Category: Chapter 10

Is the Panama Canal Drying Up?

Chapter 10 / Central America's Canals

Lucy Goodman

November 2020

In the last year a number of articles have appeared in the international press expressing concern about the recently expanded Panama Canal. Lucy Goodman translated and summarised them for The Violence of Development website in the following article. (Lucy was one of the original research assistants who worked with Martin Mowforth in Central America on the production of the book ‘The Violence of Development’ published by Pluto Press in 2014.) We are grateful to Lucy for her time and effort on behalf of the website.

The Panama Canal is one of the great engineering achievements of the 20th century. This watery bridge between the world’s two largest oceans facilitates around 6 per cent of world trade and permits the passage of more than 12,000 ships a year.

First opened in 1914, the Canal recently re-opened in 2016 after a US$5.5 billion expansion to accommodate modern cargo ships that outgrew the original infrastructure. The massive excavation project doubled the Canal’s carrying capacity by creating a second, larger traffic lane and constructing the ‘NeoPanamax’ locks at both Atlantic and Pacific ends; 70 feet wider and 18 feet deeper than their predecessors.

The government agency charged with managing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure (Panama Canal Authority or ACP), called the expansion a “marvel and a game changer.” Recently, however, the Canal has experienced severe water shortages which have jeopardised its functionality.

The question is: how can a canal connected to two oceans be without water?

The answer is in the extraordinary expenditure of freshwater during the passage of each ship through the locks. The locks rely on an injection of water from artificial lakes. The main reservoir, El Gatún, covers more than 430 km² and provides precious drinking water to the densely populated surrounding area. Before the expansion, an average of 50 million gallons of water was spent (75 Olympic swimming pools) on each passing ship, at a rate of 35 ships a day. Despite the installation of the NeoPanamax locks and their water saving tanks, around 20 million gallons of freshwater is still used on every passing ship. The ACP pay close attention to lake levels and has been on high alert since El Gatún was “well below average” in 2019.

The historically low levels of late have largely been attributed to the global climate crisis. Panamanian hydrologist Cárdenas Castillero said 2019 was among the driest years Panama has seen, with a strong El Niño, and an increase in temperatures and rainfall variability. The Canal’s watershed recorded a 20 per cent rainfall reduction compared to historic averages, equating to the fifth driest year in seven decades. According to the ACP, the temperature in the watershed rose by 0.5 to 1.5°C which caused a 10 per cent increase in evaporation potential from Lakes Gatún and Alhajuela (another reservoir constructed in 1953 to supply the locks).

Carlos A. Vargas, Vice President of the ACP, stated “we’ve had an extraordinarily dry year and have implemented various methods to safeguard the water resource.”

In February 2020 the ACP reduced the daily quota of ships traversing the Canal and limited their draught, to reduce water consumption and ensure successful passage. A fixed tariff charge of up to US$10,000 was introduced to shipping companies for the freshwater they consumed on route across Panama. Another variable charge was introduced which considers the lake levels on the day of the ship’s crossing; the lower the level the higher the fee. As the rain deficits progressed, hydroelectric generation, via the Gatún dam, and hydraulic aid, which assists ships into the lock chambers, were both eliminated.

Panamanian meteorologists could not agree whether the drought would get better or worse at the start of this year’s rainy season, but by the beginning of May 2020 the ACP confirmed that water saving initiatives were having an effect and lake levels could permit larger draught vessels than had been tentatively planned for. The Canal authority states that the water consumption fees will remain in place until the ACP’s fiscal gains recover.

In early September 2020, the Canal Authority officially opened the multi-million-dollar tender to redesign the Canal’s water management system. The publication of the specification is a big step forward in securing the Canal’s water supply for the next 50 years amidst increasing climate variability and future uncertainty. Applicants are expected to submit a portfolio of projects to strengthen and optimize water management. Proposals and valuations should be presented in the final trimester of 2021 and the Canal Authority hope to identify the winning candidate by the end of next year.

Finally, in late September 2020, the result of recent rainfall and successful water management measures allowed vessels with a maximum draught of 50 feet to pass through the Canal, for the first time in 20 months.

Lack of rainfall in 2019 meant the maximum draught had been only 46-feet, until June this year when the Canal’s capacity progressively augmented. Each additional foot of water depth affords around 330 extra containers carried per ship. This favourably impacts the economy of scale and offers an all-round more profitable route.

At the end of the 2019 financial year, a record 450 million tons of cargo had passed between the two oceans and annual revenue reached US$3,365 million, the highest since 1914. The ACP now faces the substantial challenge of keeping the Canal operational whilst preventing contagion of COVID-19. Data from the last two months indicate that the number of ships crossing the Canal has only decreased from 35 ships per day to 34, and that the queue of ships waiting to transit remains at pre-coronavirus levels.

References:

 

An airport in eastern El Salvador?

Chapter 10 / Transport infrastructure developments

At the beginning of 2020, El Salvador’s Autonomous Port Executive Commission (CEPA by its Spanish initials) sought firms to conduct a feasibility study into the construction of an airport in the east of the country close to the port of La Unión, to be known as the Pacific Airport. Eleven firms were given 300 days to produce their studies and the results of these should be presented in November this year. The decision on which study to accept will be made public in September 2021.

The aim of the plan is to provide air transport connection to the east of the country and for this development to become a pole of economic development for this region of the country.

A marketing study is also seen as an important part of the presentation, to include estimates of the demand by both airlines and by passengers, the commercial demand and possible projections of air traffic in the region. Additionally the study should make recommendations about how the project should be executed, possibly by a public-private partnership.

CEPA President Federico Anliker has explained that four specific sites have been identified for the potential airport. He further outlined two major reasons why an airport is necessary: first, because more than 50 per cent of Salvadorans living in the east of the country have relatives in the United States and this represents a potential demand for air travel; second, an airport will help the east of the country to develop and promote a tourism industry there.

Sources

  • Rosa María Pastrán, 10.03.20, ‘CEPA abre proceso para estudio de factibilidad de aeropuerto en el oriente de El Salvador’, La Prensa Gráfica, El Salvador
  • Comisión Ejecutiva Portuaria Autónoma (CEPA): cepa.gob.sv
  • Eddie Galdamez, 09.09.20, ‘The El Salvador Pacific Airport. A Project by Nayib Bukele’, El Salvador Info, elsalvadorinfo.net/el-salvador-pacific-airport/

 

Trawl fishing in Costa Rican waters approved but vetoed

Chapter 10 / Fishing

By Martin Mowforth

Key words: Trawl fishing; Costa Rica; shrimps; untargeted species; sustainable exploitation.

