Rights Action

December 16, 2024

Rights Action is a US and Canadian non-governmental organisation that supports the struggles of grassroots and Indigenous communities in Central America, especially those in Guatemala and Honduras. It lobbies on their behalf and exposes the violent roles of the US and Canadian governments in bolstering the domineering and violent neocolonial behaviour of North American transnational corporations that extract the resources of  Central American communities with no regard for the local societies, traditions or environments affected by their companies’ operations.

www.rightsaction.org

Letter from Panama’s ‘Little Hiroshima’, by Belén Fernandez

https://mailchi.mp/rightsaction/letter-from-panamas-little-hiroshima

U.S. owes reparations to survivors of 1989 “just cause” invasion of Panama

This week, Rights Action will share articles remembering the December 20, 1989 U.S. “just cause” invasion of Panama and slaughter of perhaps thousands of civilians.

Connecting the dots: As the U.S.-led west continues to support and legitimize Israel’s ethnic cleansing genocide in Palestine, and expansionist aggression in neighboring countries, it is never too late to keep on telling truth about and demanding justice and reparations for victims of previous U.S.-led imperialist invasions and aggressions.

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Letter from Panama’s ‘Little Hiroshima’

I paid a visit to El Chorrillo almost exactly 34 years after the US turned it into a ‘Little Hiroshima’ for a ‘Just Cause’.

By Belén Fernández, Al Jazeera, 24 Jan 2024

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/1/24/letter-from-panamas-little-hiroshima

Once upon a time, the United States was good buddies with a fellow named Manuel Noriega, a longstanding CIA asset and the dictator of Panama in the 1980s.

Then one day, Noriega outlived his usefulness as an imperial lackey and needed to be sent packing. And so with a straight face, the gringos accused him of the unpardonable offence of drug trafficking and undertook to overthrow him in 1989.

This was funny; after all, since at least 1972 the US had known about – and intermittently benefitted from – Noriega’s links to the drug trade. Furthermore, the US president spearheading the dictator’s removal was none other than George H W Bush, the very same George H W Bush who as director of the CIA in 1976 had ensured Noriega’s preservation on the agency payroll.

Anyway, boundless hypocrisy has always been America’s strong point. And it was once again on full display in the selection of the name for the unilateral US military operation to bring “democracy” to Panama by killing a bunch of Panamanian civilians, pulverising the impoverished Panama City neighbourhood of El Chorrillo to the extent that local ambulance drivers began to call it “Little Hiroshima”, and hauling Noriega off to Miami.

Following some heavy contemplation, the preliminary title “Operation Blue Spoon” was changed to “Operation Just Cause”. The late Colin Powell, who was then serving as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained in his 1995 autobiography, A Soldier’s Way, that he preferred the “inspirational ring” of the revised title – and the fact that “even our severest critics would have to utter ‘Just Cause’ while denouncing us”.

Plus, Powell reasoned, Blue Spoon was just “hardly a rousing call to arms… You do not risk people’s lives for Blue Spoons”.

Of course, the change in labelling was irrelevant to the civilian inhabitants of El Chorrillo – the site of Panama City’s central military barracks – who bore the lethal brunt of the ensuing “just cause”. Then again, it wasn’t their lives that Powell was concerned about risking. Just after midnight on December 20, 1989, the neighbourhood was jolted awake by the fanatical show of US firepower that would quickly earn it the moniker “Little Hiroshima”.

As US General Marc Cisneros, one of the operation’s commanders, admitted in 1999 on the 10th anniversary of the invasion, the military’s approach was probably a bit overzealous: “We made it look like we were battling Goliath… We have all these new gadgets, laser-guided missiles and stealth fighters, and we are just dying to use that stuff.”

Almost exactly 34 years after the fun with gadgets, on this past New Year’s Eve, I paid a visit to El Chorrillo, taking an Uber down the hill from a friend’s house in the Quarry Heights area of the Panamanian capital – the US military’s former command centre in the Panama Canal Zone. My plan to wander around and photograph El Chorrillo’s assortment of anti-American graffiti was thwarted when the female Uber driver, citing concerns for my safety, insisted on delivering me into the care of two policemen standing on a street corner.

Too young to have experienced the 1989 invasion, they proved chatty albeit not so confident in their own crime-fighting prowess: “Sometimes we’re standing here and people are getting robbed in the supermarket next door.”

