Olancho: three thousand dead in a decade of violence without end

For: Proceso Digital Especial (proceso.hn)

28th February 2025

This website has already included numerous articles and reports about illegal logging within the Honduran department of Olancho and the violence that this activity caused for many people there, but especially for the Movimiento Ambiental de Olancho (MAO, Olancho Environmental Movement) and its leader Padre Andrés Tamayo. In February this year, the Honduran online newssheet Proceso Digital, spurred by the most recent and distressing homicide figures for the department of Olancho, produced an alarming summary of violence within the department over the previous ten years.

We are grateful to Jorja Oliver for her translation of the report. The original Spanish version is also included in the website.

 

Tegucigalpa- Things aren’t going well for the Olanchanos; the maelstrom of violence marked the biggest department of Honduras since the first day of 2025, with the first femicide of the year; an instance that occurred in Catacamas, the bastion of the presidential family, the Zelaya Castro:

– In 2024, there wasn’t a single Olanchano municipality that didn’t register any homicides.

– The official figures register 965 violent deaths in the Olancho department in the 3 years and 54 days of the administration of President Xiomara Castro.

– The mayor of Catacamas: “we are already used to picking up bodies, taking them to the morgue and delivering them to their families”.

Angie Nicolle Rivera Galeano, a young mother of barely 20 years old, lost her life at the hands of the person whom she thought she’d spend the rest of her life with, her partner. The man attacked her during the night close to the municipal market and fled the scene of the crime with her baby.

The young woman became the first violent death to be registered in Olancho in 2025, generating repudiation from the Catacamenses. But this is not the only municipality where blood has been spilt by the Olanchanos. By the 23rd of February, there were 37 registered homicides in Olancho, only surpassed by the 42 registered in the department of Francisco Morazán, although the population of the latter is bigger.

These figures remain lower than those registered in 2024, when on the same date, according to the public registers of the national police published through the Police Online Statistical System (SEPOL), 38 people died of violent causes, just one more than this year.

In 2025, four of the twenty most violent municipalities in the country are in Olancho: Catacamas, 14 deaths, the third most violent municipality in Honduras, superseded by Tegucigalpa DC with 36, and San Pedro Sula with 18, according to data from SEPOL. The Olancho departmental capital, Juticalpa, is in ninth place, with 7 deaths this year; number 15 is occupied by the municipality of Dulce Nombre De Culmi, with 5 deaths: Guata, in north Olancho, where this year has been the scene of 4 deaths, is in 18th place. The violence in the municipality of Catacamas has motivated the Argentine newspaper INFOBAE to dedicate a report titled “what’s going on in Catacamas? The new kilometre zero for narcotics trafficking and death in Honduras.”

 

A decade of blood

In 2024, Olancho reported 264 violent deaths, the most violent municipality being Catacamas, with 74 homicides, followed by Juticalpa with 64 deaths, Patuca 19. Culmí 17 and San Esteban 12.

Last year, there wasn’t a single Olanchano municipality that didn’t register any homicides, according to Sepol.

In 2013, the figures showed 54 homicides. Ten years ago in 2015, there were 39. In the 3 years and 54 days (to 23rd February 2025) of the LIBRE party’s administration, the cradle of the presidential couple, things aren’t going well for the Olanchanos, who have cried for the 965 dead.

2022, the first year of Xiomara Castro’s governance was the deadliest in Olancho in the last 11 years and 54 days – SEPOL registered 355 violent deaths that year. In comparison to the first 3 years and 54 days of the administration of the first period of Juan Orlando Hernandez, the Olanchanos cried for 644 loved ones, that is to say 321 people less than the administration of Xiomara Castro, in the same period.

In the meantime, in the second term of Hernandez, the number of violent deaths in the first three years and 2 months, was 860. When comparing the three terms, the footprint of blood that this violence has left in Olancho is 2,469 people.

If this sum is from 2014 to the 23rd February, the date in which SEPOL provided up-to-date data, the trail of violent deaths in Olancho rounds up to 3 thousand, specifically 2,946. In recounting this blood it is important to remember that Olancho is the cradle of three of the last four former presidents of Honduras, if we take into account that the current, Xiomara Castro and former president Porffirio Lobo, have resided the larger part of their lives in the vast department. and Manuel Zelaya was born there.

 

Violent February

The chain of attacks that occurred on the 14th and 15th of February, that left at least seven dead and at least a dozen throughout Honduras, brought to the mind of the Catacamenses the time of the peak of drug trafficking, in 2007 and 2013, when the planes circulated daily, the massacres had become daily events and the crossfire didn’t respect time or place.

On the night of the 14th of February, a gunman entered a bar and started shooting, killing 4 people n there. This modus operandi was repeated in three other canteens and a barbers, all in less than 24 hours.

After the incident on the Day of Love and Friendship, the mayor Marco Ramiro Lobo said that in Catacamas “we are already accustomed to just picking up bodies, taking them to the morgue and delivering them to their families.” The police deployment continues in the city after the recent incidents, where five attacks occurring in less than 24 hours scared the population; locking them in their houses and leaving the streets totally deserted.

“On that weekend going out frightened everyone, including to the corner shop, these shootings happened in plain sight, close to the church, to the shopping centre, just like confrontations happened in a full market or petrol stations some 15 or 20 years ago,” remembered an Olanchan woman.

The woman remembered that in 2009 a plane landed in a football field in San Pedro de Catacamas, a rural area around 15 kilometres from El Carbon, where the presidential family has their residence

.

Generalised violence in the department

The liberal deputy Samuel García García said that the violence that shakes the municipality of Catacamas also exists in the whole area of Olancho and pointed out that it is linked to the movement of drugs. “There’s lots of crime; people turn up dead in any place, on paths, on roads, machine-gunned in a bullet-riddled car. What is going on is lamentable, the violence is growing more each day in the department”, he said, stressing that the police effort has remained limited. García said that in Olancho there had never been a wave of crime this strong in less than 24 hours, and “really the origin of all these situations, we all know that Olancho has become a place for drug trafficking, as well as organised crime”.

 

Deaths yes, drug decommissioning no 

Despite the fact that, as deputy García points out, “whatever it says in the vox populi, what we are hearing are territorial fights, associated with drugs.” According to Proceso Digital in 2024, a record year for the decommissioning of drugs, no strong operations happened in Olancho.

The minister of security, Gustavo Sánchez, loyal defender of the state of exception which he judges to have led to the decommissioning of some 15 thousand firearms and the confiscation of more than 26 tonnes of cocaine. The official data confirms that 2024 was a record year for the confiscation of cocaine, such that even in the times when the most prolific drug cartels flourished, no more than 25 tonnes of cocaine had ever been confiscated.

In 2012, the country became the most violent in the world with a rate of 86 homicides per every 100 thousand inhabitants. According to the National Observatory of Violence from January to December of 2012, only the department of Olancho exceeded this rate, reaching a rate of 92.5 pccmh[i] with 491 homicides.

Although the figures of current homicides differ from those registered in the strongest time of drug trafficking in the department that inspired the works of the poet Froylán Turcios, with 37 deaths this year, more than 950 in what is the administration of Xiomara Castro and close to three thousand in the last decade, the truth is that things aren’t going well for the Olanchanos.

[i]  Pccmh – personas por cada cien mil habitantes; persons for every 100,000 inhabitants.

Impunidad y conflictividad llevan al OACNUDH a instalar oficina de terreno en el atlántico de Honduras

En las adiciones de este mes al sitio web https://theviolenceofdevelopment.com incluimos el siguiente informe de Proceso Digital (https://proceso.hn) sobre la situación en la costa atlántica de Honduras. También incluimos una traducción en inglés (por Jill Powis – agradecimientos). Estamos agradecido a Proceso Digital por su obra y su información.

Por: Especiales Proceso Digital

Impunidad y conflictividad llevan al OACNUDH a instalar oficina de terreno en el atlántico de Honduras

26 de mayo de 2025 

Palabras claves: Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Honduras (OACNUDH); derechos humanos; Costa Atlántica de Honduras; impunidad; defensores del territorio y del ambiente; Bajo Aguán; Garífuna.

 

Tegucigalpa (Especial Proceso Digital) – El anuncio de la OACNUDH no es para celebrar, es una advertencia sobre los niveles de conflictividad social y de impunidad que imperan en la región atlántica de Honduras, que amerita la instalación de una oficina de terreno para conocer y registrar in situ la situación de los derechos humanos. Es la segunda oficina de esa naturaleza que se abre en América Latina, después de Colombia.

– En septiembre de 2024 se registró el asesinato del ambientalista y líder religioso Juan López, quien incluso antes de su muerte responsabilizó a políticos oficialistas si le pasaba algo.

“Hoy no es un día cualquiera; con la apertura de esta oficina en La Ceiba, Honduras se convierte en el segundo país del continente, después de Colombia, en contar con una presencia de terreno del Alto Comisionado”, expresó Bardia Jebeli, representante Adjunto y Oficial a Cargo de OACNUDH en Honduras, el 16 de mayo cuando hizo oficial la instalación de esa dependencia, en una zona donde la conflictividad social por diversos motivos se encuentra a flor de piel.

La violencia e inseguridad sumada a las demandas por acceso a la tierra son algunos de los factores que hacen de esa zona del atlántico hondureño una de las más inseguras del país, pues afloran en paralelo bandas del crimen organizado, grupos paramilitares y otras redes de criminalidad que mantienen en zozobra a la población en vista que la autoridad y la institucionalidad estatal parecen haber sido rebasadas por la presencia de este tipo de actores.

[LEER] El Aguán, una violencia diferenciada con muchas aristas

La Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Honduras (OACNUDH) ha venido registrando en sus informes todos estos focos de conflictividad y violencia, alertando al gobierno y al Estado de Honduras sobre la gravedad de lo que acontece en esa zona, al punto que se está convirtiendo también en una de las principales regiones del país caracterizada por el desplazamiento forzoso de personas y familias.

Previo a la instalación de su oficina de terreno, como le denomina el OACNUDH, funcionarios de esta dependencia internacional socializaron la iniciativa con diversos sectores locales de la zona para reafirmar el compromiso del Alto Comisionado de Naciones Unidas de acompañar al Estado de Honduras en el cumplimiento de sus compromisos y obligaciones internacionales relacionadas con el respeto de los derechos humanos.

Después de una pausa prolongada, la OACNUDH en Honduras ha salido a la luz pública con planteamientos puntuales relacionados con el respeto a los derechos humanos en materia de defensa de la vida de los activistas humanitarios, la defensa de la libertad de expresión, la necesidad de reforzar el Mecanismo de Protección, que a 10 años de su creación, se mantiene desmantelado; la abolición del estado de excepción por sus abusos y violaciones humanitarias, acompañamiento a las comunidades garífunas, y demanda por el cese de la impunidad en el crimen del ambientalista y defensor de los territorios, Juan López, en la región de Tocoa.