In mid-October, the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly approved the Act of ‘Sustainable Exploitation of Shrimp Fishing in Costa Rica’ (Act 21,478). Despite its title and its claim to sustainability, the act would have opened up the seas around Costa Rica to over-fishing by the use of trawl techniques. Semi-industrial licenses for shrimp fishing with trawl techniques would be granted by the state-run Incopesca (Instituto Costaricense de Pesca y Acuicultura).

Shrimp trawling is condemned by environmentalists and by academics at the University of Costa Rica especially on the grounds that the trawl nets are not selective and collect up other marine species such as turtles and sharks. The Environment Ministry also opposed the legislation, stating that trawling “generates greater pressure on ecosystems and resources that are already over-exploited.”  Mariano Castro of Turtle Island Restoration Network said that “This extremely harmful fishing method should be banned, not brought back.”

A shrimp trawler off the Costa Rican Pacific coast in 2015. Photo credit: Lindsay Fendt/Tico Times

Trawlers drag a net behind them to catch numerous species of fish along with the shrimp, but they also sweep up turtles and other non-targeted species of marine life. Turtles often rest and forage on the sea bed and are likely to be among those species caught up in the nets.

In 2013 the Costa Rican Constitutional Court ruled shrimp trawling to be unconstitutional and declared that it could only be re-commenced if a significant reduction in incidental catch could be demonstrated. Some studies were conducted during the administration of Luis Guillermo Solis and more recently under President Alvarado, but these were rejected on the grounds that they were geographically restricted and/or referred to only two types of shrimp.

A crucial factor behind the Presidential veto of the legislation was public opinion. Dozens of artisanal fishers protested in front of the Legislative Assembly against the reactivation of trawling. On the way to San José they suffered road blocks set up by shrimp workers, who were fearful of losing their jobs. Despite that they managed to change the minds and votes of several deputies. More general public opinion and international influence were also of some significance behind the President’s veto. Another important factor behind the veto, however, was, as Costa Rican journalist Patricia Blanco said, “the pressure of many social sectors and the public in general; Carlos Alvarado also felt obliged to honour his campaign promises.”

It is contended that when trawling was resumed in 2009 the artisanal fleet fell by 70 per cent and that when the last licenses for trawling expired the fish catch and average fish size increased.

Sources

Tico Times Weekly News Brief, various.

Turtle Island Restoration Network (TIRN) 23.10.20, ‘Costa Rica Approves Controversial Bill to Resume Trawl Fishing’

TIRN, 28.10.20, ‘Thousands Oppose Controversial Trawl Fishing Bill in Costa Rica’

The Costa Rica News, 20.10.20, ‘Dozens of Artisanal Fishermen Demonstrated Against Trawling in front of the National Assembly’

Fabiola Pomareda García, 22.10.20, ‘Aprueban cuestionado proyecto de pesca de arrastre que reabre mares a la sobreexplotación pesquera’, Semanario Universidad.

Fabiola Pomareda García, 27.10.20, ‘Más sectores solicitan al presidente Alvarado vetar la ley de pesca de arrastre’, Semanario Universidad.

Alejandro Zúñiga, 30.10.20, ‘President Carlos Alvarado vetoes Costa Rica’s controversial trawling project’, Tico Times.

Nicaraguans in Costa Rica: A Manufactured ‘Refugee’ Crisis

Chapter 10 / Migration and Remittances

There is undoubtedly a refugee and migrant crisis in Central America, one that has fuelled the migrant caravans from the Northern Triangle countries to the United States over the last two years. But the data is not always 100 per cent reliable, as John Perry explains here. We are grateful to John for permission to reproduce his article which first appeared in the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) at: https://www.coha.org/nicaraguans-in-costa-rica-a-manufactured-refugee-crisis/

March 23, 2020  

By John Perry
Masaya, Nicaragua

Key words: Coronavirus, Costa Rica, COVID-19, Nicaragua; refugees; economic migrants.

  • The situation has mostly normalized in Nicaragua and yet the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is promoting an imminent refugee crisis narrative.
  • 80% of the recent asylum requests came from people who had been living and working in Costa Rica without documents, before Nicaragua’s crisis of April 2018.
  • In 2018 Costa Rica approved only six asylum claims; by May 2019 it had approved a total of 24, and by then it had also rejected 1,300 as being “economic migrants,” not genuine asylum seekers.
  • In 2018, over 800,000 Nicaraguans were coming and going from Costa Rica: 48% of those were travelling back to Nicaragua. Numbers rose to 830,000 in 2019.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for World Peace, and some of the mainstream media, are raising the spectre that a crisis is unfolding because of increased refugee emigration from Nicaragua to Costa Rica. Yet neither the empirical data on migration between these two Central American nations nor the return to normalcy in Nicaragua support this argument. The coronavirus pandemic, which has led to tighter border closures between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, is putting a spotlight on this issue. Here we examine the history of the Nicaraguan immigrant presence in Costa Rica and argue that projections of a refugee crisis are not consistent with the evidence.

The coronavirus epidemic is still in its early stages in Central America but it has already put a focus on Costa Rica’s dependency on workers from Nicaragua. At any one time there are around 400,000 Nicaraguans working in the neighbouring country, especially doing building work, domestic work, as security guards or in agriculture. Given that a large proportion are undocumented, the real figure could be much higher, a very significant addition to Costa Rica’s population of under five million people. Yet the Vice-President of Costa Rica, Epsy Campbell, made a call this month to employers to persuade their Nicaraguan workers to stay put over the coming Easter holidays when otherwise they might leave to see their families.[1] She was clearly worried about the impact on Costa Rica’s economy if workers left the country and were unable to return because of the restrictions at the border resulting from the coronavirus epidemic.

 

President Alvarado promotes the refugee narrative while peace returns to Nicaragua.