One of the cops escorted me down the street to view the diminutive statue of a crouching human, a monument to those killed during Just Cause. Estimates of Panamanian civilian deaths during the operation range from a few hundred to many thousands, depending on whether you ask the United States or human rights organisations.

To politely extricate myself from the company of the two policemen, I asked whether they knew anyone who might want to talk to me about the invasion. As a matter of fact, they said, there was an older man named Hector who lived nearby and was the only resident of El Chorrillo to have 24-hour police protection on account of four gang attempts on his life. Hector knew all about 1989.

A few phone calls were made and I was handed off to a different set of police, who waited with me in front of Hector’s dilapidated apartment block. A young boy shot at all of us with a triceratops-shaped toy pistol, and a group of giggling young girls asked me the English words for “knife”, “dirty teeth” and “Santana” – the last name of one of the cops.

Then it was into Hector’s cramped kitchen, where preemptive New Year’s fireworks outside provided a fitting soundtrack to the subject at hand. Seventy-seven years old and in possession of a certain joie de vivre that is perhaps inaccessible to those of us who have not survived four assassination attempts, Hector unearthed a tattered 33-year-old newspaper – published on the first anniversary of Just Cause – and encouraged me to peruse the photographs of corpses and mass graves.

As it turned out, Hector had not been present during the invasion, having been expelled from Panama for political reasons some months earlier. He returned to the country in February 1990, shortly after Just Cause had been brought to its swift and triumphant close, and became a leader in the fight to prevent Panama’s new “democratic” powers that be from appropriating El Chorrillo for their own lucrative ends.

In Hector’s words, the mentality of the new opportunists was: “Let’s get the chorrilleros out of there since the gringos already burned everything.”

And burn they had, the fire spreading easily as most of the houses were made of wood. Many, incidentally, had decades previously housed the workers who built the Panama Canal – another crowning achievement in the United States’ lengthy history of imperial exploitation. While then-US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney would claim that Just Cause had “been the most surgical military operation of its size ever conducted”, you can’t really have a surgical Hiroshima.

Fishing a pamphlet by Panamanian sociologist Olmedo Beluche out of the clutter on his kitchen table, Hector set about reading to me from the section on aircraft and armaments used in Just Cause that were then deployed on a massive scale in the first Persian Gulf war: F-117 stealth bombers, Blackhawk helicopters, Apache and Cobra helicopters, 2,000-pound bombs, Hellfire missiles, and so on.

Indeed, as historian Greg Grandin has emphasised, the road to Baghdad “ran through Panama City”, with Just Cause marking the start of an “age of preemptive unilateralism, using ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ as both justifications for war and a branding opportunity”.

In 2018, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ruled that the United States should “provide full reparation for the human rights violations” committed during Operation Just Cause, “including both the material and moral dimensions”. You can guess how that’s panning out.

As I made my way back to Quarry Heights on New Year’s Eve, I passed a memorial to Martyrs’ Day – a reference not to the martyrs of El Chorrillo but rather to the martyrs of January 9, 1964. On this day, US forces in the Canal Zone killed at least 21 Panamanians during riots in the aftermath of an attempt by Panamanian students to raise Panama’s flag next to the US one.

Sixty years on from Martyrs’ Day, the US still hasn’t managed to kick its habit of killing people – including indirectly in the Gaza Strip, a “little Hiroshima” if there ever was one. Forget “moral dimensions”; the US operates in a strictly iniquitous one.

(The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance. Belén Fernández is the author of Inside Siglo XXI: Locked Up in Mexico’s Largest Immigration Center (OR Books, 2022), Checkpoint Zipolite: Quarantine in a Small Place (OR Books, 2021), Exile: Rejecting America and Finding the World (OR Books, 2019), Martyrs Never Die: Travels through South Lebanon (Warscapes, 2016), and The Imperial Messenger: Thomas Friedman at Work (Verso, 2011). She is a contributing editor at Jacobin Magazine, and has written for the New York Times, the London Review of Books blog, Current Affairs, and Middle East Eye, among numerous other publications.)

By Timothy Alexander Guzman

April 16, 2025

We are very grateful to Timothy Guzman for his permission for us to reproduce his article here. His  Silent Crow News can be found at: https:// https://silentcrownews.com/   Emphases (bold and italics, as in the original.