[LEER] Asesinan a líder ambientalista y regidor de Tocoa, Colón, Juan López

Las funciones de una Oficina en Terreno

Ahora anuncia la instalación de una oficina in situ en la ciudad de La Ceiba para un mejor registro y acompañamiento de los casos de abuso y violaciones a los derechos humanos. Honduras, según el OACNUDH y otras dependencias de Naciones Unidas y la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), es uno de los  países más mortíferos para los defensores de los derechos humanos, con mayor énfasis a quienes se dedican a defender el medio ambiente y los territorios.

«Las autoridades recibieron con entusiasmo la noticia de la apertura de esta oficina y recalcaron su disposición para trabajar de forma colaborativa ante los desafíos que enfrenta la zona norte. Esperamos que esta colaboración se traduzca en resultados concretos en favor de los derechos humanos», afirmó Bardia Jebeli.

Después de Colombia, un país con una alta conflictividad social tras la firma de los acuerdos de paz, Honduras es el segundo país en América Latina que abre una oficina regional para tomar el pulso a los derechos humanos.

La labor de estas “oficinas en terreno” se circunscribe a estar más de cerca de las comunidades y de las situaciones de derechos humanos en el territorio. Contribuyen a fortalecer las capacidades locales y nacionales al apoyar a las instituciones estatales, la sociedad civil y otras organizaciones para que puedan promover y proteger los derechos humanos de manera efectiva.

Asimismo, proporciona asistencia técnica y asesoramiento al gobierno en la implementación de políticas y programas de derechos humanos. La oficina en terrenos monitorea la situación de los derechos humanos en la zona y presenta informes al Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, según señala el OACNUDH en la conceptualización de los alcances de esta oficina regional.

Su función también se centra en trabajar con organizaciones de la sociedad civil, instituciones estatales, organizaciones regionales e internacionales para lograr los propósitos de la OACNUDH, al tiempo que contribuir a promover la justicia transicional, la promoción de la verdad y la reparación a las víctimas, además de trabajar en la prevención y protección de los defensores de derechos humanos contra las amenazas y ataques que son objeto.

En Honduras, la región del atlántico es de acuerdo con las organizaciones de derechos humanos, una de las más conflictivas, marcada por la violencia por ser estratégica en las conexiones para las operaciones del crimen organizado, en especial el narcotráfico, así como por poseer vastas extensiones de tierras de vocación agrícola, ganadera y minera, así como de riquezas culturales ancestrales. El acceso a la tierra es uno de los problemas más visibles, que cada vez se torna más complejo ante la presencia de actores paralelos de poder.

Una de esas zonas del atlántico hondureño donde se ha concentrado mucha conflictividad y violencia es la región que comprende el Bajo Aguán, muchos campesinos han muerto y han sido asesinados por este motivo, la impunidad es el denominador común de estos casos y los distintos gobiernos no han podido encontrar soluciones al conflicto, pese a firmar sendos acuerdos. La justicia no termina de llegar a esa zona del agro.

Iguales demandas reclaman los grupos garífunas y de los pueblos originarios ante la falta de cumplimiento a las sentencias internacionales emitidas por la Corte Interamericana de Justicia (Corte-IDH) por parte del Estado de Honduras.

[LEER] Misquitos y garífunas, los indígenas con mayor desplazamiento forzado en Honduras

Primeros desafíos por enfrentar

De ahí que la oficina en terreno del OACNUDH, en cuanto a la zona del Bajo Aguán, deberá dar seguimiento a un convenio de 15 puntos suscrito entre el gobierno de la presidenta Xiomara Castro y los sectores organizados del Aguán en 2022, donde algunos de los compromisos suscritos se relacionan con la presencia en las zonas de conflicto del Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, la Secretaría de la Presidencia, la Corte Suprema de Justicia, la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos y la Fiscalía de Derechos Humanos con mandato suficiente para: investigar las violaciones a los derechos humanos, proponer medidas de reparación a las víctimas, determinar las causas que dieron origen a las violaciones en la región del Aguán en los últimos 30 años.

También, la instalación de un mecanismo de investigación, seguimiento y reparación de violaciones a derechos humanos de las víctimas del conflicto agrario del Bajó Aguán. El mecanismo tendrá una estructura acordada entre las partes conformes de la comisión tripartita. Asimismo, la instalación de un mecanismo de investigación, seguimiento y reparación de violaciones a derechos humanos de las víctimas del conflicto agrario del Bajó Aguán.

Se encuentra también el compromiso de Investigar el accionar de las fuerzas de seguridad del Estado y empresas de seguridad privada, sus vínculos con estructuras irregulares y su papel en actos de violencia contra campesinos en el Bajo Aguán y, en caso de comprobar su participación en actos delictivos, trasladar ante las instancias judiciales las respectivas denuncias y demandas derivadas de dicha investigación. A ello se suma asegurar el cumplimiento de las medidas cautelares otorgadas por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos para los defensores del Bajo Aguán.

Ninguno de estos acuerdos se ha podido cumplir a cabalidad, y la nueva oficina del OACNUDH ya tiene al menos una ruta diseñada de los seguimientos que debe hacer para lograr el cumplimiento de los mismos y contribuir a bajar los niveles de polarización y conflictividad en esa zona.

A inicios del 2025, más de 65 organizaciones que laboran en la zona emitieron un comunicado de emergencia para llamar la atención de lo que ahí estaba sucediendo. Casi seis meses después de ese llamado, el OACNUDH ha anunciado que abre su primera oficina regional de terreno para atender los problemas, registrar las denuncias, dar seguimiento a los acuerdos, generar alertas de advertencia, proteger los derechos humanos.

El inicio de esa oficina regional de terreno, así como la llegada al país hace varios años de la OACNUDH, lejos de ser celebrada por un Estado, es sinónimo de que la situación de los derechos humanos no pasa por su mejor momento, el deterioro se ahonda, la institucionalidad sigue debilitándose, y el Estado es incapaz de atender a sus ciudadanos para dar las garantías mínimas de respeto a sus derechos y libertades en países en un coma democrático como Honduras. (PD)

Impunity and conflict lead OHCHR to set up field office on Honduras’ Caribbean coast

The following special report by the Honduran digital newspaper has been translated for The Violence of Development website by Jill Powis who spent a year accompanying Garífuna leaders on the Caribbean coast of Honduras. We are very grateful for her efforts for the website. The original Spanish is also included in the August 2025 additions to the website. We are also grateful to Proceso Digital for their work and information – https://proceso.hn .

By: Especiales Proceso Digital

Impunidad y conflictividad llevan al OACNUDH a instalar oficina de terreno en el atlántico de Honduras

26 May 2025

Key words: Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); human rights; northern Honduras; impunity; environment and land defenders; Bajo Aguán; Garífuna.

Tegucigalpa (Especial Proceso Digital) – The announcement by the OHCHR (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) is no cause for celebration; it is a sad indication of the levels of social conflict and impunity in Honduras’ Atlantic region which have reached such extremes that a field office is needed to investigate and document the human rights situation on the ground. It is the second such office to be opened in Latin America, after Colombia.

September 2024 saw the murder of environmentalist and religious leader Juan López who, before his death, said that if anything happened to him, pro-government politicians would be responsible.

‘Today is not just any day; with the opening of this office in La Ceiba, Honduras becomes only the second country on the continent, after Colombia, to have a field presence of the High Commissioner’, said Bardia Jebeli, Deputy Representative and Officer in Charge of the OHCHR in Honduras, on 16 May, when he officially opened the office in a region where social conflict, for a  variety of reasons, is spiralling out of control.

Violence and lack of security, coupled with land claims, are some of the factors that make this area of the Honduran Atlantic coast one of the most dangerous in the country, with organised crime, paramilitary groups and other criminal networks all active in the region, keeping the population in a state of fear, as state authority and institutions seem to be impotent in the face of these groups.

[LEER] El Aguán, una violencia diferenciada con muchas aristas

The OHCHR has been documenting these flashpoints of conflict and violence in its reports, alerting the government and the Honduran state to the seriousness of the situation in this region, which is on such a scale that it is becoming one of the worst in the country for the forced displacement of people and families.

Before the field office was set up, OHCHR officials raised awareness of the initiative among various local organisations and institutions, reaffirming the UN High Commissioner’s commitment to supporting the Honduran government in meeting its international human rights commitments and obligations.

After a long hiatus, the OHCHR in Honduras has come to the fore with specific proposals on the protection of human rights defenders, the defence of freedom of expression, the need to reform both the Protection Mechanism which is still totally inadequate a full 10 years after its inception, the abolition of the state of emergency due to the human rights violations committed under it, support for Garifuna communities, and a demand for an end to impunity for the murder of Juan López, the  environmental and land defender, in the Tocoa region.

[LEER] Asesinan a líder ambientalista y regidor de Tocoa, Colón, Juan López

The murder of environmentalist Juan López in Bajo Aguán was a crime that shook Honduras in 2024.

 

The role of a Field Office

A field office has been set up in La Ceiba so that human rights abuses and violations can be better documented and followed up. Honduras, according to the OHCHR and other UN agencies, as well as the Organisation of American States (OAS), is one of the deadliest countries for human rights defenders, in particular for those who defend the environment and land.

“The authorities enthusiastically welcomed the news that this office was opening and stressed their willingness to work collaboratively on the challenges facing the north of the country. We hope that this collaboration will translate into concrete results for human rights,” said Bardia Jebeli.

Honduras is only the second country in Latin America to host a regional office to monitor human rights after Colombia, a country with a high level of social conflict since the signing of the Peace Accords.

The role of field offices is to be closer to communities and human rights situations on the ground. They contribute to strengthening local and national capacities by supporting state institutions, civil society and other organisations to promote and protect human rights effectively.

It also provides technical assistance and advice to the government on the implementation of human rights policies and programmes. The field office monitors the human rights situation in the region and reports to the UN Human Rights Council, stated the OHCHR when explaining its scope.

It also focuses on working with civil society organisations, state institutions, regional and international organisations to achieve the OHCHR’s aims, while contributing to the promotion of transitional justice and of truth and reparation for victims, as well as working on the protection of human rights defenders, seeking to prevent the threats and attacks against them.

The Atlantic region is, according to human rights organisations, one of the most conflict-ridden in Honduras, marked by violence due to its strategic connections with organised crime operations, especially drug trafficking, as well as its vast tracts of agricultural, livestock and mining land, along with ancestral cultural riches. Access to land is one of the most obvious problems, and it is becoming increasingly complex due to the presence of “parallel power groups” (illegal groups presenting a direct challenge to the power of the state).

One region of the Honduran Atlantic which is a flashpoint for conflict and violence is the Bajo Aguán, where many campesinos have been murdered due to land disputes.  Impunity is the common denominator in these cases and governments have failed to find solutions to the conflict, despite signing agreements. Justice has yet to reach this agricultural region.

