[22] and Wayne Ellwood suggests that “talk of ‘level playing fields’ and ‘pure competition’ obscures the evidence that poor countries are severely disadvantaged to begin with”.[23] Oscar Guardiola-Rivera refers to this supposed playing field as being one “where players are unequal and competition unfair.”[24]

In the existing circumstances of inequality, it can be forcefully argued that there can be no such thing as free trade or a level playing field.

The deregulation of the local business environment – deregulation is another of the theoretical planks on which the ideology of free trade is built – to create the hypothetical level playing field actually creates the conditions which clearly favour those with access to wealth and resources. Stealing Bernard Crick’s phrase, we might describe deregulation as “the dramatic bonfire of the controls needed to make free markets tolerable”.[25] Without those controls which protect the national industries, those who stand to gain are those who already have the advantage of wealth and power that enable them to access even greater levels of capital and technology.

Elsewhere in the world beyond Central America, the idea of promoting a strategy of import substitution industry had been dealt a blow by the rise of the South-East Asian ‘tiger’ economies, and after the 1970s few nations in the world clung onto or placed great hope in achieving development through the rise of an economy led by national industrial growth. For those nations which did not willingly embrace neoliberalism, it was forced upon them by the USA and Europe and by the debt crisis. The crisis was and still is managed by the world’s two major international financial institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) in which the interests of the two major political centres (the USA and Europe) hold sway.

The debt crisis was managed through structural adjustment programmes which later metamorphosed into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), although the PR part of the initials might have more accurately signified ‘Public Relations’. Through these the international financial institutions imposed on indebted nations loan conditions which included trade liberalisation, the deregulation of industry and the privatisation of state-owned industries and services. This is what Martin Khor (Director of the Third World Network) describes as the ‘de-industrialisation’ of the developing world[26], preventing governments from managing their country’s basic services such as health, education and water and from protecting the livelihoods of small producers and manufacturers by placing tariffs on unfairly subsidised imports.

But how does this process of de-industrialisation fit with the evidence of increasing manufacturing importance in national statistics for the Central American economies? The Table on Exports of manufactured goods as a percentage of total exports demonstrates that from 1970 to 2010 the value of the export of manufactured goods as a percentage of all exports increased in five of the seven countries. The answer to the apparent contradiction is found in the maquilas or sweatshop assembly factories which have been established in the region over the decades since the 1970s. As labour costs increased in the developed capitalist or metropolitan nations, transnational corporations (TNCs) found it profitable to re-locate the most labour-intensive elements of their production to low-wage countries which would serve simply as a platform to receive components which were altered in some way and then ‘sprung off’ the platform either to markets in the metropolitan nations or to other platforms elsewhere in the world where further alterations or additions were made to the product.

The maquila process is one which contributes to a globalised economy rather than to a national economy. Very often there is little advantage accruing to the host nation other than the employment opportunities offered to local populations, but the maquilas are associated with extremely poor wage levels and abusive conditions of employment. The development of maquilas is covered again in more depth later in this chapter.

To some extent this inequality of access to modern business infrastructure is illustrated by the example of the Plan Puebla-Panama given in the following section. This brings us very suitably to ask the question: how have the effects of these global policies shown themselves in the economies of Central America? And that in turn brings us to an examination of the most recent twenty years of free trade treaties negotiated between the Central American nations and other trading blocks.