In early April, Defense News reported that the Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth was going to Panama to speak to its leadership and discuss the situation with the Panama Canal concerning China,

“Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will travel to Panama next week, the second senior U.S. official to visit the country in as many months, as President Donald Trump says America is “reclaiming” the country’s eponymous canal.”

US aggression in Panama is following a blueprint to reclaim its “backyard” since China is winning influence and trade among Latin American nations. This is an insult to Panama, in fact, it’s an imperialist move that signifies that the Trump regime does not respect the sovereignty of the Panamanian people. This brings back the horrible memories of the US invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989 that resulted in hundreds, some estimates say, thousands of people dead.

“While there, Hegseth will meet with the country’s president, José Raul Mulino, and attend a meeting of regional chiefs of defense. He will also visit military sites and the Panama Canal itself.”

This is alarming not only to Panama, but to other Latin American nations on Washington’s list for regime change including Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

The report said that:

“In a statement Friday, Pentagon Press Secretary Sean Parnell wrote the meetings “will drive ongoing efforts to strengthen our partnerships with Panama and other Central American nations toward our shared vision for a peaceful and secure Western Hemisphere.”

The mainstream media including Trump’s cheerleaders, Fox news and Newsmax, has been rather silent about these developments. According to Defense News,

“The U.S. has a small military presence in Panama, though the Pentagon has reportedly been planning options to increase that number, in line with the president’s goal to take control of the canal. America is currently participating in a military exercise inside the country.“ He continued, “To further enhance our national security, my administration will be reclaiming the Panama Canal, and we’ve already started doing it,” Trump said in a March address to Congress.”

Panama’s President José Raul Mulino originally rejected Trump’s claims, but it seems that somehow he was intimidated,

“In a post on the social app X after Trump’s speech, Mulino said ownership of the canal wasn’t being transferred and that he and Rubio didn’t discuss the topic.” Mulino said, “I reject, on behalf of Panama and all Panamanians, this new affront to the truth and to our dignity as a nation.”

The US Department of Defense highlighted what Hegseth had said at the press conference: “The era of capitulating to coercion by the communist Chinese is over.” He continued, “[China’s] growing and adversarial control of strategic land and critical infrastructure in this hemisphere cannot and will not stand.”

Trump Now Threatening Panama. His “Neo-Monroeism” Might Set Americas Ablaze

Hegseth had announced the “expanded partnership” with Panamanian Public Security Minister Frank Abrego. Hegseth said that: “The Panama Canal is key terrain that must be secured by Panama, with America, and not China.”

In other words, the US is now in control of the Panama Canal because there was never a “partnership.” The US treats Panama as a puppet state under the banner of democracy.

Now it seems that President Mulino has reversed his stance.  Le Monde ‘Panama deal allows US to deploy troops to canal, but no permanent bases’ reported that US troops would be occupying, not building new bases:

US troops will be able to deploy a string of bases along the Panama Canal under a joint deal seen by AFP on Thursday, April 10, a major concession to President Donald Trump as he seeks to reestablish influence over the vital waterway. The agreement, signed by top security officials from both countries, allows US military personnel to deploy to Panama-controlled facilities for training, exercises and “other activities”.

“Other activities” means that the CIA will be using those occupied bases in Panama to conduct regime change operations in Latin America.  Mulino did warn that Trump’s idea to have US-owned bases in Panama would ignite mass protests:

Mulino was on Thursday in Peru, where he revealed that the United States had asked to have its own bases. Mulino said he had told visiting Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth that US bases, allowed under an earlier draft, would be “unacceptable.” He warned Hegseth: “Do you want to create a mess, what we’ve put in place here would set the country on fire.

In a Memorandum of Understanding, Hegseth and Abrego supposedly acknowledged that Panama “won” concessions, but who in their right mind would trust the US President and his neocon regime?

In the watered-down “Memorandum of Understanding,” signed by Hegseth and Panama’s security chief Frank Abrego on Wednesday, Panama won its own concessions. The United States recognized Panama’s sovereignty – not a given following Trump’s refusal to rule out an invasion – and Panama will retain control over any installations. Panama will also have to agree to any deployments. But given Trump’s willingness to rip up or rewrite trade deals, treaties and agreements, that might offer little succour to worried Panamanians.