Similarly, Garífuna and indigenous peoples’ groups are protesting in view of the Honduran state’s failure to comply with international judgments issued by the Inter-American Court of Justice regarding the protection of their territories.

[LEER] Misquitos y garífunas, los indígenas con mayor desplazamiento forzado en Honduras

The OHCHR field office should monitor implementation of the 15-point agreement between President Xiomara Castro’s government and organisations in the Bajo Aguán, signed in 2022.  The commitments in the agreement include the presence, in the areas subject to land disputes, of the National Human Rights Commissioner, the Secretariat of the Presidency, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Human Rights Secretariat and the Human Rights Prosecutor’s Office.  These have a mandate to investigate human rights violations, propose reparations for victims, and determine the factors that gave rise to the human rights violations and abuses in the Bajo Aguán region over the last 30 years.

The agreement also provides for a mechanism to be established to investigate, follow-up and provide reparations for the violation of the human rights of the victims of the land conflict in Bajo Aguán. The mechanism’s structure would be agreed by the members of the tripartite commission.

There is also the commitment to investigate the actions of the state security forces and private security companies, their links to illegal groups and their role in acts of violence against campesinos in Bajo Aguán.  If their participation in criminal acts were proven, the lawsuits arising from these investigations would be brought before the courts. In addition, compliance with the precautionary measures granted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the human rights defenders of Bajo Aguán must be ensured.

 

Bajo Aguán is a centre of conflict due to multiple factors that converge there.

None of these commitments has been fully met, but this means that at least the new OHCHR office already has a route mapped out for monitoring compliance with them and for helping to reduce polarisation and conflict in the area.

In early 2025, over 65 organisations working in the area issued an urgent statement to draw attention to the situation there. Almost six months later, the OHCHR has announced that it is opening its first regional field office in Honduras to address the issues, receive reports of human rights violations, monitor implementation of the commitments under the Agreement, issue early warning alerts and protect human rights. 

The opening of this regional field office as well as the arrival of the OHCHR in the country several years ago, far from being a cause of celebration for a state, is a stark indication that the human rights situation is not at its best and is deteriorating, state institutions are becoming increasingly fragile, and the state is incapable of providing its citizens with the minimum guarantees for the respect of their rights and freedoms in countries such as Honduras which are in a democratic coma. 

 

Structural violence underpins land disputes in Guatemala

We are grateful to the Latin America Bureau of London for their permission to include the following article by Leonie Malin Höher in our monthly additions to The Violence of Development website.

By Leonie Malin Höher

May 6, 2025, Latin America Bureau

In the latest of ongoing violent attacks against the rural community of Lajeb Kej, private security forces destroy the resident families’ homes and force them off their land located in Alta Verapaz, a department in the mountainous northern and central highland regions of Guatemala, infamous for land disputes and forced displacement.

On 22 January 2025, a community of families living near Tucurú, Alta Verapaz, was forcibly displaced from the land they had been inhabiting. Denominated unofficially as Lajeb Kej, this Maya Q’eqchi community has had to vacate their home after years of legal and social struggle to defend their rights to land, housing, and health.

After concerted community efforts to resolve the legal battle regarding the land in question and to halt violent intimidations of the families, private security forces finally decided to destroy the families’ houses, forcing them to flee.

Sandra Calel, coordinator of Ixoq Mayaj, a women’s association focused on supporting young people and Maya women in rural areas, and expert on the Lajeb Kej case, has made a statement referring to the displacement on social media: ‘The families’ crops and houses were destroyed. Supposedly, this was a peaceful displacement. They say it is peaceful, but it is violent. They are destroying the people’s cultural identity, which affects the communities’ human rights’.

Calel collaborates with members of a network of farming communities supported by the umbrella organization Unión Verapacense de Organizaciones Campesinas (UVOC). Before meeting with government officials about land conflict, Calel stated, ‘We know that defending a right means risking your life and losing your territory. That’s why we are here [at the National Palace], looking at how the government can help resolve land issues’.

In her role as a member of UVOC, Calel participates in regular dialogues with the current administration under Bernardo Arévalo to address land conflict in Q’eqchi’ territories, but institutional support for vulnerable rural communities has been difficult to establish under a municipal political structure that regularly prioritizes private companies’ and landowners’ interests over community wellbeing.

Notably, just 5 km from Lajeb Kej, the hydroelectric company Santa Teresa began installing a dam in 2006 to extract resources from the Polochic River. It has been documented that community members have been offered money in exchange for their land under the guise of advancing hydroelectric works.

The ¡No más desalojos en Guatemala! [no more displacement in Guatemala] campaign (a collaboration between Land Rights Now, International Land Coalition de América Latina y el Caribe, Plataforma por la Defensa de la Tierra y el Territorio, and Coalición Nacional por la Tierra Guatemala) represents a collective effort to highlight patterns of displacement and community experiences that are ignored and repressed. The campaign confirms that private motivations to enrich extractive companies continue to put local communities at risk.

The corrupting power of private land ownership 

The case of the Lajeb Kej community’s struggle to defend their right to land, water, and health is not unique to the area. Alta Verapaz, a department located in the mountainous northern and central highland regions of Guatemala, is well-known for land disputes, forced displacement, and socio-economic vulnerability in Indigenous communities.

The territory upon which the modern map of Alta Verapaz was drawn pertains to Indigenous peoples of Maya Q’eqchi’, Achi, and Poqomchi’ heritage. Having inhabited the area and cultivated the land for centuries, these communities persist in the defence of their cultural and communal claims to live safely within the territory.

Q’eqchis, Achis, and Poqomchis have experienced a long history of land dispossession, from initial Spanish colonization of their lands 500 years ago to the local and multinational exploitation of their lands today. At the crux of the matter is conflict between individualistic and communitarian approaches to land.

In the late 19th century, after the Guatemalan Liberal Revolution of 1871, the idea and practices of private property took hold more strongly in the country and greatly changed Mayan communities’ experiences of life and land. Within the Mayan cosmovision, land was never something to be bought, sold, or owned by an individual. According to many Indigenous philosophies and worldviews, land is conceptualized within a broader framework of territory that encompasses much more than the physical characteristics of a piece of land. It includes community-oriented visions of land and territory as material, spiritual, and life-giving; to be taken care of collectively.

Under today’s economic conditions in Guatemala, like in most parts of the globe, individualistic notions of land as private property dominate. According to the International Land Coalition, the long-standing agrarian conflict in the country seriously affects Indigenous and peasant communities, exacerbating violence and inequality in rural areas.

The families of Lajeb Kej, who survived through subsistence agriculture in the small land area they lived on before their forced displacement, were exposed directly to the imposition of private property.

The families of Lajeb Kej have a photocopy of an 1894 land title stating the community as owners of their territory. But this document, which has been passed down from generation to generation, is no longer recognized by the authorities.

The area that the families of Lajeb Kej inhabited was designated by the Registro de Informacion Catastral (RIC) as terreno baldío. In Guatemala, terreno baldío refers to land that does not have an owner. Despite this official designation, the people of Lajeb Kej were not safe from displacement. Throughout several years, a private landowner, armed with private security forces and supported by an institutional narrative painting subsistence farmers and local Indigenous communities as dangerous “usurpers” of private property, laid claim to land that technically pertains to the state.

These private security forces carried out systemic attacks against the community In January, the private imposition upon the terreno baldío culminated in the forced displacement of 186 people.

Long time, no solution

Since 2021, UVOC has been accompanying the Lajeb Kej community, lending support on legal and logistical matters in their fight to recuperate their rights. This comes after multiple attacks – including the destruction of their homes by chainsaw and fire in 2010, the beating of a local leader in 2023 and his son’s ear being cut off by attackers, as well as regular disturbance from drones and gunshots fired into the air.

After many years of advocacy, members of UVOC were hopeful about making progress with land dispute cases when Bernardo Arévalo took office in January of 2024. ‘[We had] so many years of suffering, without being able to express the needs of the communities. We believed that with this new government, there would be an opportunity’, UVOC’s general director Carlos Morales stated in an interview in February 2025.

In a positive political turn, the current administration did not take long after Arévalo’s inauguration to prioritize land issues and to sign the Acuerdo Agrario, committing to direct collaboration with community organizations to advance on conflicts related to land distribution and ownership.

However, the institutional barriers to change have proven to be significant, with over 1,000 land conflicts continuing actively in the country. Guatemalan media outlet Factor 4 has called out how little national and international attention is given to these conflicts, especially to the “silent crisis” of forced internal displacement. Often, public rhetoric follows a narrative blaming vulnerable populations for their circumstances, describing community members as “invaders” and “property usurpers”.

This narrative serves to protect private interests over collective welfare. In the case of Lajeb Kej, it is important to remember the link between private land ownership and extractive industries, such as hydroelectricity.

For the members of UVOC, the current administration has provided a window of opportunity to advance on solutions Q’eqchi’ community leaders have been advocating for since the early 2000s. For example, a robust government mechanism of attention to crisis, a stop to forced displacement, the provision of alternative housing in cases of legal displacement, reform of land policy, recognition of community-held and ancestral land rights, to name a few.

The recent displacement of the families of Lajeb Kej is just one piece of a larger puzzle of the structural violence underpinning land disputes in the country. Land disputes that are rooted in decades, if not centuries, of inequalities and unjust land management practices.

However, as the second year of Arévalo’s administration begins and violent displacements continue, it is clear that these solutions are still far from being actualized. The recent displacement of the families of Lajeb Kej is just one piece of a larger puzzle of the structural violence underpinning land disputes in the country. Land disputes that are rooted in decades, if not centuries, of inequalities and unjust land management practices.

UVOC’s Morales verbalizes the communities’ desires to best make progress: ‘we want to make structural changes. People with lots of power have been criminalizing the Indigenous and farming sectors. […] If we can improve the mechanism of attention to crisis, I believe things will get better. Things must change’. What the communities UVOC accompanies require is actually quite simple, even though the historical and political context have made them almost unattainable: peace and land access, to allow for small-scale subsistence farming and rural community development.

As long as socio-political divisions remain stark, whether rural-urban, public-private, or Indigenous-ladino, progress will remain slow. To ensure forced internal displacements finally come to an end, to attend to the varied land crises in Indigenous territories, and to support communities in their rights to land and life, structural change is non-negotiable.

Leonie Malin Höher is a University of St Andrews (International Relations and Sustainable Development) and Oxford (Latin American Studies) graduate who specializes in research, writing, and advocacy around a variety of social justice-focused topics. She is especially interested in adaptation responses to the climate crisis (e.g. migration), social movements led by environmental defenders, state-society interactions regarding the regulation of corporate interests, and female leadership of justice movements.

Header image: composite of author’s photo of the mountains surrounding Lajeb Kej and still from the documentary ‘Lajeb Kej, la resistencia del valle Polochic – Todas Somos Defensoras’.