So the current epidemic has brought grudging recognition by Costa Rica of the importance of ‘Nicas’ to its economy. Yet until just a few weeks ago, Costa Rica’s president Carlos Alvarado was making regular calls for help to deal with the numbers pleading asylum in the country since the attempted coup in Nicaragua in April 2018.

Alvarado has cultivated a close relationship with the UN High Commission for Refugees, whose officials have praised Costa Rican institutions during their regular visits. Last year they awarded his government $650 million to meet the “challenge” created by the ongoing ‘crisis’ in Nicaragua, even though by then Costa Rica’s neighbour had long been at peace.[2]

 

UNHCR claims of “refugee outflows” from Nicaragua not substantiated by the data

Then on March 10 this year 2020, even as the coronavirus crisis was escalating, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), suddenly decided to dramatize a problem that most people had thought was being steadily resolved. Its spokesperson Shabia Mantoo asserted that 4,000 Nicaraguans “continue to flee their country” every month, principally to Costa Rica.[3] “With no political resolution in sight”, she tweeted, “refugee outflows [are] expected to continue,” making no reference to the amnesties in Nicaragua for those who left for Costa Rica and the promises of safe return.[4] Despite the UNHCR giving no source for its claim that 4,000 Nicaraguans continue to flee abroad, its message was accepted as authoritative and quickly picked up by international media. The Guardian, for example, warned that the “exodus [is] expected to continue… amid fears of [a] repeat of state and police repression.”[5] The Organisation for World Peace went much further, making the absurd claim that Nicaragua threatens to cause the world’s next big refugee crisis.[6]

 

A porous border that ensures work for thousands of Nicaraguans

In this situation, especially as both countries face a real crisis produced by the coronavirus pandemic, cool heads are needed. These alarmist stories are not only bereft of real facts, but appear to be written by people ignorant of the historic economic and social ties between these two countries, which are much stronger than, for example, either country’s relationship with its neighbours to the north (Honduras) or the south (Panama). At the end of 2018, almost 350,000 Nicaraguans were officially recognised as residents in Costa Rica, a figure which had grown by only 10,000 during the year of Nicaragua’s crisis.[7] Many more, possibly even the same number again, are believed to live and work undocumented in Costa Rica. This is made possible by the long and porous land border: there are said to be 20 or more unofficial crossing places, many of them known to authorities on both sides. Nicaraguans can easily cross into Costa Rica, work for perhaps six months harvesting coffee or picking bananas, and return home with their wages, no questions asked. Most Nica families, especially in rural areas, have someone who has done this.

The reality is that huge numbers of Nicaraguans travel in both directions across the border on a daily basis. For example, official figures show that in March 2018, a month before the crisis, 33,000 Nicaraguans headed south while 44,000 returned home. The whole of 2018 saw over 800,000 Nicaraguans coming and going: 48% of those were travelling back to Nicaragua, a country which according to the UNHCR was (and still is) in “political and social crisis”. Numbers rose to 830,000 in 2019, now almost evenly split between those travelling in either direction.[8] Indeed, extra demand led the long-distance bus companies operating between the two countries to increase their services. And, of course, the large volume of undocumented border crossings must be added to these official figures.

 

Just a handful of Nicaraguan asylum claims have been granted by Costa Rica

How does this help us understand the “refugee outflow” from Nicaragua? First, we have to ask whether the figures being quoted are plausible. Costa Rican migration figures show a total of just under 55,000 applications for asylum by Nicaraguans in the past two years (23,063 in 2018[9] and approximately 31,500[10] in 2019). Assuming these accurately reflect the bureaucratic process, they are significantly below the figure of 77,000 given by the UNHCR.[11] Even if all of the 55,000 were new arrivals, the numbers are very small as a proportion of Nicaraguans officially crossing into Costa Rica. For example, in 2018 asylum requests came from less than 6% of those officially counted as crossing the border that year, and of course this would be an even smaller proportion if illegal border crossings were taken into account.[12] Even counting its non-Nicaraguan asylum seekers, Costa Rica has just 0.05% of the global total of nearly 75 million people classified as “of concern” to the UNHCR.[13] It seems Costa Rica is far from facing “the world’s next big refugee crisis.”

 

Most “refugees” are actually economic migrants

What is more, the 55,000 claims appear to include many that aren’t genuine. President Alvarado acknowledged in August 2018 that more than 80% of the recent asylum requests came from people who had been living in Costa Rica without documents, before Nicaragua’s crisis of April 2018.[14] In other words, four out of five asylum seekers were (according to the Costa Rican government itself) judged to be economic migrants, living in the country already and now trying to take advantage of the crisis to regularise their status. This might explain why Costa Rica is approving very few of these applications: in 2018 it approved only six; by May 2019 it had approved a total of 24, and by then it had also rejected 1,300 as being “economic migrants,” not genuine asylum seekers. During 2018, Nicaraguan applicants had one chance in 3,800 of being officially accepted, whereas asylum seekers from El Salvador (for example) had a one in ten chance. Nicaraguans also accounted for 84% of the 1,181 people deported in 2018. In addition, Costa Rica gave over 4,800 Nicaraguan asylum seekers permission to work, instead of recognising them as refugees, officially accepting that they were there to obtain jobs.[15]

The UNHCR not only exaggerates – probably by a very big margin – the number of genuine asylum seekers in Costa Rica, it goes on to claim that there are 4,000 new asylum seekers per month, expecting “these numbers to grow”.[16] This amounts to forecasting in excess of 50,000 new cases over the course of 2020, or a near doubling of the total reached at the end of 2019. It seems little more than a figure plucked from the air. Why would more people leave now than at the peak of the crisis in 2018? Is the UNHCR unaware that, by the Costa Rican government’s own admission, more than three-quarters of cases arise from Nicaraguans already living there? If, as the enduring presence of Nicaraguan labour in Costa Rica indicates (and is implied by the Costa Rican government’s decisions on cases) the pressure to emigrate from Nicaragua to Costa Rica is mainly an economic one, why would one expect more people to leave as the Nicaraguan economy recovers from the damage done by the roadblocks and other disruptions in 2018? Of course, both economies are now susceptible to damage as a result of the pandemic, but if anything this will lead to less movement across the border as security measures tighten.