In an important note, Le Monde mentioned how Trump allowed BlackRock, a deep state corporate entity to buy two ports for $19 billion which angered Beijing. The ports’ parent company CK Hutchison announced last month a deal to offload 43 ports in 23 countries – including its two on the Panama Canal – to a consortium led by US asset manager BlackRock for $19 billion in cash. A furious Beijing has since announced an antitrust review of the deal

However, Panama’s opposition describes what is happening as a ‘Camouflaged Invasion’ as reported by The Guardian: Panamanian opposition politicians have accused the US of launching a “camouflaged invasion” of the country, amid simmering discontent over the government’s handling of the diplomatic crisis.

After a three-day visit by the US defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, Donald Trump appeared to confirm that US military personnel had been deployed to the Central American country on Thursday, telling reporters: “We’ve moved a lot of troops to Panama”

Washington is clearly trying to reoccupy Panama under the radar which will not sit well with most Panamanians: “Hegseth said that the US would increase its military presence at three former US bases in the country to “secure the Panama canal from Chinese influence.”

Since 1999, the US military exited Panama under the 1977 Torrijos-Carter Treaty that handed over the canal to Panamanian authorities, “Under the canal’s neutrality treaty, no foreign power can “maintain military forces, defense sites and military installations within its national territory”, and the US comments have prompted outrage in Panama.”

Ricardo Lombana, the leader of the opposition Other Way Movement said that “This is a camouflaged invasion” and that it’s “an invasion without firing a shot, but with a cudgel and threats.”

This is the case: the US has invaded Panama without media attention. The Trump regime is following in the footsteps of the former US President, William McKinley the imperialist who led the effort to get the US into a war with Spain in what is known as the Spanish–American War.  McKinley expanded US territories with the annexation of Hawaii and led to the forced colonization of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and American Samoa.

The Panamanian people will reject this imperialist move by the Trump Whitehouse. I also agree with Panama’s President, José Raul Mulino, in what he originally said about the US having their own bases would “set the country on fire.”  But having US military personal in already existing military bases can also set Panama on fire. Either way, it’s a bad situation for Panama; protests are guaranteed, and the world is watching closely.

Timothy Alexander Guzman writes on his own blog site, Silent Crow News, where this article was originally published.

By Martin Mowforth

From ENCA Newsletter No. 93

March 2025

On 12 February, three US military planes arrived in Panama carrying 299 shackled deportees from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. A few days later a plane carrying 135 US deportees arrived in Costa Rica.

Along with Guatemala, Panama and Costa Rica had agreed with the US Trump Administration, following a visit by the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, to receive deported migrants who are not citizens of their own country. These recipient countries have agreed to ‘repatriate’ deported migrants. All three countries, however, are reportedly ill-equipped to cope with such an influx of vulnerable people. A half of those arriving in Costa Rica were children and included babies in arms and two of the women are pregnant.

After five hours in the flight to Costa Rica, they were immediately transferred to buses for an eight-hour journey to reach the Temporary Attention Centre of Migrants (CATEM by its Spanish initials) located in the Puntarenas region in the south of the country. The ombudsman who was present at the arrival and transfer claimed that many of the deportees cried out for help, especially in trying to let their families know their whereabouts, and others were clearly in some form of distress.

In Panama they were stripped of their passports and cellphones and forbidden to speak with lawyers or journalists. They were guarded by police and locked in a hotel in Panama City before being transferred to a temporary camp in the jungle. Almost 100 of the deportees who had not consented to their deportation were driven to a camp described in a Guardian article as like “a concentration camp”.

Panamanian political scientist Rodrigo Noriega from the University of Panama called this process of deportation “a legal catastrophe” and declared that it “violates international human rights treaties”. Costa Rican social researcher Carlos Sandoval explained that the United States is transferring the slow repatriation process to third countries. The US should administer deportation but has sought Central American countries to manage the process. Panama and Costa Rica say that the US assumes the total cost of the operation and that the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) will participate in the process.

Costa Rican president Chaves said that “the United States is treating us very well.” Two Costa Rican deputies, however, were sanctioned by Washington for opposing the president’s decision to reject Chinese technology. President Chaves also explained that “We’re helping our powerful economic brother in the north, because if (the US) imposes a tax on our export zones, we’re screwed.”