Edited and Published by: Rebecca Wilson

Republishing: You are free to republish this article on your website, but please follow our guidelines.

This article was originally published by Latin America Bureau here https://lab.org.uk/maya-qeqchi-community-forcibly-displaced-by-the-power-of-private-interests/   Sign up to Latin America Bureau’s newsletter for similar stories.’

Los Horcones, Honduras: Reflections on a Massacre and Its Legacy

By  James Phillips, Covert Action Magazine

June 25, 2025

We are grateful to James Phillips for this article which is available for public use since its publication online by Covert Action Magazine. The original (22nd June 2025), is available at: https://covertactionmagazine.com/2025/06/25/los-horcones-honduras-reflections-on-a-massacre-and-its-legacy/

[Source: cac.unah.edu.hn]

June 25 marked the 50th anniversary of the Los Horcones massacre, a gruesome and desperate event that still haunts Honduran society and is emblematic of major forces that have shaped much of modern global history.

[Source: goodreads.com]

A thorough and well-sourced description of the Los Horcones massacre and its context is provided in Penny Lernoux’s now-classic, Cry of the People: United States Involvement in the Rise of Fascism, Torture and Murder and the Persecution of the Catholic Church in Latin America [(New York: Doubleday, 1980), 109-114]. Her account is disturbing but worth reading, if only to help us understand the savagery that resides in the plans of those who must dominate and control at all costs, and the events we see today in Honduras and elsewhere. Here, I can only briefly outline what happened.

The massacre occurred in the Lepaguare Valley, in the municipal district of Juticalpa, in the Department of Olancho, on the hacienda “Los Horcones,” There, a group of military officers and landowners (or their paid agents) tortured and murdered 15 people, including 11 peasant farmers, two young women, and two Catholic priests—Ivan Betancur (a Colombian citizen) and Casimir Cypher (a U.S. citizen from Wisconsin).

Casimir Cypher [Source: uscatholic.org]

The priests were singled out for the worst torture and their bodies were mutilated while they were still alive. The peasant farmers were burned to death in a bread oven. The perpetrators threw the bodies in a well on the Los Horcones property and dynamited the well. There was at least one witness hidden in the woods at a distance.

The peasants were leaders and members of the National Peasant Union (Union Nacional de Campesinos, UNC), an organization influenced by the social teachings of the Catholic Church that emphasized social justice, human rights, and a ”preferential option for the poor.” The UNC had organized a “March of Hunger,” to highlight their demands for land that they felt was illegally and unjustly being monopolized by the large ranchers. The large landowners in the region decided to eliminate this threat, and the Honduran military government colluded with them in doing so.

The military blocked the march, but that was only the catalyst for a vicious campaign against the peasants and their Catholic Church supporters. The landowners set a price of $10,000 for the head (literally) of the progressive Catholic Bishop of Juticalpa, Nicholas D’Antonio (a U.S. citizen from New York). They also paid the military commander of the region $2,500 to kill Father Betancourt whom they saw as a supporter and enabler of the peasants. (In current dollars, those sums would be considerably higher.)

It soon became clear that the Honduran military government under General Juan Alberto Melgar Castro was deeply involved. The government responded to the Los Horcones massacre by giving a few military officers jail sentences, but it also raided and destroyed the offices of the UNC, hunted other UNC leaders, and effectively ordered the expulsion from Honduras of all foreign priests.

[Source: honduras2etc.wordpress.com]

General Juan Alberto Melgar Castro [Source: alchetron.com]

Bishop D’Antonio was out of the country during the massacre. Had he been in Honduras he would almost certainly have been killed and beheaded. He could not return to Honduras and was forced to close the diocese.

As Lernoux documents, the campaign against peasant organizations and progressive elements of the Catholic Church had been going on for months before Los Horcones, with arrests, beatings and imprisonment of priests and peasants in different parts of Honduras.

In 2013, Honduran Jesuit priest and human rights leader Ismael Moreno (Padre Melo) wrote that the Los Horcones massacre was probably the starkest example of government repression against the Catholic Church in recent Honduran history, and that it caused Church leaders and many others to move away from their support of popular demands for social justice. But its significance goes beyond even that.

Ismael Moreno (Padre Melo). [Source: nonosolvidamosdehonduras.blogspot.com]

I first visited Honduras in 1974, one year before the Los Horcones massacre. What I saw was a very different scene. One afternoon, the Jesuits with whom I was staying took me to a ranch where a group of peasant farmers was busy preparing a plot of land for cultivation. The ranch belonged to a beef and hamburger fast food corporation in the U.S. The peasants were occupying without permission a small portion of the huge ranch.

Such land occupations (tomas de tierra) were and still are a regular event in Honduras where rural communities desperately need land to plant food crops, while large corporations and landowners hold thousands of acres of unused land. A contingent of Honduran soldiers was loitering in the road beside the plot where the peasants were working. The soldiers did nothing to stop them, but they did prevent the corporation’s security guards from forcibly evicting the peasants.

I was aware that this was a very rare scene in Honduran history. The military government, in a very brief liberal moment under General Oswaldo López Arellano, had passed the Agrarian Reform Law of 1974 that embodied the principle (in theory) that all Hondurans had the right to a piece of land. Peasant groups took that seriously as they occupied unused lands. “We are the agrarian reform,” they sometimes said. The contrast between this and the events of 1975 could not have been more stark.

Much of recent Honduran history has been marked by such contrasts. The government of President Carlos Roberto Reina (1994-98) managed to exercise some civilian control over the military and to sign international agreements for the rights of the country’s Indigenous people, only to have these advances ignored in practice and undone in the following decade.

Carlos Roberto Reina [Source: timetoast.com]

General Oswaldo López Arellano [Source: thetimes.com]

Manuel Zelaya, who became Honduran president in 2006, was the son of the owner of Los Horcones. Given his family background, the Honduran landowning elite and the U.S. government expected President Zalaya to remain faithful to the interests of his landowning social class.

[Source: pencanada.ca]

When he declared a moratorium on large mining projects and began to consult peasant groups about their needs and concerns, the elite regarded him as a class traitor. He was forcibly deposed and sent into exile on June 28, 2009.

There followed 12 years of right-wing repression and corruption, mostly under President Juan Orlando Hernández, one of the organizers of the 2009 coup. Those years were marked by the increasing power of foreign corporations, drug lords and criminal gangs, and the killing, criminalization and displacement of peasant communities and environmental defenders and their organizations. People began to refer to the country as a narco-dictatorship.

Juan Orlando Hernández [Source: prensalibre.com]

The United States was, to say the least, not unhappy about the 2009 coup, and continued to support Hernández until it became clear that his unpopularity and the rising level of anger among the Honduran population was likely to lose him the 2021 election.

I was in Honduras for that election. Hernández’s National Party operatives tried to bribe peasants by offering them money and other desirable goods if they promised to vote for him. Some later said they accepted the bribe but did not vote for him. Hernández’s hand-picked successor was defeated. (Powerful rulers who underestimate the “simple” rural people are often shocked by the result. Somoza made a similar mistake in Nicaragua in the 1970s.)

Thus, in yet another apparent contrast, Hernández’s party lost to Xiomara Castro, who promised a major reform and an end to corruption. When Hernández lost, the U.S. demanded his extradition to stand trial in New York for drug trafficking. He was convicted, sentenced to 45 years in prison, and remains in a U.S. prison. From staunch ally of the U.S. to convicted criminal, he seems to be yet another “victim” of U.S. imperial expediency.

During these past four years, Xiomara Castro’s government has been a classic example of the difficulties facing reformist efforts in a country largely controlled by a determined and ruthless elite that has the support of the U.S. and powerful U.S. corporate interests. In a previous article (CAM, May 3, 2023), I wrote about the dilemmas facing her government. Beyond these dilemmas, Castro has endured veiled and public warnings from the U.S. Embassy that her reforms might be her undoing.

Xiomara Castro [Source: the-independent.com]

As president, Xiomara Castro and her government have managed to make some meaningful changes, but change is difficult in the face of a deeply entrenched network of repression and corruption. Disillusionment and frustration among Hondurans at the failure of more sweeping change is something the Honduran elite and its Washington allies want to channel to undermine her government. They would prefer to have her term become simply another short period of attempted liberalization rather than the start of an ongoing tide of change in Honduran history.

This 50th anniversary year of Los Horcones also happens to be an election year in Honduras. National and local elections are scheduled for November. It is certain that the United States will, as always, be deeply involved in shaping the outcome. Whoever wins the election in November, significant change is unlikely, or it will be slow and costly in coming unless, perhaps, the United States as the major influence in Honduras supports significant change—something that would require change in the U.S. itself.

In a global context, Los Horcones at 50 years is part of a much larger conflict that has deeply shaped the past century, especially in Latin America and parts of Asia and Africa. Anthropologists, rural sociologists, and political economists have written about it. In the 1970s, Sidney Mintz wrote about what he and others called the proletarianization of peasant communities in the colonial Caribbean.

Sidney Mintz [Source: hub.jhu.edu]

At the same time, Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1970), Ernest Feder (1971) and others were documenting and critiquing the massive displacement of rural communities by corporate extractive industries in Latin America, and the millions of displaced small farmers who roamed the continent looking for work—a cheap labor force and a growing urban population of desperately poor people. More recently, Mexican anthropologist Sergio Quesada-Aldana and others have used the term descampesinizar (to de-peasantizeto refer to the elimination of rural communities and peasants from the land.

Rodolfo Stavenhagen [Source: eluniversal.com]

This elimination takes place in several ways: making people landless, criminalizing their way of life, killing them, undermining their cultural values. Making people landless is accomplished by legal and illegal machinations; by making environmental conditions so bad that communities cannot survive and must move or scatter; or by killing community leaders so as to frighten others. Local elites and foreign corporations enlist the muscle of national governments and their security forces in these thefts.

The global corporate economy uses the land for its own profit while harnessing landless people as a cheap labor pool. Two centuries ago, half the world’s population were rural small farmers, peasants. They were the food suppliers and the foot soldiers (often under duress) of empires.

Today, their numbers are a fraction of what they were. Their land-rooted way of life is considered obsolete in the global commercial economy. Empire today depends on direct control of land and resources and a large, landless and cheap labor pool.

Now and in the near future, even this labor force of recycled peasants is quite likely to become a victim of mechanization and advanced technology, making them entirely superfluous in the plans of global capital—not needed as workers and too poor to be consumers. We already see the result of that in cities filled with displaced peasant families whose children grow up in poverty, vulnerable to gang recruiters and to other threats to body and soul. The cost, in endless conflict and misery, is incalculable.