The 2019 report Dismissing the Truth noted that some informal interviews carried out with Nicaraguan asylum seekers in Costa Rica confirmed what President Alvarado had said about many being economic migrants.[17] Of those who were recent arrivals, some said they were not fleeing persecution but rather had been affected by the intense economic crisis produced in Nicaragua by the blockading of cities by opposition gangs in the period April-July 2018, which meant that businesses closed down and many workers lost their jobs. Some had fled because they had committed crimes when controlling the roadblocks and were well aware they would be held accountable if they stayed. Those in this category included (for example) the criminals responsible for the kidnap, torture and murder of the unarmed police officer Gabriel de Jesús Vado Ruíz in Masaya, Nicaragua, on July 14-15, 2018.

 

Most of the prominent opposition figures have returned to Nicaragua

Perhaps the biggest paradox is that, as the figures in this article indicate, Nicaraguans have been free to travel in and out their country and many have done so, encouraged by the amnesty granted in 2019. One of the internationally accepted tests of a genuine refugee is that they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. As the Costa Rican government makes clear from its actions, most Nicaraguans in the country do not meet this test. Those returning to Nicaragua have included most of the prominent political critics of Nicaragua’s Sandinista government, who have not only moved back but have since been busy travelling to the United States and elsewhere, lobbying against their own government, apparently without facing any problems on their return. It is of course very much part of their message that Nicaragua is still in a “crisis” which can only be resolved if they, rather than elected President Daniel Ortega, were to be in power.

 

Both UNHCR and the OAS misrepresent the situation

The UNHCR is not the only international body to be complicit in sustaining the argument that Nicaragua’s crisis is unresolved. The same applies, for example, to the Organisation of American States (OAS). Costa Rica’s leaders have been consistent critics of the Sandinista governments, and they have both a political and economic interest in maintaining the fiction that it is they who are suffering from Nicaragua’s continuing “crisis”. It has taken a pandemic to flush out the truth, that Costa Rica is as dependent on Nicaragua economically as Nicaragua is on Costa Rica. And as to the true scale and nature of the refugee problem in Costa Rica, the UNHCR has a duty to explain the actual context, report the facts, and avoid alarmist forecasts that have little basis in reality.

 

John Perry is a writer based in Nicaragua and writes on Central America for The Nation, London Review of Books, Open Democracy and The Grayzone.

Endnotes

[1] “Gobierno pide a residentes nicaragüenses no abandonar el país en los próximos días,” https://semanariouniversidad.com/pais/gobierno-pide-a-residentes-nicaraguenses-no-abandonar-el-pais-en-los-proximos-dias/

[2] “Costa Rica y OEA firman proyecto por $650 mil para atender a migrantes nicaragüenses en suelo tico,” http://cb24.tv/2019/08/12/costa-rica-y-oea-firman-proyecto-por-650-mil-para-atender-a-migrantes-nicaraguenses-en-suelo-tico/

[3] “Two years of political and social crisis in Nicaragua force more than 100,000 to flee,” https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/3/5e6759934/years-political-social-crisis-nicaragua-forces-100000-flee.html

[4] https://twitter.com/Shabia_M/status/1237335001823350786

[5] “Over 100,000 have fled Nicaragua since brutal 2018 crackdown, says UN,” https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/mar/11/over-100000-have-fled-nicaragua-since-brutal-2018-crackdown-says-un

[6] “Nicaraguan Dissent Threatens To Cause The Next Big Refugee Crisis,” https://theowp.org/nicaraguan-dissent-threatens-to-cause-the-next-big-refugee-crisis/

[7] All statistics quoted in the article, unless otherwise referenced, are taken from the monthly and annual reports on the statistics page of the Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería, Costa Rica (http://www.migracion.go.cr/Paginas/Centro%20de%20Documentaci%C3%B3n/Estad%C3%ADsticas.aspx#collapseFour) (hereafter cited as Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería).

[8] Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería.

[9] Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería.

[10] “Migración recibe a Kelly Clements, Alta Comisionada Adjunta para los Refugiados de las Naciones Unidas,” http://www.mgp.go.cr/prensa/noticias/336-migracion-recibe-a-kelly-clements-alta-comisionada-adjunta-para-los-refugiados-de-las-naciones-unidas

[11] “Two years of political and social crisis in Nicaragua force more than 100,000 to flee,” https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/3/5e6759934/years-political-social-crisis-nicaragua-forces-100000-flee.html

[12] Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería.

[13] Statistics available at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.73827218.1882832936.1584822524-850912820.1584397536

[14] “Presidente de Costa Rica defiende atención a migración nicaragüense por crisis,” https://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/472337-costa-rica-atencion-migracion-nicaraguense-crisis/

[15] Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería.

[16] “Two years of political and social crisis in Nicaragua force more than 100,000 to flee,” https://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/briefing/2020/3/5e6759934/years-political-social-crisis-nicaragua-forces-100000-flee.html

[17] Available at https://afgj.org/dismissing-the-truth-why-amnesty-international-is-wrong-about-nicaragua

Migration and forced displacement in Central America

Chapter 10 / Migration and Remittances

By Martin Mowforth

Key words: migration; forced displacement; Central America; Norther Triangle countries; UNHCR data; refugees; asylum seekers.

In early December [2020], data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) relating to refugees in and asylum seekers from Central American countries showed the following:.

  • There are around 470,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the north of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) throughout the world.
  • There are more than 97,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Mexico from Central America.
  • There are over 318,000 internally displaced people in Honduras and El Salvador.
  • Over 102,000 Nicaraguans have left their country during 2020.

The UNHCR website explains that:

“Growing numbers of people in Central America are being forced to leave their homes. … Compounded by socio-economic instability and poverty, they are escaping gang violence, threats, extortion, recruitment into gangs or prostitution, as well as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people – collectively known as LGBTI – are also feeling persecution. Many more are displaced more than once within their own countries or have been deported back home, often into dangerous situations.”

“The escalating situation of chronic violence and insecurity, coupled with COVID-19-related restrictions, is exacerbating hardship and persecution for tens of thousands of people in Central America, who now have limited means of finding protection and making ends meet.”

The UNHCR website cites Raúl who fled with his family from El Salvador to neighbouring Guatemala: “We had our own bakery in El Salvador, until gangs arrived, and we could no longer sell bread. We were threatened out of our country.”