Sources:

• Mat Youkee, 19.02.25, ‘Police search for woman who escaped Panama hotel where US deportees are being held’, London, The Guardian.
• NACLA Update, February 2025.
• Daniela Muñoz Solano, 21.02.25, ‘Derechos humanos de migrantes deportados por Estados Unidos se violaron en Costa Rica, señala Defensoría’, San José, Semanario Universidad.
• Tico Times, 21.02.25, ‘How Central America Turned Into US Deportation Centers’, AFP via Tico Times.
• Reuters, 19.02.25, ‘Costa Rica could hold US deporteesfor up to six weeks, president says’, Reuters.

By Doug Specht

Published by The SAIS Review of International Affairs.

El Salvador’s ‘maverick’^[1] president, Nayib Bukele, has proposed a unique agreement with the United States, offering to house American criminals and deportees^[2] in its notorious mega-prison, Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (Terrorism Confinement Center, abbreviated CECOT). This unprecedented deal, put forward by Bukele, aims to accommodate U.S. deportees regardless of their nationality, including violent American offenders and gang members. However, this agreement raises significant legal, ethical, and humanitarian concerns, with critics arguing that the condition of El Salvador’s prisons and U.S. law make this project a non-starter.

The Deal

At the core of this agreement is El Salvador’s willingness to accept deportees from the United States, regardless of their nationality. This provision extends beyond typical deportation arrangements, as it includes the accommodation of violent American offenders, including U.S. citizens and legal residents currently in U.S. custody. Furthermore, the agreement specifically targets gang members, with El Salvador agreeing to accept for deportation any illegal immigrant in the United States who is a criminal of any nationality, explicitly mentioning members of notorious gangs^[3] such as MS-13 and Tren de Aragua.

This proposal comes at a time when El Salvador already maintains the world’s highest incarceration rate, with over 110,000 people imprisoned as of early 2024^[4], following a high-profile and ethically dubious crackdown on gangs. These incarceration rates and the question of human rights abuses have brought condemnation from the international community, and many will be concerned at the prospect of more prisoners being imported to already crowded prisons. For President Bukele, though, this not only helps his well-managed strongman image but also has significant financial incentives. El Salvador will charge the United States a fee for housing these prisoners, which Bukele has described as “relatively low for the U.S. but significant for us, making our entire prison system sustainable”. This financial arrangement introduces a new dynamic to international criminal justice cooperation, potentially setting a precedent for similar agreements in the future.

Bukele is also likely considering other benefits to this offering to accommodate U.S. deportees and criminals. Beyond the economic benefits, this deal could elevate El Salvador’s profile on the global stage, potentially granting Bukele increased international recognition – although this may not all be positive. Furthermore, the agreement aligns with Bukele’s tough-on-crime stance, which has garnered substantial domestic support^[5] among Salvadorans.

The Trump administration’s positive reception^[6] of this offer reflects its own policy priorities. The deal supports the administration’s efforts to accelerate deportations and deter illegal immigration while simultaneously offering a potential solution to the U.S.’s own overcrowded prison system. Additionally, this agreement could strengthen ties with El Salvador, as the Central American nation positions itself as a valuable partner to the Trump administration, it is likely to lead to increased diplomatic influence and potentially more favourable treatment in other areas of bilateral relations. Conversely, this agreement may be seen by other nations in the region as a continuation of U.S. interference and interventionism^[7], unsettling their relationships with El Salvador and potentially disrupting the dynamics in Central America.

While distinct from the El Salvador agreement, recent developments regarding the use of Guantanamo Bay for migrant^[8] detention provide an interesting parallel. The Trump administration has expressed intentions to expand Guantanamo’s capacity to hold up to 30,000 migrants. The U.S. has begun transporting migrants to Guantanamo, with the first flight intending to take members of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua. However, these actions have faced legal challenges, with a federal judge blocking^[9] the transfer of three Venezuelan immigrants to Guantanamo. Instead, these persons were deported to Venezuela, highlighting the complex legal landscape surrounding such measures, and how such policies could heighten tensions between nations.

Political and Legal Implications

The proposed agreement presents a complex web of political and legal implications. This arrangement challenges established norms in international criminal justice and immigration policy, raising questions about its feasibility and potential consequences. The legality of deporting U.S. citizens to serve sentences in foreign prisons is uncertain and likely to face rigorous legal scrutiny. The agreement also raises significant humanitarian questions with human rights organizations expressing grave concerns about El Salvador’s prison conditions and the potential for rights violations under this arrangement. Moreover, the implementation of this deal could have far-reaching effects on international relations and migration policies in the region.