The landless poor in Honduras: victims of extractive capitalism and the plunder of Central America by foreign corporations. [Source: archivo.tiempo.hn]

Around 2015, landowners in another part of Honduras offered a $50,000 reward to anyone who would kill the local Catholic pastor, a Jesuit priest from the U.S. whom I knew. His support for the peasant communities’ demands made him an enemy of the landowners as they systematically seized land and murdered local peasant leaders. That was one of many similar situations. [NOTE: These four lines look like there is more space between each line than normal.]

It does not have to be this way. There are examples of thriving peasant communities that maintain their way of life, their identity, and their ability to make important decisions while contributing to the food security and economy of their country. Many studies have shown that peasant farmers and cooperatives are often more productive than large plantations. What is required is a government that believes in the worth of peasant communities and is willing to support them while curbing the worst predations of large landowners and corporations. This shift in a country’s political economy and mentality is seldom easy and never perfect.

Many peasant communities are thriving in Honduras, including especially those run as cooperatives. [Source: kairosphotos.com]

Los Horcones happened and continues to happen in Honduras and in many other places, in ways large and small so that global capital can have the world at its disposal, unencumbered by self-reliant communities of small farmers on the land.

Los Horcones is emblematic of the insatiable forces that drive this situation. That is why we must remember horrific events like Los Horcones today. The courage and sacrifice of the peasants and their supporters reminds us of what is at stake.

[Note: In descriptions of the Los Horcones massacre, the three foreign priests are named and, thanks to Lernoux, we know the names of the two young women—Maria Elena Bolivar who would have become Fr. Betancur’s future sister-in-law, and Ruth Garcia, a Honduran university student. I have not found anywhere the names of the eleven peasant members of UNC. There might be a story in that. If anyone knows their names, please share them. They deserve to be remembered by name. JP]

 

Guatemalan Human Rights: Recent Trends

We are grateful to the Guatemala Human Rights Commission (GHRC, USA) for their regular updates on developments in Guatemala. Here we reproduce part of their September 2025 update.

www.ghrc-usa.org

In Guatemala high-profile Indigenous and campesino leaders have come under sustained attack in recent months. The arrest of Esteban Toc Tzay, an Indigenous Authority from Sololá who helped to lead the 2023 protests that prevented a coup d’etat and allowed President Bernardo Arévalo to take office, and the arrest of Leocadio Juracán, leader of the Campesino Committee of the Highlands, are the latest stark examples of the targeted repression being carried out by a co-opted Public Ministry whose leader, Attorney General Consuelo Porras, is facing her last months in office. The selection of a new attorney general will take place next spring. In the time remaining, struggle for power is escalating between the corrupt forces that favour impunity and the defenders of justice, democracy, and human rights.

 

Human Rights Violations

UDEFEGUA Reports 400 Percent Increase in Assassinations

In its annual report released in July, Human Rights Defenders Protection Unit of Guatemala found an overall significant decrease in human rights violations in 2024 compared to the previous year but a startling increase in assassinations. With the exception of 2017, when 41 girls at the Hogar Seguro were killed, more people defending human rights were targeted and assassinated in 2024 than in any year since the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996. In fact, the number of assassinations more than quadrupled. UDEFEGUA documented 28 assassinations in 2024, compared to 6 in 2023. As UDEFEGUA explains, “Previously, patterns of aggression within the justice system—such as unfounded complaints, protracted legal proceedings, or the spurious use of preventive detention—were used as a means of attrition. Although these continue to be widely used, during 2024 there was a worrying trend towards more direct and irreversible attacks, such as murders. What was previously achieved through criminalization processes that can be costly and time-consuming is now being shortened with more direct and lethal attacks.” Corruption within the justice system, according to UDEFEGUA, and the assurance that murders will go unpunished has led to this increase. The vast majority of those assassinated were defending Indigenous rights and land and environmental rights. 

 

Esteban Toc Tzay, Indigenous Leader from Sololá, Arrested

Esteban Toc Tzay, former deputy mayor of the Indigenous Municipality of Sololá from 2022 to 2023, was arrested on August 28, as he was driving on the Inter-American Highway after a dialysis treatment. The 61-year-old leader was involved in organizing the protests to protect democracy in 2023, protests which were pivotal in assuring the transition of power, as corrupt forces linked to the Public Ministry attempted to prevent President Arévalo from taking office. The Public Ministry, headed by Consuelo Porras, has remained silent about the reasons for his arrest, but Indigenous Authorities believe it is related to a complaint several Indigenous Authorities who led the protests filed demanding the resignation of Porras, together with the head of the Special Prosecutor’s Office Against Impunity, Rafael Curruchiche, and Judge Fredy Orellana, and demanding that the results of the presidential election be respected. Toc Tzay is accused of sedition, terrorism, obstruction of criminal proceedings, unlawful association, and obstruction of justice. was supposed to have a hearing before a judge on September 3, but one of the plaintiffs, Ricardo Méndez Ruiz, failed to attend and so the hearing was postponed until September 5. Méndez Ruiz, head of the Foundation Against Terrorism, was sanctioned by the European Union in June 2025 for “actions that undermine the rule of law in Guatemala, consisting in persecution and intimidation of representatives of the media, and of lawyers, judges and prosecutors.” The charges against Toc Tzay are believed to be linked to those against Héctor Cháclan and Luis Pacheco, Indigenous Authorities with the 48 Cantones of Totonicapán, who were arrested in April and remain in pretrial detention.

 

Campesino Leader Leocadio Juracán Arrested

On August 13, in an apparent act of criminalization against those who defend the land and territory, Leocadio Juracán, leader of the Campesino Committee of the Highlands (CCDA), was arrested at the airport in Guatemala City as he attempted to fly to South Africa to speak at a conference. According to Breaking the Silence, he was accused of aggravated trespassing [usurpación], damage to national heritage, illegal selling of natural resources, and attempted arson of forestal areas in the Izabal region of Guatemala. The CCDA believes the accusations are related to the March 5 eviction of 35 Q’eqchi’ families from their homes in the community of Río Tebernal, in Livingston, Izabal.

At a hearing in Puerto Barrios, Izabal, on August 18, a judge dismissed three out of the four charges against Juracán, leaving aggravated trespassing as the only charge, and he was released on bail. He is not able to leave the country and is not allowed to enter the department of Izabal. His trial has been set to begin on February 5, 2026. Juracán is a former member of the Guatemalan Congress; he was elected in 2015 to represent the Convergencia party and in 2019 was elected to represent the Winaq party.

The criminalization of Indigenous leaders and others is intensifying, as the preliminary findings of Margaret Satterthwaite, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, confirm. During her May visit to Guatemala, she found a “consistent and alarming picture of criminalization” and said the “instrumental use of criminal law by the Prosecutor General’s Office appears to amount to a systematic pattern of intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights, targeted at specific groups. This persecution appears to be intensifying, as those who have sought to end impunity and corruption, defend human rights, or speak out against abuses of power increasingly face digital harassment, threats, and criminal charges.”

 

Three Killed in Violent Eviction in Río Hondo, Zacapa

On July 29, days after UN Special Rapporteur Balakrishnan Rajagopal published a report calling for an immediate moratorium on evictions, two campesinos and a police officer died of gunshot wounds during an attempt to evict campesinos from land allegedly owned by a hydroelectric company. Prensa Libre reported that rescue teams “transported a civilian and a PNC officer to the emergency room of the Zacapa Regional Hospital, both with gunshot wounds.” The police officer died in the emergency room, while two community members died at the scene.

Since last June, according to a report by the Guatemalan news outlet Cronica, a group of campesinos had been camped on land belonging to the Guatemalan-owned Pasabién Hydroelectric Plant, demanding that it cease operations because of their ancestral rights to the land, going back two centuries. In a shootout, two residents of the village of Santa Rosalía de Mármol died at the scene, while officer Erick Sacul died upon arrival at the state hospital in the department of Zacapa, according to police.

According to the PNC, the eviction was ordered by a court, at the request of the Public Ministry. The PNC lamented the deaths of a special forces officer and two members of the community. The PNC said the operation in Río Hondo was planned “with the aim of allowing entry to the properties of the entity Inversiones Pasabién, S.A. to carry out legally authorized repair work.” The statement goes on to report that “during the convoy’s journey, the police were met with violence, with shots being fired at the officers from elevated positions on the mountain.” The statement also reported the involvement of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office, and the department’s municipal firefighters.

The deadly confrontation took place in the context of a broader historical conflict between indigenous communities and the government over hydroelectric plants in their communities. In March, representatives of 24 indigenous communities in northern Guatemala called on the authorities to permanently cancel the Santa Rita plant, in Alta Verapaz, which was imposed without consent and led to various violent attacks, including the killing of three people in 2014 who were attempting to defend their rights to land.

 

Forty-Five Families in Plan Grande Could Be Evicted 

On July 19, the Constitutional Court eliminated the legal guarantees protecting 45 Q’eqchi’ families in Plan Grande, a community located in Sierra Santa Cruz, north of Lake Izabal. These Q’eqchi’ families have lived on these lands since at least the late 19th century and were displaced in 2015. Expert analysis reveals that fraudulent land records dated June 30, 2016, granted a company called CXI ownership of the family’s ancestral territory. As Peace Brigades International notes in its Monthly Information Bulletin, the Constitutional Court ruling authorizes the eviction of the community and the arrest of its leaders Abelino Chub, Martín Xi, Mateo Pop, and Héctor Che. Until the time of the ruling, the community had been protected by a 2019 ruling from High Risk Court A, which granted injunctive relief to community representatives, recognizing that CXI did not own the land.

The community has suffered harassment, arrests, and threats, such as those directed against leader Abelino Chub, who was criminally prosecuted but acquitted in 2019. The case is now before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which demanded that the State take measures by July 2025 to guarantee the fundamental rights of the community.

 

UN Special Rapporteur Calls for Halt to Evictions

On July 25, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, concluded a 12-day visit to Guatemala, which included the departments of Alta Verapaz, Izabal, and Zacapa. In his end-of-mission statement, he focused on forced evictions in Indigenous communities. He described the evictions as “inhumane and clearly contrary to international law.” He cited Guatemala’s colonial legacy as a factor laying the groundwork for evictions, along with inadequate legal systems that do not specifically protect Indigenous communities. In his words, “Due to a long and painful history of colonialism, extractive imperialism, armed conflict, and dispossession of Indigenous People, Guatemala is left with a legacy of land conflict, lack of legal certainty over tenure security, and excessive land concentration in the hands of a privileged few.” He mentioned that secure tenure is the most essential element of the right to adequate housing and called on Guatemala to pass or reform laws so that collective land titles of Indigenous and campesino communities would be recognized and the legal registration of these titles ensured. Without secure tenure, he said, “we see a large number of illegal evictions and violations of many human rights.” The rapporteur called for “a historical international reparations commission to adequately address the consequences of colonial rule and imperial take-over of land, which often continues to this day.”