Whilst there are similar factors at play in the three Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – as described in the UNHCR quote above – the situation in Nicaragua has rather different recent causes. In the case of Nicaragua, the UNHCR puts the number of refugee and asylum seekers down to political persecution. Whilst this may explain the motives of some of those included in the data, the UNHCR data should be questioned as many of the applications from Nicaraguans for asylum or refugee status or citizenship within Costa Rica come from Nicaraguans who are already resident in Costa Rica or are regular economic migrants who travel seasonally to work on the Costa Rican plantations or who do domestic work there.

Indeed, the UNHCR is accused of manufacturing a ‘refugee crisis’ by John Perry who explains in more detail the misuse of data in his article ‘Nicaraguans in Costa Rica: A Manufactured ‘Refugee’ Crisis’ which is also included as the next item in this month’s additions to The Violence of Development website (December 2020).

Electric motoring is still not easy in Costa Rica

Chapter 10 / Transport infrastructure developments

By Martin Mowforth

Key words: decarbonisation; electric vehicles; EV charging stations.

The first two articles in this section of ‘The Violence of Development’ website (dated April 2019 and March 2020 – section entitled ‘Transport infrastructure developments’ in Chapter 10) reported on the intention of the Costa Rican government, and especially of President Carlos Alvarado and the First Lady, Claudia Dobles, to decarbonise the country. One pillar of their strategy, for which the First Lady is directly responsible, is their efforts to convert the country’s fleet of motor vehicles from oil to electricity.

A report in the Tico Times (an English language online newspaper on Costa Rica) states that the country added 727 new electric vehicles during 2020, giving the country a total of 3,106. 330 of the 727 were purchased by the government and assigned to public institutions.

As the Presidency suggests, Costa Rica is undoubtedly a leader in this field in Central America, and also in Latin America. But the total of 3,106 is only a fraction – less than 0.3% to be a little more precise – of the total motorised vehicles registered in the country.

The intent of the government, however, is shown clearly in the growing number of electric vehicle charging stations which now number around 120 and have a countrywide coverage. The PlugShare website identifies these EV charging stations as shown on the map below.

The intent is important and undeniable, but there is a very long way to go.

Guatemala / Belize border dispute

Chapter 10 / Selected political developments and politicians in Central America

By Martin Mowforth, March 2021

Guatemala gained its independence from Spain in 1821 and claims that it inherited Spain’s original claim to a large part of what is now Belizean territory – see map. Belize gained its independence from the UK in 1981 and argues that the borders were defined by an 1859 boundary convention between the UK and Guatemala.

In April 2018, over 95% of Guatemalan voters (with a low turnout of only 25%) voted in favour of referring the decision about the border dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based in The Hague, although the two countries had already, in 2008, agreed to allow the ICJ to resolve the dispute. In April 2019, Belizeans also approved the reference of the dispute to the ICJ by a 55% to 45% majority.

Relations between the two current governments are cordial and on 8th March this year (2021) the Latin America News Dispatch reported that officials from the two governments  met at the disputed border between the two countries on 4th March, the first time that such a meeting has taken place. In the meeting, which took place at an Organisation of American States (OAS) office, Belize Foreign Minister Eamon Courtenay and his Guatemalan counterpart Pedro Brolo Villa expressed a shared desire to improve relations between the two countries, which have deteriorated because of the border dispute. Since independence, Guatemala has claimed all or part of the territory of Belize.

Despite the cordial governmental relations, the last two decades have witnessed various illegal incursions and resource thefts by Guatemalans in the disputed territory and numerous killings of Guatemalan squatters by Belizean civilians and soldiers. At times even air travel between the two countries has been affected.

The ICJ is currently analyzing briefs submitted by each country.

 

Nicaragua, COP26, Climate Justice and Reparations

Chapter 10 / Climate change, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and carbon credits

By Helen Yuill (Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign), February 2021

This article was first published by the Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign (NSC). We are grateful to Helen, a coordinator of the NSC, for permission to reproduce the article on The Violence of Development website. Helen made minor revisions of the original article for the TVOD website.

Key words: climate change; climate injustice; Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage; Paris Agreement; universal responsibility versus common but differentiated responsibility; COP26.

 

In the lead up to COP26 in November this year,  the Nicaraguan representative Dr Paul Oquist, argues that the high level of social and economic destruction caused by Covid-19 and its impact on humanity will be ‘small, transient and recoverable’ compared with the potential total, irreversible destruction of the climate crisis. This is a view now shared by millions across the globe.

 

Climate injustice is inseparable from social and economic injustice

Countries of the Global South, such as Nicaragua, have been impoverished by colonialism and centuries of subjugation to the needs and wants of the North.  The resulting climate injustice is therefore inseparable from the multiple forms of social and economic injustice and inequality between and within nations.

In the case of the climate crisis, countries of the Global South – such as Nicaragua – and their most marginalised citizens suffer the most severe consequences of climate extremes for which they bear least responsibility. These countries also lack the resources to confront the violence of poverty, the violence of Covid-19 and violence of the climate crisis.

 

Climate Justice and reparations for loss and damage

COP13 in Warsaw agreed the ‘Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage’ – here’s the link to the reference: https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/loss-and-damage-ld/warsaw-international-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage-associated-with-climate-change-impacts-wim The mechanism acknowledges that “loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves, more than that which can be reduced by adaptation.”

An Alliance of Small Island States and Least Developed countries argued a long standing claim for reparations for the disproportionate loss and damage they had suffered.  However, this was strongly resisted by developed countries, especially the US, and the final agreement focuses on ‘enhancing knowledge and understanding’ and ‘strengthening dialogue and coordination’, and ‘capacity building’.

 

The Paris Agreement 2015 (COP21) fudges the issue of loss and damage

Nicaragua initially refused(*) to sign the Paris Agreement arguing that “doing so would mean being complicit to an Agreement that would lead to a catastrophic three degree increase in global warming because ‘ the largest polluters lack the political will and ambition to address the most pressing issue facing the planet and humanity’.”

Instead of apportioning blame to the largest polluters, COP21 invented the concept of universal responsibilities which effectively meant that “we are all responsible for climate change and we all have to contribute to the solution”.  This nullified the concepts of historic responsibilities and common but differentiated responsibility central to the UN Convention on Climate Change.