[1] Eduardo Galeano (1973) Open Veins of Latin America: Five Centuries of the Pillage of a Continent, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, p. 218.
[2] Katie Willis (2002) ‘Open for business: strategies for economic diversification’, in Challenges and Change in Middle America, edited by Cathy McIlwaine and Katie Willis, Essex: Pearson Education.
[3] Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1987) The Political Economy of Central America Since 1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.80-81.
[4] Op.cit. Katie Willis..
[5] André Gunder Frank (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Monthly Review Press, London.
[6] Frank, A. G. (1966) ‘The development of underdevelopment’, Monthly Review 18, 4: 17–31; (1969) Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, New York: Monthly Review Press; (1970) Lumpen-Bourgeoisie: Lumpen-Development, Dependency, Class, and Politics in Latin America, New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
[7] Kay, C. (1989) Latin America Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, London: Routledge.
[8] Walter Rodney (1988) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London: Bogle L’Ouverture Publications.
[9] Arturo Escobar (1995) Encountering Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.83.
[10] Op.cit. (Willis).
[11] Ron Ayres and David Clark (1998) ‘Capitalism, Industrialisation and Development in Latin America: the Dependency Paradigm Revisited’, Capital & Class, 64 (Spring) (pp.89-118), London. (Quote from p.110).
[12] For example, see: Duncan Green (2003) Silent Revolution: the rise and crisis of market economics in Latin America, Latin America Bureau; Susan George (1988) A Fate Worse Than Debt, Penguin; Susan George (1992) The Debt Boomerang, Pluto Press; and refer to the work of the World Development Movement and the Third World Network.
[13] Op.cit. (Willis).
[14] John Perry (2008) ‘The debate on energy and climate change – a different perspective’, Ch. 17 (pp 229-244) of ‘Opening Doors – Improving housing services for refugees and new migrants’, Chartered Institute of Housing.
[15] Rostow, W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-communist Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[16] Gilbert Rist (1997) History of Development, London: Zed Books.
[17] WTO/OMT (1995) GATS and Tourism, Madrid: WTO/OMT, p. 1.
[18] David Ricardo (1817) The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London, J.M. Dent, 1973.
[19] Op.cit. (Rist, p.114).
[20] Teresa Hayter (1982) The Creation of World Poverty: An Alternative View to the Brandt Report, London: Pluto Press, p.96.
[21] Bridget Wooding and Richard Moseley-Williams (2004) ‘Worlds Apart’, Interact, Spring 2004. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, p. 9.
[22] Fred Rosen (2003) ‘Changing the terms of the debate: a report from Antigua’, NACLA Report on the Americas, XXXVII (3), November/December 2003, page 25. New York: North American Congress on Latin America.
[23] Wayne Ellwood (2004) ‘The World Trading System’, New Internationalist, no. 374, December 2004, Oxford: New Internationalist.
[24] Oscar Guardiola-Rivera (2010) What if Latin America Ruled the World? How the South Will Take the North into the 22nd Century, London: Bloomsbury, p.3.
[25] Bernard Crick (2004) ‘How the rich stole the dream’, The Independent, London, 11 June 2004. Crick was referring to the manipulation of the capitalist tax system to benefit the rich, but in the context of the development of the capitalist economic system. We consider that the contexts of his remark and of ours are similar enough for it to be used to describe deregulation.
[26] Martin Khor (21 June 2006) ‘Beware of NAMA’s slippery slope to de-industrialisation’, TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues (June 06/18), www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo431.htm (accessed 30.07.12).

Aims and effects of CAFTA-DR, according to UNES

In March 2011 to mark the fifth anniversary of the signing of CAFTA-DR, UNES (the Salvadoran Ecological Unit) sent an open letter to Deputies of the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly demanding an evaluation of the trade agreement, whose effects they claimed included the following:

  • The 60,000 new jobs to be created each year, as promised by those who promoted the agreement, have not been realised; in fact unemployment is greater than it was five years before.
  • Small farmers and small businesses have not been able to export their goods to the US market; in fact the crisis experienced by the campesino sector and by small businesses has deepened.
  • Food cannot be bought cheaper than it was in 2006; in fact the price of basic foodstuffs is much more expensive; similarly with the price of medicines.
  • There is no greater stability or security for Central Americans who migrate to the USA; in fact the humiliation and deportations have increased.
  • The commercial deficit between El Salvador and the USA has widened; although exports from US, European and Korean TNCs in El Salvador have increased, imports from the USA have increased much more. Also, despite their stagnation, dependence on remittances from family members has grown.
  • Two mining TNCs have claims against the government of El Salvador in a foreign tribunal for US$170 million as compensation for the cancellation of their permits for gold and silver extraction in El Salvador.
  • Central American regional integration is experiencing greater difficulties now than it did in 2006 when CAFTA-DR came into force.
  • CAFTA-DR is particularly beneficial for transnational corporations that the European Union has also begun free trade treaty negotiations with the region; this is euphemistically called an ‘Agreement of Association’.

Source: Revista Ecotopia 272 (March 2011) ‘Organizaciones Sociales Demandan Evaluación y Denuncia del CAFTA-DR’, San Salvador: UNES.

Nicaragua exporting beans and cattle to Venezuela

From Nicaragua Network Hotline 09.06.09

Two hundred and fifty small farmers in the Department of Carazo planted 870 acres of black beans, all for export to Venezuela, and the national cattle industry will export 1,100 head of cattle there as well this month, part of the Ortega government’s efforts to find new markets under the Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas (ALBA) cooperative fair trade agreement. The black beans were planted under contract with Nicaragua Food, Inc. (ALBALINISA), which made a commitment to purchase all that was produced. The cattle shipment was part of an agreement to export 5,500 head to Venezuela.

Small farmers received 80 pounds of seed and 200 pounds of fertilizer and technical assistance which enabled them to produce 1,437 pounds of beans per acre cultivated. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR) now plans to expand the program to 17,400 acres, all for export under ALBA to Venezuela.

Nicaragua’s cattle industry has generated US$11 million under ALBA, according to National Assembly Deputy Douglas Aleman. That is expected to rise by the end of the year. Aleman also said that 6,000 tons of beef will be shipped to Venezuela in July as part of the ALBA agreements. He said that he expected that in the coming weeks a second accord will be signed to raise the amount of beef exported to Venezuela to 12,000 tons.

Aleman also said during a celebration of International Milk Day and the Week of the Child, that the proposed Law for the Promotion of the Dairy Sector will, among other things, establish that all children under 12 years old should have a glass of milk a day in school. Promoted by the dairy industry and the government, the law is expected to easily pass the National Assembly.