He noted that evictions executed with a court order, and thus technically legal, often are carried out with extreme force: “Homes are often burned during evictions, along with private possession of very poor people which would amount to cruel and inhuman treatment and a grave violation of international law. Enormous shows of force by police forces which use military equipment and tactics, is a common occurrence in forced evictions. This excess use of force is plainly contrary to international human rights law: I call for an urgent stop to these tactics.”

In conclusion, he made an urgent appeal: “I urge Guatemala to urgently establish a moratorium on collective evictions and to pass a national law as soon as possible prohibiting illegal evictions, with strict guarantees of a much more humane approach to usurpacion [alleged trespassing] that respects international human rights law.”

The UN Special Rapporteur was invited by the Arévalo government, which has demonstrated its openness to international scrutiny. Since President Arévalo took office in 2024, the executive branch has shown a willingness to address the rights of Guatemala’s Indigenous, as illustrated by last year’s Agrarian Agreement. The Public Ministry, however, has not shown the same intentions. The Public Prosecutor’s Office, led by Consuelo Porras, who has been sanctioned internationally by the governments of the United States and the European Union, is responsible for many of the evictions of Indigenous communities. These communities, attempting to reclaim their ancestral lands, are accused of trespassing and other crimes and are then often evicted.
More than 1,000 people in the department of Alta Verapaz have arrest warrants for “trespassing.”

Communities Call for Closure of Cerro Blanco Mine

Residents and social organizations from Asunción Mita, Jutiapa, in a July press conference asked the Arévalo administration to revoke Cerro Blanco’s mining license for alleged irregularities and to close the mine for violating the rights of the community. The gold mine, owned by the Canadian company Bluestone, has been opposed by the affected communities because of significant environmental damage, including pollution with arsenic of a river that is in a protected area. They asked the authorities of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) and the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) to conduct an audit of all mining projects with anomalies in their files. They also announced the creation of a Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, where abuses against peoples and communities and human rights violations will be denounced. The press conference coincided with a visit by an  international observation mission composed of people from the Basque Country, Denmark, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.

On a positive note, ten licenses were cancelled for mines in Izabel. On July 31, at a press conference held at the National Palace of Culture, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN) officials announced the cancelation of environmental licenses for ten nickel exploration and exploitation projects in Sierra Santa Cruz, Livingston, Izabal. The licenses were granted in 2023, during the administration of former president Alejandro Giammattei, and were riddled with anomalies. Maya Q’eqchi’, Garifuna, and mestizo communities of Livingston and El Estor had been protesting for months, insisted on their cancellation, since mining would affect the water supply of at least 54 communities living in the Sierra Santa Cruz.

US threats can’t stop our growing relations with Central America: China reacts to visa restrictions

The US has imposed visa restrictions on Central American nationals for their links with China in its latest move to pressure countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to break ties with the Asian powerhouse.

October 23, 2025 by Abdul Rahman, People’s Dispatch. We are grateful to Abdul Rahman and to People’s Dispatch for their work.

People’s Dispatch website: https://peoplesdispatch.org/

Key words: China, United States; Bolivarian Venezuela; China; Cuba; Latin America; Monroe Doctrine

Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun. Photo: MFA China

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Guo Jiakun said on Tuesday, October 21, that his country has formally lodged serious protests against the announcement of US visa restrictions on Central American citizens for their links with the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Noting that no amount of weaponization of visas or other threats can hold back China’s “flourishing ties” with Central American countries, Jiakun suggested the US give up “it’s bullying and domineering act.”

Jiakun was replying to a question related to the US State Department’s press release last month announcing restrictions on visas for Central American nationals “working” in collaboration with the CPC, barring them and their family members from entering the US.

The State Department had said that the move was to counter China’s “corrupt” influence in Central America and to stop its alleged attempts to “subvert rule of law”. The press release did not specify the charges.

“The US takes illegitimate measures in the name of the rule of law, uses unilateral sanctions for political suppression and economic coercion targeting relevant regions, countries and personnel, puts its own domestic law above international law and its international obligations, and undermines the legitimate and lawful rights and interests of other countries,” Jiakun asserted.

China called the move yet another example of US “bullyism which seriously violates the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and sabotages the international order.”

Jiakun asserted that US accusations about China’s normal relationships with Central American countries displays its contempt for these countries’ independence and a lack of basic respect for their people and shows US politicians’ “deep seated arrogance and bias”.

“China will continue to be the good friend and good partner of Central American countries in the common pursuit of development and vitalization, and in building a China-LAC community with a shared future,” Jiakun said.

 

Assault on regional independence 

The US has increased its targeting of Latin American and Caribbean countries and their relationship with China recently in what is widely assumed as its attempts to reassert its imperialist belief of the region being its “backyard”.

Referring to the long-held US belief that the region is within its sphere of influence, Jiakun had observed in June this year that all nations should realize that “the American continent is nobody’s backyard.”

Propounded by President James Monroe in 1823, the US has treated Latin America and the Caribbean as its “backyard” for almost two centuries now. The doctrine is often invoked to justify hostility towards the governments trying to build better relations with a foreign power or trying to assert independence from the hegemonic presence of the US.

It became the basis of a persistent imperialist US policy of coups and counter coups against popular governments and unilateral sanctions against various countries in the region, including Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, and others.

In addition, the US has been using its economic leverage and military might to threaten the countries in the region to force them to shape their policies according to its own liking.

In recent times, several top US officials have pushed for US interference in the region, with President Donald Trump openly threatening to take over Panama and claiming to have sanctioned CIA operations in Venezuela in addition to deploying military vessels in and around it.

The Chinese reaction was a response to the increasingly visible attempts by the US to dismantle or sabotage its growing political and economic relations with Latin American countries, built through decades of effort.

China has claimed that the US has been carrying out cyber attacks and digital surveillance in Latin American and the Caribbean countries, targeting Chinese interests in its effort to pressure the governments in the region to break or limit their ties with China.

Claiming that US attempts undermine the sovereignty of the countries in the region and amounts to interfering in their internal affairs, China has maintained that its relations with the countries in the region is based on mutual respect without any intention to harm any third country.

General elections in Honduras: Emerging risks for land defenders

We have included the following short extracts from the monthly news alert of the Aguán valley to illustrate the local effects of the corrupt election held in November 2025. They also illustrate the mechanisms by which power can be deployed to threaten those who attempt to defend their land, environment and community.

Tocoa, Colon, Honduras – During the month of November, general elections were held in the country. Prior to the elections, the Agrarian Platform issued a statement warning of a plan to create the political conditions for an electoral coup, one that would favour the return to power of the business, political, and criminal sectors that had benefited from the 2009 coup and the narco-dictatorship. Days later, popular organisations spoke out against US interference in the electoral process and called for the consolidation of popular unity to defend the self-determination of peoples and territories.

Furthermore, the modus operandi that enables criminalization, exploitation, and plunder in Colón was once again evident. While the mayor of Tocoa, Adán Funez, hands over land titles to people who administer social media platforms which harass leaders, campesino communities, and environmental defenders, Funez is also attempting to remove councilman Leonel George, known in the region for his environmental advocacy, from office.

 

Latest News

Adán Fúnez Donates Land to Social Media Page Administrators: An investigation by Contracorriente reveals that the mayor of Tocoa, Adán Fúnez, donated land to administrators of social media pages that conduct smear campaigns against leaders and grassroots, campesino, and environmental organisations in Tocoa. Among the beneficiaries are Héctor Madrid, a journalist, correspondent for several media outlets, and administrator of the Noticias de Colón HN Facebook page, and Erlin Henríquez, an evangelical pastor who also administers pages and groups on Facebook. Both received land in the municipality of Tocoa between 2015 and 2016. These same individuals have disseminated content defending various people with alleged ties to organised crime, including the criminal group Los Cachos.

Solidarity with Councillor Leonel George: On November 13, organisations demonstrated in solidarity with Councillor Leonel George, a member of the Tocoa Municipal Committee for Common and Public Goods, who, along with three other councillors, has been summoned to a hearing by the Ministry of the Interior and Justice. The hearing was requested by the mayor of Tocoa, Adán Fúnez, who sought their removal from office as municipal councillors due to their absences from three consecutive regular sessions.

In an interview, Leonel George described the situation as “selective persecution” and “revenge” on the part of the mayor, because the four councillors summoned to the hearing were the same ones who had denounced Adán Fúnez for abuse of power.

Popular movements speak out on elections: On November 27, popular organizations and movements in Honduras issued statements regarding the general elections, reaffirming their independence and commitment to defending human rights and land, and warning of the serious risk posed by political forces seeking to return to authoritarianism, corruption, and dispossession. On November 28, the campesino movement organized in the Agrarian Platform warned of the development of media campaigns and the creation of political conditions aimed at justifying an electoral coup in the general elections.

Trump’s interference invalidates the presidential election in Honduras

In Imperialism, by John Perry

08/12/2025

We are grateful to John for his permission for us to reproduce his article in the TVOD website.

An extraordinary catalogue of US interference – amounting to an electoral coup – may have destroyed what was already a struggling democracy in Honduras. Trump has succeeded in closing the door to progressive government and in all likelihood his preferred neoliberal candidate – previously trailing in many opinion polls – will be declared president when the count eventually finishes.

While Washington’s aversion to foreign interference in its domestic elections verges on paranoia, the gross hypocrisy which runs through its foreign policy leaves it free of any compunction when meddling in other countries’ elections, especially in Latin America. Perhaps no country has greater recent experience of this than Honduras. Although most accounts of this meddling begin in 2009 with the ousting by army officers of its democratically elected president, Mel Zelaya, in truth US dominance of the country has a much longer history, as I described at the time.

The US refused to designate Zelaya’s toppling as a “military coup” or to back international calls for his rapid return to office. Washington then backed all the post-coup governments, including those established by Juan Orlando Hernández when his National Party “won” two highly manipulated elections. Rampant corruption by him and his predecessors ensured that Honduras became a “narcostate.” Nevertheless, US administrations embraced Hernández as a prime ally in the war on drugs up until the point when he left office, was extradited and committed to 45 years in a US prison. Only the large majority won by the Libre party’s Xiomara Castro in the 2021 election, and the fact that Hernández had become a liability, temporarily frustrated Washington’s customary ability to get the Honduran president that best suited its interests.

Castro’s government only partly fulfilled its progressive aims, not least because of the continuing power wielded by Honduras’s often corrupt elite, a judicial and security system still strongly subject to US influence, and social media campaigns which often originated in Washington. Opinion polls showed that Castro’s chosen successor as Libre Party candidate, Rixi Moncada, would be in a close race with the right-wing candidates of the two traditional parties, the Liberals’ Salvador Nasralla and the National Party’s Nasry Asfura. Trump favoured Asfura, effectively the successor to Juan Orlando Hernández, as the candidate most attuned to his policies.