Although the Paris Agreement provides for the continuation of the Warsaw International Mechanism it explicitly states that its inclusion “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”. The inclusion of this clause was the condition on which developed countries, particularly the United States, agreed to a reference to loss and damage.

This meant that there was no apportioning of blame on the largest polluters, including the UK, historically responsible for the highest levels of emissions. In effect this means forcing countries of the Global South to bear the cost of climate extremes through loss of lives, livelihoods and environmental destruction.

After COP21 Paul Oquist stated: “The Paris outcome is similar to the rescue by governments of the banks which caused the 2008 financial and economic crisis, passing the bill for the crisis on to workers, pensioners and taxpayers. In Paris, the rescue was of the COP21 governments which have caused global warming, passing the cost to those least responsible who will die in the largest numbers unable to make good their losses, much less adapt to a change in climate increasing in intensity as the century wears on.”

 

COP26 in Glasgow, November 2021

In the lead up to COP26, Nicaragua is advocating that leaders of countries such as the UK, who are most responsible for causing the crisis, must recognise and act on their historic responsibility to provide reparations in the form of climate finance.

Loss and damage must be raised to the same level as mitigation and adaptation: this is what would constitute climate justice.

For countries such as Nicaragua, this finance is critical to enable them to change their energy matrix to renewables, to finance extensive reafforestation, to put in place other emission reduction measures, and to meet sustainable development goals, particularly in poverty reduction.

Nicaragua is also calling for an international green alliance which would bring together developed and developing countries to confront the climate crisis.

(*) Nicaragua ratified the Paris Agreement in 2017 after finding itself – for completely opposite reasons – in a club of two with the Trump administration.

Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign: nicaraguasc.org.uk

Bukele moves towards dictatorship and increases his popularity

Chapter 10 / Selected political developments and politicians in Central America

(Have we seen this somewhere before?)

By Martin Mowforth for The Violence of Development website – with thanks to the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES – www.cispes.org) and their newsletters. May 2021

Key words: El Salvador; President Bukele; New Ideas party; democracy; separation of powers; dictatorship; public approval.

If anyone had any doubts about President Bukele’s intentions to tear down any government institutions that could oppose him, he made them abundantly clear on Saturday, 1st May. On the first day of El Salvador’s new legislative term, Bukele’s New Ideas party, which now has an overwhelming majority, moved quickly to illegally sack all the members of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and the Attorney General, who were quickly replaced in a midnight session.

The decision to remove and replace the five magistrates failed to comply with the constitutionally-established justifications for doing so, and the magistrates were not granted a hearing and defence, as is their right under law.

It is clear that the basis of the decision was to eliminate any institutional opposition and to convert all of the branches of government into instruments of the president. This explains why the same legislators also removed the Attorney General, Raúl Melara and next may remove the Human Rights Ombudsman, José Apolonio Tobar Serrano, who, during the pandemic, denounced widespread violations of human rights and corruption among many members of the Bukele administration.

US Vice President Kamala Harris rejected the actions of El Salvador’s President for dismissing his country’s Attorney General and Supreme Court judges. “Washington is concerned about El Salvador’s democracy. An independent judiciary is vital to a healthy democracy and a strong economy,” Harris tweeted.[i]

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also reacted to Bukele’s decision to remove Salvadoran Attorney General Raúl Melara.”We urge President Bukele not to interrupt El Salvador’s democratic path, respect the separation of powers, defend the press, and support the private sector,” he said.

The Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) remarked that: “Condescending lectures from the Biden administration will not impede [these] assaults on democracy; President Bukele and his party are very clear on the type of dictatorship they wish to establish in El Salvador. If the United States government does not immediately act to restrict police, military, and other funds that strengthen the regime, there is no doubt that the United States, too, will be responsible for what follows.”[ii]

Meanwhile, as the following table shows, the President’s approval rating has remained high since he became president. In all the surveys conducted since taking office, Bukele has received a rating or score of over 75 percent. The table below shows just those polls conducted so far in 2021.[iii]

 

[i]  Telesur (3 May 2021) ‘Kamala Harris Rejects Actions of the President of El Salvador’.

[ii]  https://www.cispes.org/article/cispes-condemns-technical-coup-detat-el-salvador

[iii]  https://elsalvadorinfo.net/nayib-bukele-approval-rate/

Costa Rica increases its marine protected areas to pay off its historical debt (1)

Chapter 10 / Biodiversity loss, species loss, and coral loss

Report by Lucy Goodman, for The Violence of Development website.

Lucy Goodman is a marine conservation specialist who in 2010 was an assistant researcher with Martin Mowforth in Central America during the work conducted for the book ‘The Violence of Development’. The positive environmental factors in Costa Rica described by Lucy should be set against the regular reports of environmental contamination associated especially with the cultivation of the country’s export crops.

This year Costa Rica has surpassed a reforestation target by achieving 75 per cent forest cover after a low of 21 per cent in 1987. Since 2014, the country has satisfied more than 95 per cent of its energy demand from renewable sources – predominantly hydroelectric power (‘renewable’ but certainly not impact-free). And in 2017, the Costa Rican Institute of Electricity boasted a record-breaking 300 days of power supplied solely by renewables. Complete electrification of Costa Rica’s buses and taxis is expected by 2050, in line with the Paris Agreement’s net zero emissions target.

The country’s exemplary role in nature conservation, and dedication to climate change mitigation, won it the United Nations Environment Programme’s (UNEP) ‘2019 Champions of the Earth Award’. The UNEP declared Costa Rica pioneers of sustainability and hopes other nations will emulate their decarbonisation template.

For a relatively small country of five million people, Costa Rica, ranked 126th by land area, has a big reputation for ecological and climatic stewardship. This environmental accolade may precede it, given that Costa Rica’s marine territory is ten times larger than its terrestrial equivalent, and until recently, management efforts have solely focused on the latter. The country ostensibly lags behind in marine and coastal protection. Key threats come from pollution and water contamination, the illegitimate development of coastal infrastructure, unregulated shipping and the illegal extraction of marine resources.