The proposed arrangement represents a significant shift in U.S. immigration and criminal justice policies. It could set a precedent for outsourcing incarceration by transferring U.S. prisoners to foreign countries. The agreement also expands options for deporting individuals, including those from countries reluctant to accept deportees. Moreover, it could pave the way for similar arrangements with other Central American nations, fundamentally altering the landscape of regional cooperation on criminal justice and immigration matters.

However, the proposed deal faces substantial legal challenges^[10]. Perhaps the most glaring issue is the constitutional impossibility of deporting U.S. citizens^[11], making this aspect of the agreement a moot point at present. The transfer of prisoners to a foreign country also raises serious due process concerns, questioning prisoners’ legal rights and access to fair treatment. Furthermore, the proposal may violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, given the reported conditions in Salvadoran prisons.

From an international law perspective, the agreement could contravene various statutes regarding migrant rights and prisoner treatment. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules^[12]) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights^[13] set standards that this agreement may violate, particularly concerning the treatment of prisoners and the right to due process.

The CECOT Mega-Prison and Public Concern

President Bukele’s proposal to house those deported in El Salvador’s Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), a mega-prison facility opened in 2023^[14] with a capacity of 40,000 inmates, exacerbates the legal and political ramifications of this deal. Using CECOT for this purpose raises questions about prison conditions and potential human rights implications. CECOT has become a focal point of international scrutiny since its inauguration in. The facility, a cornerstone of President Nayib Bukele’s aggressive anti-gang strategy^[15], has ignited a heated debate about the balance between security measures and human rights in the criminal justice system.

CECOT’s sheer scale is unprecedented in Latin America. The prison complex comprises eight expansive pavilions, each containing cells that house between 65 to 70 prisoners. The facility’s architecture and operational protocols prioritise security and isolation over rehabilitation, reflecting a punitive approach to incarceration. Cells are windowless, furnished only with bare metal bunks devoid of mattresses. Sanitary facilities are woefully inadequate, with each cell equipped with just two sinks and two toilets for dozens of inmates, offering no privacy. The extreme confinement regime exacerbates the harsh conditions, where prisoners are restricted to their cells for 23.5 hours daily, with a mere 30-minute allowance for exercise in a windowless corridor. Surveillance is omnipresent, with CCTV cameras and armed guards monitoring from elevated positions, creating an atmosphere of constant observation and control.

When compared to international standards, CECOT’s conditions fall significantly short of accepted norms for the humane treatment of prisoners. The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners are routinely contravened^[16] within CECOT’s walls. The lack of basic amenities such as mattresses, adequate sanitation, and recreational facilities stands in stark contrast to these international guidelines. Moreover, the extreme isolation and absence of rehabilitation programs directly contradict global standards that emphasise the importance of preparing inmates for reintegration into society.

Human rights organisations and legal experts have been unequivocal in their condemnation of CECOT and the broader implications of El Salvador’s incarceration policies. Amnesty International has characterised the situation in El Salvador as a “human rights crisis,”^[17] pointing to widespread arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and allegations of torture. Human Rights Watch has documented extensive human rights violations^[18] during El Salvador’s state of emergency, with particular concern for conditions in facilities like CECOT. The gravity of the situation is further underscored by the assessment of Miguel Sarre, a former member of the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture, who described CECOT as a “concrete and steel pit“^[19] designed to “dispose of people without formally applying the death penalty”. Such stark criticisms from respected international observers highlight the severity of the human rights concerns surrounding CECOT.

The establishment and operation of CECOT have had a profound impact on El Salvador’s international reputation. While some international figures, notably U.S. President Donald Trump, have praised Bukele’s hardline approach to crime, the broader international community views CECOT as emblematic of human rights abuses. The facility has drawn intense scrutiny from international bodies such as the United Nations and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, placing El Salvador under a global spotlight^[20]. This attention has sparked wider debates about the appropriate balance between security measures and human rights protections in Latin America and beyond.