The fact that the November 30 election took place at the height of the US military build-up in the Caribbean was itself a crucial ingredient in determining the outcome. Both right-wing candidates were able to warn Hondurans that a vote for Libre would be an invitation to the US military to turns its guns on them. Trump emboldened them by asking on Truth Social, “Will Maduro and his Narcoterrorists take over another country like they have taken over Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela?” According to him, a vote for Asfura would ensure that Honduras did not face the same potential fate as Venezuela. “Tito and I can work together to fight the Narcocommunists,” he added. “I cannot work with Moncada and the Communists.” Nor, apparently, could he even trust Nasralla, whom he described as “borderline communist.”

The president then trumped this statement by declaring that only if Asfura won would US aid for Honduras continue. “If he doesn’t win, the United States will not be throwing good money after bad,” he said. When Nasralla appeared to have edged ahead of Asfura, in a close count, Trump said that it “looks like Honduras is trying to change the results of their Presidential Election,” adding, “If they do, there will be hell to pay!” Then, in a night “marked by technical failures and tension in the results system,” the count suddenly gave the lead to Asfura. The International Observation Mission of the American Association of Jurists asserted that Trump’s intervention “has placed the legitimacy of the democratic process in crisis.”

In an even more extraordinary move, Trump announced that he would be pardoning the disgraced former president Hernández, who has indeed since walked free from prison. A move that might have harmed the National Party appears instead to have been an astute boost to Asfura’s campaign, given that many of his supporters still idolize Hernández and regard Asfura as an inferior leader. However, Mike Vigil, a former senior official in the US Drug Enforcement Agency, told the Guardian that pardoning Hernández “shows that the entire counter-drug effort of Donald Trump is a charade.” Activist and author Dana Frank told the Guardian that “his repressive, thieving, dictatorial history, backed by the United States year after year, has evaporated from the story.”

Another, very effective but little publicized intervention appears to have taken place, if Rixi Moncada’s claim in an interview with Telesur is correct. According to her, huge numbers of the 2.5 million Hondurans who receive remittances from family members in the US were warned that, if Libre won, they would not receive their December payments. The magnitude of the threat (whether or not it could have been carried out in practice) is indicated by the fact that remittances account for a quarter of Honduras’s GDP. It seems possible that many poor households’ votes, which might have gone to Libre, didn’t – because of text messages sent directly to their phones.

That electoral fraud would again favour the US-supported candidate was indicated in the run up to November 30 by leaked audios implicating the National Party’s representative on the national election council. The council’s Libre representative, Marlon Ochoa, who denounced that planned fraud, has now published a detailed account of irregularities since counting started, which he claims invalidate 86 per cent of polling returns. Indeed, at the time of writing, following a week of technical problems in vote counting, there is still no official winner.

Rixi Moncada harshly questioned the silence of the electoral observation missions from the Organization of America States and European Union, which she accused of deliberately omitting any reference to Trump’s interference in their bulletins on the conduct of the election. “So far they have not commented on the intervention of the U.S. president in their reports,” Moncada claimed, noting their attitude “borders on complacency.” New York Times interviews with Hondurans showed clearly that Trump’s comments influenced their votes. Mark Weisbrot, of the US Centre for Economic and Policy Research, pointed out that his interventions were “a violation of Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the United States is a signatory.”

Emboldened by his apparent success in defeating “communism,” even if (at the time of writing) he may not yet have secured the victory of his preferred neoliberal candidate, Trump has gone on to publish his own “corollary” to the century-old Monroe Doctrine, endorsing its claims to a unique US sphere of influence covering the whole region. Echoing the 1904 corollary to the doctrine issued by President Roosevelt, which declared that the US would be a “hemispheric police power,” Trump says he is “proudly reasserting” control over “our hemisphere,” guarding the American continents “against communism, fascism, and foreign infringement.”

Nothing could be a clearer manifestation of what has been called the “Donroe Doctrine” than the military build-up in the Caribbean, which provided the threatening backdrop to the final weeks of the Honduran election campaign. As Roger Harris and I noted in a recent article, the deployment of one-fifth of US maritime power is aimed not just at Venezuela, but at starting a wider domino effect in the Caribbean basin. In the aftermath of November’s election night in Honduras, the first domino appears to have fallen.

John Perry has written for The NationLondon Review of BooksGuardian, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, CounterPunchGrayzone and other outlets. He is based in Masaya, Nicaragua.

Trump’s pardon of an ex-Honduran president is shocking.

So is the history of US support for him. Obama, Trump, and Biden stood by their man in Tegucigalpa for the eight vicious, destructive years he was in power

By Dana Frank, 6 Dec, 2025

The Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/dec/06/trump-honduras-juan-orlando-hernandez reproduced by Rights Action on 8th December 2025.

Since President Trump first announced the pardon of former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández last Friday, the media has been wading through the long list of criminal acts that led to Hernández’s 2024 conviction for drug trafficking, money laundering and arms dealing.

Trump’s outrageous pardon is being contrasted with his unlawful, aggressive attacks on boats allegedly trafficking drugs for the government of Venezuela.

Missing from the narrative, though, are the other illegal acts committed by Hernández that weren’t about drug trafficking and thus didn’t fall under the justice department’s anti-drug mandate when it charged and convicted him in the southern district of New York. Many are the crimes of Juan Orlando Hernández, and ruinous.

And long is the history of US support for him in full knowledge of those crimes. Presidents Obama, Trump and Biden all stood by their man in Honduras for the eight vicious, destructive years he was in power. They ignored his drug connections, supported the military and police that kept him in power through state terror, and countenanced his illegal re-elections. Hernández was only able to rise to power, and stay there, because of the United States government.

When Hernández was a member of congress he was part of a committee that approved the 2009 military coup that deposed the democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya. As president of congress in 2012, he led the “technical coup” in which four out of five members of the constitutional branch of the supreme court were illegally and replaced with his loyalists.

Hernández won the presidency in a dubious 2013 election. Two years later it was revealed that he and his party stole as much as $300m from the national health service to pay for their campaigns, bankrupting it.

Under his watch, the criminal justice system crumbled; gangs, violence, extortion and murder proliferated.

In 2017, Hernández ran for re-election even though the constitution strictly forbade it. When the majority of the results had been counted in that election and his opponent was clearly ahead, Hernández’s officials shut down the computers, then announced a week later that he had won by 1.7%.

In response, outraged Hondurans peacefully protested and Hernández’s security forces used live bullets for the first time in decades, killing at least 20 protesters and bystanders.

All those years Hernández was also in bed with drug traffickers. As the brave prosecutors of the southern district of New York (SDNY) have shown, he accepted huge sums from drug traffickers, including a million dollars from the famous Mexican cartel leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán. Memorably, Hernández promised to “shove the drugs right up the gringos’ noses”.

But when Hernández overthrew the supreme court in 2012, the US government looked the other way. When widespread violence erupted in the run-up to the 2013 election that Hernández falsely claimed to have won, and a recount was barred, Obama’s secretary of state, John Kerry, blessed the outcome and praised the Honduran government “for ensuring that the electoral process was generally transparent, peaceful, and reflected the will of the Honduran people”.

When Hernández ran for re-election in 2016 in complete violation of the Honduran constitution, the US embassy in Tegucigalpa announced: “The United States does not oppose President Hernández or others from presenting themselves for re-election according to Honduran democratic practices.”

And when Hernández went on to steal the 2017 election, the state department, under Trump, congratulated him on his victory.

In 2015, hundreds of thousands of people erupted in peaceful anti-corruption demonstrations demanding “FUERA JOH!” (Hernández Out!). Days after the biggest single march in the capital, the US ambassador, James Nealon, stood next to Hernández in a matching guayabera shirt at the embassy’s big Fourth of July party and announced very deliberately: “Relations between the United States and Honduras are perhaps the best in history.”

Soon after, Biden, then the vice-president, launched the “Central American Alliance for Prosperity”, rushing $250m to aid the Honduran government.

During all these years the US also poured tens of millions of dollars into the support of the Honduran military and police, shared intelligence with its military, and worked closely with figures now documented to have been collaborating with drug traffickers. Former general Julián Pacheco Tinoco, minister of security under Hernández, for example, was named explicitly during Hernández’s trial. It’s implausible to think the US wasn’t well aware of Hernández’s narco connections all these years, given its vast intelligence apparatus including the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Yet in 2017, Gen John Kelly, former head of the United States Southern Command and about to become Trump’s chief of staff, referred to Hernández as a “good friend” and a “great guy”. Adm Craig Faller, head of the United States Southern Command, after presenting a medal in December 2020 to the chief of Hernández’s armed forces in December 2020 announced: “Honduras is a trusted partner in regional efforts to combat illicit traffickers.”

Beginning in 2015, 80 Members of Congress and a dozen senators demanded that the US suspend all security aid to Honduras, but Obama, Trump and Biden kept the money flowing nonetheless.

Thanks to Trump’s shocking pardon, Hernández’s drug crimes are now more well known than ever. But the rest of his repressive, thieving, dictatorial history, backed by the United States year after year, has evaporated from the story.

Who will be held accountable up north for supporting him all those years, in yet another chapter of repressive US intervention in Latin America? Or will Hernández’s full criminal history – and US support for him – be swiftly forgotten?

Dana Frank is Professor Emerita of History at the University of California, Santa Cruz. A well-regarded senior historian, she is the author of many books on labour, women, and social justice in the US and Honduras.

U.S. Scrambles to Put Pressure on Nicaragua

By Becca Renk, in NicaNotes

December 4, 2025

[Becca Renk is originally from Idaho, USA. For 25 years, she has lived and worked in sustainable community development in Nicaragua. She coordinates the work of Casa Benjamín Linder in Managua and serves on the coordinating committee of the Nicaragua Solidarity Coalition. This article was first published in Sovereign Media at: https://sovereignmedia.online/u-s-scrambles-to-put-pressure-on-nicaragua/ ]

We are grateful to Becca for her permission to reproduce her article here on the TVOD website.

 

“We were already struggling with 18% tariffs this year, I don’t know how we could export our coffee under 100% tariffs,” René Gaitan tells me as we watch the clouds clear out over a breathtaking expanse of Nicaraguan landscape. The view from the El Porvenir worker-owned coffee cooperative stretches from Lake Managua up toward the Honduran border, dominated by the smoking crater of the Telica volcano. Gaitán is the vice president of the 51-family cooperative. (You can purchase coffee from El Porvenir Cooperative here.)

Rene Gaitán shows the developing fruit on the coffee bushes of the 51 family El Porvenir coffee cooperative in the department of Leon where he is vice-president. Photo: Becca Renk
[Follow the coffee process in the photos below.]

The co-op is remote; its members hike or ride horseback eight kilometers to get the bus to the city of León, a three-hour ride away. But the news on 20 October that the U.S. may impose 100% tariffs on the Central American nation reached the co-op with the lightning speed of the internet on Gaitan’s smart phone, charged by solar panels.