Photograph of a mangrove in the Lower Sea Zone which subsists in the coastal waters of Costa Rica’s central Pacific coastal zone. | Photo: EFE

To start paying off its historical debt to oceanic biodiversity, Costa Rica has added more than 11,000 sq. km. to its charted marine management area. Four new zones:

  1. Montes Submarinos,
  2. Cabo Blanco,
  3. Bahía Santa Elena, and
  4. Barra Del Colorado

only equate to less than 3 per cent of the country’s marine territory under some level of protection. Although progressive, this figure falls short of the 10 per cent Costa Rica pledged to protect by this time. By contrast, 13,000 sq.km. of Costa Rica’s terrestrial area is protected; representing 25 per cent of the 30 per cent target.  Each marine protected area (MPA) has unique characteristics and a high ecosystems service value:

  1. Montes Submarinos is an oceanic mountain range, connected to the Galapagos Islands, which hosts sharks, rays, whales and is valued by migratory species, and fishermen
  2. The Nicoya peninsula has a few protected turtle nesting beaches already. The continental shelf slopes rapidly here facilitating whale, dolphin and orca watching. Cabo Blanco, was also designated for its submarine coral and rocky reef habitats.
  3. The Saint Elena Bay area, on the northern Pacific coast, also has valuable ‘black coral’ reefs and the country’s oldest rock formations.
  4. The case for Barra del Colorado, in the northern Caribbean, was made because of its coastal lagoon and channel network which support a very high concentration of migratory birds, nesting sea turtles, sperm whales, manatees and tarpon, a valued species for sport fishers.

Photograph of two herons seeking prey in a mangrove in the Lower Sea Zone, which subsists in the coastal waters of Costa Rica’s central Pacific coastal zone. | Photo: EFE

These new marine protected areas incorporate a governance system and local training programmes. To promote ecosystem recovery, the MPAs support ecotourism initiatives and local marine tour operators through the creation of business and management plans, improved internet access, family-run inns and endorsing fishing in combination with less invasive activities (e.g., snorkelling).

The ‘Costa Rica for ever Association’ encourages the government, private sector and civil society to fulfil the country’s environmental commitments. Director Zdenka Piskulich said “We may not have reached 30 per cent conservation, but what we are protecting, we are doing well and that is what we, as a country, can showcase to the world.”

Central America has a half century of experience with MPAs; the first official designation was the Peninsula de Cosiguina on Nicaragua’s Pacific coast in 1958.

An assessment by Carlos Espinosa in 2018, identified almost 200 sites in Central America purposefully created to protect oceanic and coastal habitats – although very few are official MPAs and there is dubious variability in their governance and management. A breakdown of these areas per country has Belize with 86, Panama with 45, Costa Rica with 24, Honduras with 23, Nicaragua with 8, Guatemala with 7 and El Salvador with 4. Espinosa’s updated map of Central American MPAs now shows 40 sites in Costa Rica – a doubling since 2018. https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=10WJV3Du2j3Cm3vtoMwwmgRHTnwQ&ll=17.829969272589658%2C-89.68465986328124&z=7

Whilst a handful of strategies have been successful, historically most protected areas in the region have not achieved a high level of success, and governments have failed to meet targets. Carlos Espinosa finds that “Poor rural people in Central America do not assign value to protected areas, since they fail to clearly perceive their services in the face of the rush to prosper in a degraded socioeconomic environment where too often the alternative is to fight to survive amid misery, corruption and crime” (Dos Mares). It is this lack of community prioritisation that currently inhibits MPA success in Central America. Dos Mares, resourced by Carlos Espinosa himself, is a voluntary initiative that works with poor communities within the reserves, to help them to perceive their value and identify the opportunities that protected marine areas bring.

References:

  1. El Economista, (2020) ‘Costa Rica amplía su área de protección marina para saldar deuda histórica’, 24 September 2020.
  2. The Costa Rican News (TCRN), (2020) ‘Costa Rica expands its Marine Protection Area in defence of Biodiversity’, 11 October 2020.
  3. Juan José Alvarado, Jorge Cortés, María Fernanda Esquivel and Eva Salas, (2012) ‘Costa Rica’s Marine Protected Areas: status and perspectives’, Revista de Biología Tropical, March 2012.
  4. Priyanka Shrestha, (2019) ‘Costa Rica receives UN’s highest environmental honour’, Energy Live News: https://www.energylivenews.com/2019/09/23/costa-rica-receives-uns-highest-environmental-honour/, 23 September 2019.
  5. Jonny Bairstow, (2017) ‘Costa Rica hits 300 days of clean power so far in 2017’ in Energy Live News, Costa Rica hits 300 days of clean power so far in 2017 – Energy Live News
  6. Carlos A. Espinosa, (2018) ‘The MPAs of Central America: An introductory view of their successes, lessons learned, and ongoing challenges’ (Article 1 of 3), 17 May 2018, MPA News.

Also of value in the preparation of this report were the following websites:
https://en.dosmares.org/
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=10WJV3Du2j3Cm3vtoMwwmgRHTnwQ&ll=11.989579700050982%2C-87.42379949999999&z=6
https://www.specialplacesofcostarica.com/costa-ricas-rainforest-how-the-country-managed-to-restore-it/
https://www.protectedplanet.net/en

 

Bukele eyes Bitcoin to renew El Salvador’s economic independence, but the economic and environmental impacts might not add up

Chapter 10 / Selected political developments and politicians in Central America

Since El Salvador adopted the US Dollar as the country’s main currency, both sides of the political spectrum have questioned the lack of economic autonomy that comes with being tied to the US Federal Reserve. Now as President Bukele pushes for the formal adoption of bitcoin as legal tender, Doug Specht writes on the political, economic, and environmental implications of such a move. This article has previously appeared in Geographical Magazine and the newsletter of the Environmental Network for Central America, and is reproduced here with kind permission of the author.

On 9th June 2021, El Salvador’s congress approved President Nayib Bukele’s proposal for Bitcoin, one of the world’s largest cryptocurrencies, to become legal tender within the nation. This will move the currency from a form of payment that businesses can choose to accept (Bitcoin is already legal in El Salvador, as it is in most countries) to one that they have to accept. Celebrating his win, Bukele quickly changed his profile picture on Twitter to one in which lasers are shining from his eyes, a move that did not go unnoticed by other crypto enthusiasts such as Elon Musk. To these enthusiasts, the act is seen as paving the way for Bitcoin to become more mainstream and accessible. Others, though, question why any government would wish to link themselves to a currency that sees wild volatility—in the week following the Salvadoran Congress’ approval, Bitcoin’s value fluctuated between US$38,200 and US$31,428, having previously hit more than US$58,000 through May.