Broader Implications

This agreement between El Salvador and the United States to house deportees and American criminals in Salvadoran prisons represents a significant departure from traditional approaches to international criminal justice and migration management. While having some parallels with the previous Trump administration’s controversial “safe third country” agreements, known as Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs)^[21], with Guatemala, Honduras, as well as El Salvador, this new agreement goes much further. The 2019 ACAs allowed the U.S. to send asylum seekers to these countries if they had travelled through them on their way to the U.S., obliging them to seek asylum there first. At the time Guatemala was the only country to implement the agreement^[22], with a limited number of migrants – reportedly around 700 – being sent there.

Even in these more targeted agreements critics argued that these countries were not equipped to handle large numbers of asylum seekers and were not safe. The Biden administration suspended and withdrew^[23] from these agreements in February 2021, effectively ending the policy. With Trump returning to the White House, his new and more far-reaching arrangement with Bukele has the potential to reshape future agreements on asylum and deportation, as well as diplomatic relations, particularly within the Americas, and its implications extend far beyond the borders of the two countries involved.

This agreement sets a controversial precedent for migration policies that could significantly influence future international arrangements. Expanding the concept of “safe third country“^[24] agreements may encourage other nations to offer similar arrangements, potentially leading to a shift in global migration policies. Developed countries might increasingly seek to outsource their immigration challenges to less developed nations – The United Kingdom’s attempts to deport migrants to Rwanda^[25] for example – fundamentally altering the landscape of international migration governance. Future agreements could potentially include provisions for housing deportees or criminals from other countries, representing a significant evolution in how nations manage cross-border population movements.

The potential ripple effects of this agreement on U.S.-Central American relations are substantial and multifaceted. The deal may alter regional power dynamics as El Salvador could gain increased influence due to its closer ties with the United States. This could pressure other Central American countries to offer similar concessions to maintain favourable relations with the U.S., potentially leading to a reconfiguration of alliances and partnerships within the region. The economic implications of the deal are equally significant. The financial compensation El Salvador receives for housing prisoners could influence its economic policies and development strategies. This might also prompt other Central American countries to seek similar economic opportunities through unconventional agreements with the U.S., potentially leading to a new form of economic dependency in the region centred around migration and criminal justice outsourcing.

The agreement is likely to reshape security dynamics across Central America. It could lead to increased U.S. involvement in El Salvador’s security apparatus, potentially extending to other countries in the region. While this might result in a more integrated approach to combating transnational crime and gang activity across Central America, it could also raise concerns about sovereignty and U.S. influence in the region’s internal affairs. The U.S. track record of intervention in the region^[26] has seldom benefited local inhabitants and has typically been motivated by strategic interests rather than humanitarian concerns. For example, supporting the military regime in El Salvador or the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the overthrow of President Jacob Arbenz in Guatemala, the backing of convicted leaders like Juan Orland Hernandez in Honduras, or the invasion of Panama in 1989, have sought to benefit the U.S., but have all brought instability, economic hardship and increased migration, violence and corruption to the local population.

Conversely, the human rights issues raised by this agreement could increase tensions between U.S., El Salvador, and human rights advocates, potentially straining diplomatic relations in the region. International human rights organisations may increase their scrutiny of U.S. and Central American countries’ justice systems and prison conditions. The deal is very likely to bring about increased monitoring of El Salvador’s prison system, particularly the CECOT mega-prison – potentially a good thing for those housed there. The additional scrutiny that this deal brings to prisons in the region though, may create tensions with countries such as Guatemala^[27] where efforts are made to keep their own overcrowded prisons out of the spotlight. The agreement may also lead to greater scrutiny of U.S. immigration policies and deportation procedures. This heightened attention from legal experts, civil rights groups, and international organizations is likely to frustrate the Trump administration and may well lead to the U.S. pulling out of further global humanitarian and migration agreements^[28] in an attempt to avoid such attention.

The El Salvador-U.S. agreement represents a significant shift in approaches to migration and criminal justice on an international scale. Its broader implications could reshape diplomatic relations, particularly in the Americas, and potentially usher in a new era of transnational agreements that challenge traditional notions of national sovereignty and international cooperation. The deal also faces substantial legal and ethical challenges that also reach well beyond the region. As this unprecedented deal unfolds, its success or failure will likely influence future policy decisions and diplomatic negotiations far beyond the immediate context of El Salvador and the United States. The international community will be closely watching the implementation and consequences of this agreement, as it may set the stage for a new paradigm in global governance of migration and criminal justice.