A U.S. Trade Representative’s office (USTR) report alleges that the Nicaraguan government violates labour regulations, including “allowing use of child and forced labour, human trafficking, repression of freedom of association and collective bargaining.” Washington is using these allegations to threaten punitive measures, including 100% tariffs on goods imported from Nicaragua and suspension of all benefits for Nicaragua from the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).

The USTR report’s allegations are opaque: most are cut and pasted from reports by the U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Labour, which do not cite their sources, or from paid mouthpieces such as Manuel Orozco and Expediente Abierto. The report fails to produce evidence of the Nicaraguan government’s complacency in child or forced labour, describes chartered flights of migrants being allowed into the country on the $10 tourist visas granted to all visitors as “human trafficking,” and conflates industry trade associations with unions when describing “union arrests.” Those arrested in the description were not in fact union leaders, but instead two leaders of a business owners lobbying group who were arrested for acts of treason including requesting military interventions and planning terrorist acts with financing from foreign powers.

Karla Aguilar is picking ripe coffee (and a cacao pod) at El Porvenir. Photo: Becca Renk

Although U.S. government sources cited in the USTR report claim that the Nicaraguan government does not adequately track and publish information, the Sandinista government’s own publicly available annual reports clearly show a track record of improvements in the area of labour rights since coming back into power in 2007.

According to the Nicaraguan Ministry of Labour, between January 2007 and December 2023, Nicaragua increased child labour inspections by 4600%, and 70,452 companies signed commitments to use no child labour and to respect the rights of adolescent workers. During that same period, 1,636 new unions were formed, making the total number of workers now affiliated in unions 1.2 million, or 38% of Nicaragua’s total labour force. There was a 300% increase in workplace labour inspections and 138,374 women who were working for less than minimum wage had their salaries raised to the minimum. In total, the government accompanied workers in filing successful claims against their employers that resulted in $8.8 million in claims for workers. There have been 3,010 sessions of tripartite labour negotiations among government, business and unions, and the minimum wage has increased 550% over 17 years.

Coop member Eleuterio Rios is de-pulping coffee with a manual hand crank machine.

U.S. wants Nicaragua out of CAFTA-DR

With so many measurable advances in Nicaragua, why is the U.S. now grasping at straws to claim the country violates labour laws?

For some time, the U.S. has been engaged in hybrid warfare against the revolutionary governments of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. To date, U.S. sanctions against Nicaragua are more limited than in the other two countries, in part because Nicaragua’s participation in CAFTA-DR makes imposing unilateral trade sanctions more complicated. In fact, the legality of the 18% tariff imposed on Nicaraguan goods earlier this year is questionable under CAFTA-DR rules.

While the U.S. freezes assets of Nicaraguan officials, imposes visa bans, and restricts U.S. citizens from doing business with certain Nicaraguan entities, they cannot impose full trade sanctions without the approval of the other five countries. To exclude Nicaragua completely from CAFTA-DR would require the agreement of all its member countries, which is unlikely to happen.

An El Porvenir co-op member is drying coffee on a concrete patio. Photo: Becca Renk

As the U.S. amps up its attacks against Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, it is anxious to further pressure Nicaragua and isolate it from its neighbouring Central American countries. In order to achieve this, the U.S. hopes to sidestep the lengthy bureaucratic processes of CAFTA-DR and justify immediate action against Nicaragua with these trumped-up accusations of labour rights violations.

CAFTA-DR designed to benefit big business

The USTR threats have Nicaraguan cooperatives like El Porvenir worried. Coffee, Nicaragua’s largest export, supports 52,000 families and provides 500,000 jobs in the country. Under CAFTA-DR, even small producers have been able to export their products — including coffee, dairy, meat and beans — duty-free to the U.S.

The 20-year-old CAFTA-DR was not initially designed to benefit small farmers or cooperatives. Like the earlier North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico, CAFTA-DR was written to disproportionately benefit large U.S. businesses and was effectively imposed on the southern countries by the U.S.

Nicaragua ratified the free trade agreement in 2005 under the U.S.-client government of then-President Enrique Bolaños in a legislature controlled by his Constitutionalist Liberal Party. Elected representatives of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) party, many of whom were union leaders, cast 37 of the 38 votes against ratifying the trade agreement.

However, FSLN lawmakers worked to pass complementary implementation legislation for CAFTA-DR in Nicaragua, which ensured that small producers and cooperatives would also have access to the benefits, not just big business.

Dolores Lopez and friends are sorting the green coffee. Photo: Becca Renk

Nicaragua beat the U.S. at its own game

While CAFTA-DR has modestly increased Nicaragua’s trade flows, those who benefited most are small producers who have been able to leverage the free trade agreement to access long-term purchasing agreements in direct partnership with U.S. markets. This has allowed farmers to negotiate a credit component into contracts to invest in adding value to their product. By purchasing machinery to process and package their own product, farmers and co-ops can cut out intermediaries, leaving more profits in the pockets of producers. (You can purchase coffee from El Porvenir Cooperative here.)

The FSLN returned to power in Nicaragua in 2007, shortly after CAFTA-DR went into effect. Combined with CAFTA-DR benefits, its efforts have turned small-scale production in the country around. The Sandinista government designed its national development plan with poverty reduction at its centre, and rolled out programs based on a trickle-up economic philosophy that focused on strengthening rural and creative economies with micro and small businesses and co-ops. Over 18 years, the country has worked to improve stability, quality and profit margins for those at the bottom of the production chain including training 95,000 farmers annually in value added products, building 800 new centres of crop collection and processing for coffee and cacao, and financing 19 agro-industrial processing centres.

Nicaragua’s resiliency strategy

In an ironic twist, U.S. consumers and corporations are likely to be the biggest losers in a trade war against Nicaragua. In a statement, the National Council of Textile Organisations pointed out that Nicaragua forms part of a $1.1 billion integrated supply chain: textiles assembled in Nicaragua use components from other CAFTA-DR countries with goods traveling up and down the isthmus to make apparel for the U.S. market. It warned that “destabilizing the U.S.-CAFTA-DR production platform would have serious implications for U.S. and regional workers, migration, economic development, and pending and future investment.”

El Porvenir co-op are members unloading organic coffee for export. Photo: Paul Mohally

While U.S. companies in Nicaragua rely on U.S. markets, Nicaraguan companies are poised to pivot to other markets. Over the past 18 years, Nicaragua has embraced a strategy of diversifying markets and as a result, the country is no longer dependent solely on the U.S. for selling its products. For example, in recent years, Panama has surpassed the U.S. as the leading investor in the country, and Nicaragua’s free trade agreement with China led to a 218.3 % increase in exports to China in its first year of implementation in 2024.

While René Gaitan and I are discussing strategies for selling El Porvenir coffee without being subject to 100% tariffs, 130 km away in Waswalí, Matagalpa, Nicaraguan Co-Minister of Foreign Affairs Valrack Jaentschke was speaking at the opening of the coffee harvest. In his remarks, Jaentschke noted that the U.S. is not the only market for coffee — this year, Nicaragua’s $1.3-billion coffee harvest will be exported to 55 different countries. He also addressed the punitive trade measures threatened by the U.S:

“The world has also been shaken by new – and old! – forms of imposition in international trade and politics…. A type of threat is emerging – or re-emerging, some would say – which respects nothing and no one in its eagerness to dismantle the international system that nations have been building over the last 80 years….

“The Nicaraguan people, who have faced throughout their history all kinds of difficulties, invasions, climate impacts, and political threats, have always been able to face them successfully, trusting in our own strengths and in the unity of our people.”

In the midst of so much insecurity, one thing is certain: Nicaragua’s diplomacy, economic policies and unwavering focus on poverty reduction have created a national resiliency that will allow the country to outmanoeuver U.S. machinations once again.

You couldn’t make it up – I – the case of Rodrigo Rosenberg

This is a slightly fuller text version of Box 9.2 (p. 173) in the book. In particular this website version provides more information about the sources that may be consulted for further information about the subject.

It was a murder that spawned a macabre YouTube sensation and threatened to topple Guatemala’s government. Hitmen shot dead Rodrigo Rosenberg, a lawyer, in Guatemala City soon after he recorded a sombre video blaming his imminent assassination on President Colom.

Rosenberg was thought to be in a suicidal state, following the assassination of his close friends Khalil Musa and his daughter Marjorie Musa, the recent death of his mother and separation from his wife and children. He had been investigating the deaths of the Musas and had been romantically involved with Marjorie Musa.

An investigation by the UN International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) involved 300 officials and analysed more than 100,000 telephone calls and many videos, CCTV recordings, photographs and documents. Rosenberg had contracted his cousins Francisco José Valdés Paíz and José Estuardo Valdés Paíz to hire a hitman to carry out the murder of a supposed extortionist who was blackmailing Rosenberg. The identity of the target was allegedly unknown to the Valdés Paíz brothers, but they are now seen as the masterminds of the murder and are currently avoiding arrest. The machinations involved in the scheme would be of great fascination to dramatists, conspiracy theorists and fantasists, but are far too complex to be detailed here.

Ultimately the hit was carried out by a group led by Willian Gilberto Santos Divas, a former member of the police. Rosenberg was shot three times in the head, once in the neck and once in the back. In September 2009, nine suspects, including members of the police and military, were arrested for the murder.

The CICIG investigation concluded that the lawyer, in a state of depression over personal problems and angry with the government, sacrificed his own life in an elaborate sting. Rosenberg made the video knowing that two days later assassins he had hired would ambush him near his home. He apparently hoped the video would render him a martyr.

The Head of CICIG, Carlos Castresana, said they had found no evidence to link the President to Rosenberg’s death.


Sources:
CICIG (2010) ‘Caso Rosenberg: Resultados de la Investigación’, Guatemala City, United Nations CICIG, 12 January 2010.
Rory Carroll (2009) ‘Lawyer in YouTube murder plot video hired his own assassins – UN’, The Guardian, London, 14 January 2010.
Danilo Valladares (2009) ‘Guatemala: Police, Military arrested for lawyer’s murder’, IPS, 14 September 2009.
Julie Chappell (UK Ambassador to Guatemala) (2010) ‘The Rosenberg Assassination and Justice in Guatemala’, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 13 January 2010.
Moon Travel Guide (2010) ‘Rosenberg planned his own execution, UN commission says’, 14 January 2010: www.moon.com/blogs/guatemala/ (accessed 24.01.10).
Gilberto López (2010) ‘La frase lapidaria, ……’, Semanario Universidad, www.semanario.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/mainmenu-mundo/ (accessed 10.01.10).
Martin Barillas (2010) ‘Guatemala: murdered lawyer planned his own death’, Spero News, 12 January 2010, www.speroforum.com/a/25412/ (accessed 24.01.10).
Central American Politics (2010) ‘Rosenberg orchestrated his own murder?’, 12 January 2010, http://centralamericanpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/01/ (accessed 24.01.10).