So why would Bukele want to bring such a currency to the country? The reasons are complex and multifaceted. First, Bukele has earned a reputation of being technologically savvy and paints himself as much a social media star as a president. This, along with his promises to be radically different from the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), political parties that have dominated Salvadoran politics since the end of the Salvadoran Civil War, helped him win over young voters in 2019, leading to his election. Bukele enjoys announcing his ideas and policies on Twitter. Unlike former US president Donald Trump, though, his content is clever and nuanced and often draws upon longstanding Internet jokes and memes. Although Bukele’s personal futurist ambitions are surely the catalyst for this move, it is El Salvador’s complex financial and political history that have paved the way for the adoption of Bitcoin.

In 2001, El Salvador moved away from its own currency—the colón, which was adopted in 1892—and made the US dollar its legal, and only, currency. Although places such as Ecuador undertook dollarization to stem runaway inflation, El Salvador’s move was less driven by a moment of economic crisis—though it did reduce interest rates in the short term. Instead, it was the consequences of living in the United States’ backyard that forced El Salvador’s hand. Political turmoil, the bloody civil war, and US foreign policy led to the emigration of many Salvadorans to the United States. This saw trade links and remittances grow as expats transferred dollars back to El Salvador. In 2016, these remittances accounted for 17 percent of El Salvador’s GDP, around US$4.6 billion. The US has also accounted for up to 60 percent of El Salvador’s export trade. These transactions were smoothed by dollarization, but as the colón stopped circulating, El Salvador’s central bank ceased to have any role in monetary policy, with this now resting in the US Federal Reserve’s hands. The long-term benefits to El Salvador have been questioned, and many have called for the end of the US dollar in El Salvador and for the country to regain control of its reserves.

Bukele has announced this regaining of control, as well as both the boosting of the economy and increased ease of transferring remittances as reasons for Bitcoin adoption. However, his assertion that the Salvadoran GDP will increase by 25 percent if 1 percent of Bitcoin is invested in the country has been widely questioned by economists, who note that his cited Bitcoin market cap of US$680 billion is unstable and that most bitcoin owners will not be looking to invest in El Salvador. Furthermore, given that El Salvador has one of the lowest rates of Internet connectivity in the Americas, it is hard to see how the wider population will be able to embrace Bitcoin for the collection of remittances or otherwise.

If the economic reasons for Bitcoin adoption are questionable, it might still be seen as a politically astute move. Talk of smoothing remittances will win over overseas voters. It will also be seen as a step towards further independence from the US, a policy that can win votes on both the political left and right. El Salvador might have been economically better off if it had adopted a cryptocurrency that was more stable, but these, being linked one to one to the US dollar, would have been much less of a political statement.

As a way to court voters, though, with perhaps little real economic gain, the adoption of Bitcoin might have some deeply significant and very real impacts on the lives of Salvadorans—unintended consequences of Bukele’s desire to appear ultra-modern. The digital mining of Bitcoin, like other crypto currencies, involves – in simple terms – using sophisticated and high-powered computers to solve extremely complex computational maths problems, the completion of which is rewarded with the production of a new bitcoin which can be store in a digital wallet, and then used for purchases and trading. This process is hugely power intensive, using dozens of terawatts of electricity per year—more than the whole of countries such as the Netherlands. And with a large amount of Bitcoin mining taking place where electricity is the cheapest, the environmental impact is huge.

China has the most Bitcoin mining facilities of any country by far, and although the country has been slowly moving toward renewable energy, about two-thirds of its electricity comes from coal. The Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance estimates a single transaction of Bitcoin has the same carbon footprint as 680,000 Visa transactions. Other currencies such as Ethereum have made promises of being more environmentally friendly, but with little oversight of the crypto-mining industry these promises are hard to measure.

With El Salvador being highly susceptible to climate change, pushing for the use of such an environmentally damaging currency seems short-sighted. The World Bank already predicts that weather-related events and other hazards caused by climate change mean El Salvador is incurring annual losses of around 2.5 percent GDP. Severe weather events driven by climate change have also led to a significant loss of life, habitats, and biodiversity in the last 30 years. Unregulated and unabated crypto mining will further drive climate change, making living in many parts of the world increasingly difficult, including Central America.

Bukele claims to be bringing El Salvador into the future with cryptocurrency. His choice of Bitcoin, though, rather than those that claim more environmental credentials or those that are securely connected to the US dollar, suggest that this is little more than a political gimmick—and one that could have serious environmental consequences that cannot be outweighed by any financial gains.

Wildlife underpasses aid animal migrations

Chapter 10 / Biodiversity loss, species loss, and coral loss

(Photo: From Breaking Belize News)

In August this year [2021], Rubén Morales Iglesias reported for Breaking Belize News on the construction of wildlife underpasses to enable animals to cross the Coastal Road of Belize.

Panthera-Belize is the Belizean branch of the international organisation known as Panthera, whose Jaguar Corridor Initiative tries to protect jaguars throughout their whole six million square kilometres range. Pantherea-Belize has been advising the Belizean government on the construction of wildlife underpasses beneath the Coastal Road.

Panthera focuses on reducing the impacts of human development on panther populations and on mitigating human – jaguar conflicts by, for instance, training agriculturalists in building jaguar-proof livestock enclosures. In Central America, Panthera works with the governments of Belize, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.

In Belize, conservationists are working to create the Maya Forest Corridor connecting the Belize Maya Forest in the north-west of the country with the Maya Mountains Massif network of protected areas in southern Belize.

Panthera-Belize have monitored the area using camera traps and have so far documented up to 25 jaguars using land on either side of the Coastal Road. But not only jaguars inhabit the area. Pumas, tapirs and other wildlife species live on either side of the highway. The underpasses should help all of these populations to carry out their short-range and long-range movements and migrations.

Sources:

Panthera website: https://www.panthera.org/jaguars-conservation-country

Rubén Morales Iglesias, 21 August 2021, ‘Wildlife underpasses being built for animal crossings on Coastal Road’, Breaking Belize News.

James Krupa, 26 July 2021, ‘Huge wildlife corridor in Belize sees progress, boosting hope for jaguars and more (commentary)’, Mongabay.